U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals

OMB #1125-0002
Notice of Appeal from a Decision of an Immigration Judge

1. List Names and Alien Numbers (A-Numbers) of all Respondents/Applicants.

Oscar Patricio Azogue Martinez, A-number 245-892-413

WARNING: Names and A-Numbers for everyone appealing the Immigration Judge's decision must be written in item #1. The names and A-Numbers listed will be the only ones considered to be the subjects of the appeal.

2. I am ☑ the Respondent/Applicant ☐ DHS-ICE *(Mark only one box.)*

3. I am ☐ DETAINED ☑ NOT DETAINED *(Mark only one box).*

4. My last hearing was at: immigration Court, Buffalo, New York. *(Location, City, State)*

5. **What decision are you appealing?**

Mark only one box below. If you want to appeal more than one decision, you must use more than one Notice of Appeal (Form EOIR-26).

☑ I am filing an appeal from the Immigration Judge's decision *in **merits** proceedings* (example: removal, deportation, exclusion, asylum, etc.) dated 10/13/2026

☐ I am filing an appeal from the Immigration Judge's decision *in **bond** proceedings* dated _____ (For DHS use only: Did DHS invoke the automatic stay provision before the Immigration Court? ☐ Yes ☐ No)

☐ I am filing an appeal from the Immigration Judge's decision ***denying a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider*** dated _____

☐ I am filing an ***interlocutory appeal*** from the Immigration Judge's decision dated _____

(Please attach a copy of the Immigration Judge's decision that you are appealing.)

Form EOIR-26
Rev. Mar. 2026
Exp. 12/31/2028

6. State in detail the reasons for this appeal. Please refer to the General Instructions at item F for further guidance. You are not limited to the space provided below; use more sheets of paper if necessary. Write your name(s) and A-Number(s) on every additional sheet.

Respondent, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby submits the following reasons for appeal, in response to the Immigration Judge's (IJ) pretermission and denial of Respondent's applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and subsequent order of removal.

The IJ's decision, dated October 13, 2026, was based on the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Motion to Pretermit filed under Matter of H-A-A-V-, 29 I&N Dec. 233 (BIA 2025).

Respondent respectfully presents the following grounds for this appeal:

1. The IJ erred in granting DHS's motion without explaining how the facts and procedural posture of this case fit within Matter of H-A-A-V-, 29 I&N Dec. 233 (BIA 2025). The order does not identify which of Respondent's allegations, accepted as true, fail to establish prima facie eligibility, and it does not address the arguments raised in Respondent's opposition, including the disputed material facts, binding Second Circuit precedent, and due process. An IJ must consider the parties' arguments and render findings sufficient to permit meaningful review. See Matter of S-H-, 23 I&N Dec. 462 (BIA 2002). Whether the IJ's reasoning is adequate is a question of law that the Board reviews de novo. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii).

The remaining grounds for appeal are provided in the additional sheets attached to this Notice of Appeal.

(Attach additional sheets if necessary)

WARNING: You must clearly explain the specific facts and law on which you base your appeal of the Immigration Judge's decision. The Board may summarily dismiss your appeal if it cannot tell from this Notice of Appeal, or any statements attached to this Notice of Appeal, why you are appealing.

7. Do you desire oral argument before the Board of Immigration Appeals? ☑ Yes ☐ No

WARNING: If you mark "Yes" in item #7, you should also include in your statement in item #6 why you believe your case warrants review by a three-member panel. The Board ordinarily will not grant a request for oral argument unless you also file a brief.

8. Do you intend to file a separate written brief or statement after filing this Notice of Appeal? ☑ Yes ☐ No

WARNING: If you mark "Yes" in Item #8, you will be expected to file a written brief or statement after you receive a briefing schedule from the Board. The Board may summarily dismiss your appeal if you do not file a brief or statement within the time set in the briefing schedule.

9. Signature of Person Appealing (or attorney or representative):

Print Name: Oscar Patricio Azogue Martinez

Sign Here: 

Date: 10/21/2026

10. Mailing Address of Respondents/Applicants:

Name: Oscar Patricio Azogue Martinez

Street Address: 5440 W Ridge Rd

Apartment or Room Number:

City, State, Zip Code: Spencerport, NY 14559

Telephone Number: (585) 802-9113

NOTE: You must notify the Board within five (5) business days if you move to a new address or change your telephone number. You must use the Change of Address Form/Board of Immigration Appeals (Form EOIR-33/BIA).

11. Mailing Address of Attorney or Representative for the Respondents/Applicants:

Name: Otavio Haverroth Silva

Street Address: 5051 La Jolla Blvd.

Suite or Room Number: Suite 202

City, State, Zip Code: San Diego, CA, 92109

Telephone Number: (510) 2419336

Email: otavio@yousalaw.com

NOTE: If an attorney or representative signs this appeal for you, he or she must file *with this appeal*, a Notice of Entry of Appearance as Attorney or Representative Before the Board of Immigration Appeals (Form EOIR-27).

12. **PROOF OF SERVICE**
You must complete this section.

I Otavio Haverroth Silva

mailed or delivered a copy of this Notice of Appeal on N/A

to Assistant Chief Counsel of DHS - ICE

at N/A

☑ No service needed. I electronically filed this document, and the opposing party is participating in ECAS.

SIGN HERE: 

NOTE: If you are the Respondent or Applicant, the "Opposing Party" is the Assistant Chief Counsel of DHS – ICE.

WARNING: If you do not complete this section properly, your appeal will be rejected or dismissed. If you do not attach a fee payment receipt or a completed Fee Waiver Request (Form EOIR-26A) to this appeal, your appeal may be rejected or dismissed.

HAVE YOU?

- [x] Read all of the General Instructions.
- [x] Provided all of the requested information.
- [x] Completed this form in English.
- [ ] Provided a certified English translation for all non-English attachments.
- [x] Signed the form.
- [x] Served a copy of this form and all attachments on the opposing party, if applicable.
- [x] Completed and signed the Proof of Service.
- [x] Attached the required fee payment receipt or Fee Waiver Request.
- [x] Attached a completed and signed EOIR-27 for each respondent or applicant represented by an attorney or representative.

ADDITIONAL SHEETS OF RESPONDENT'S REASONS FOR APPEAL - FORM EOIR-26, SECTION 6

The Respondent respectfully presents the following remaining grounds for his appeal:

2. The IJ erred in pretermitting Respondent's applications because, under the standard set out in *Matter of H-A-A-V-*, 29 I&N Dec. 233 (BIA 2025), pretermission was not appropriate in this case. Pretermission is permitted only where the applicant's factual allegations, viewed in the light most favorable to him, fail to establish prima facie eligibility, and the Board recognized that claims involving disputed factual issues "will warrant a full hearing and cross-examination." *Id.* at 238. Unlike the respondent in *H-A-A-V-*, Respondent never conceded the material facts, articulated his protected grounds in writing, and faced an express reservation by DHS to challenge his credibility. *See id.* at 235–37.

3. The IJ also erred by applying a merits standard to a prima facie inquiry. Prima facie eligibility requires only a reasonable likelihood of satisfying the requirements for relief. *Matter of H-A-A-V-*, 29 I&N Dec. at 236 (*citing Matter of L-O-G-*, 21 I&N Dec. 413, 419 (BIA 1996)). Although the IJ stated that "all the facts presented in the record are considered undisputed," the IJ repeatedly framed the question as whether Respondent had "met the burden" of establishing his claim, and went on to weigh the evidence and to resolve contested questions of fact against him, including the persecutors' motive and the government's ability and willingness to protect him. *See Matter of N-M-*, 25 I&N Dec. 526, 532 (BIA 2011).

4. The IJ misapplied the requirement that the record be viewed in the light most favorable to Respondent. Although the order recites that standard, the IJ drew the relevant inferences against him: the IJ construed against him the fact that he was not targeted until he resisted the organization's demands, read the country conditions evidence in the government's favor, and treated his decision not to report the assault as dispositive rather than crediting his stated fear of retaliation. *See Matter of H-A-A-V-*, 29 I&N Dec. at 235 n.3 (comparing the inquiry to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which assumes the truth of the allegations and gives the claimant "the full benefit of the doubt").

5. The IJ violated Respondent's statutory, regulatory, and constitutional right to a full and fair hearing. By pretermitting his applications without allowing him to testify, despite disputed material facts and a pending challenge to his credibility, the IJ denied him a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on his own behalf and the meaningful opportunity to be heard that due process requires. INA § 240(b)(4)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(c)(3)(iii); *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); . The IJ also foreclosed the credibility assessment contemplated by INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(iii). Respondent further preserves the position that pretermission of a contested asylum claim without testimony is inconsistent with the Act and the implementing regulations.

6. The IJ erred as a matter of law and fact in finding that Respondent failed to make a prima facie showing that the government of Ecuador is unable or unwilling to protect him from Los Choneros, and misapplied the governing standard. The IJ required Respondent to show that "the government of Ecuador as a whole" is unable or unwilling to protect him, and treated his decision not to report the December 29, 2023 assault as dispositive, without considering whether reporting would have been futile or dangerous in light of his allegation that the local police were infiltrated by Los Choneros. *See Matter of C-G-T-*, 28 I&N Dec. 740, 743–44 (BIA 2023). Even under the condonation or complete-helplessness standard that the IJ applied, an allegation that the local police are infiltrated by the persecutor, accepted as true, describes condonation rather than mere difficulty controlling private behavior.

7. The IJ misconstrued the country conditions evidence. The IJ read the record as establishing only "the high rate of crime and general violence in Ecuador" and the government's attempts "to fight gang crime," but the excerpts the IJ quoted describe violence at "record levels" and a government invoking an "internal armed conflict," which the Constitutional Court has questioned, to loosen human rights protections. A government's efforts against organized crime are not the same as its ability to protect a particular individual, and the IJ did not address the record evidence of the infiltration of the security forces and the judiciary by Los Choneros and other criminal organizations, or of the organization's continued operation and expansion despite the 2024 emergency measures.

8. The IJ erred as a matter of law and fact in framing Respondent's harm as generalized crime and in finding that the persecutors' motive was solely criminal. The IJ concluded that "[t]he facts of this case makes a prima facie showing the motive of the actors was criminal," which reverses the inquiry: the question is whether Respondent's allegations establish a reasonable likelihood that a protected ground was "at least one central reason" for the harm, not whether the facts could support an alternative criminal motive. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i); *Matter of J-B-N- & S-M-*, 24 I&N Dec. 208, 214 (BIA 2007). The IJ also relied on *Matter of S-E-G-*, 24 I&N Dec. 579, 587 (BIA 2008), to treat Respondent as a victim of general crime conditions, although that decision turned on its own record of indiscriminate gang violence and should not be construed as a categorical rejection of claims involving gang-related persecution, *see Matter of M-E-V-G-*, 26 I&N Dec. 227, 250–51 (BIA 2014), and Respondent alleged that he was singled out after openly and repeatedly refusing to submit to the organization's authority. A persecutor's motive is a question of fact that could not be resolved against Respondent without a hearing. *See Matter of N-M-*, 25 I&N Dec. at 532.

9. The IJ erred as a matter of law in rejecting Respondent's actual and imputed political opinion claim by applying an incorrect legal standard. The IJ adopted the Board's rule that a political opinion must concern "a discrete cause that is tied to a government of a country, including a de facto government," *Matter of D-G-E-A- & N-G-G-E-*, 29 I&N Dec. 570, 577 (BIA 2026), without applying even that standard to the record, including the country conditions evidence bearing on whether Los Choneros functions as a de facto authority and on how Respondent's open defiance of the organization would be perceived. The IJ also failed to apply binding Second Circuit precedent recognizing that a political opinion may be directed at a non-state entity that plays a role similar to that of a government, and that resistance to a gang's authority may take on a political dimension. *See Zelaya-Moreno v. Wilkinson*, 989 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2021); *Hernandez-Chacon v. Barr*, 948 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2020). Respondent preserves the position that the Board's interpretation cannot displace the Second Circuit's construction of the statute, which governs these proceedings. *See Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369 (2024); *Matter of Jose Antonio GARCIA*, 28 I&N Dec. 693, 703 (BIA 2023).

10. The IJ erred as a matter of law in rejecting the three particular social groups delineated in Respondent's Pre-Hearing Statement. The IJ did not identify the proposed groups or analyze immutability, particularity, or social distinction as to any of them, contrary to the case-by-case analysis and fact-based inquiry that the Board's precedents require. *See Matter of M-E-V-G-*, 26 I&N Dec. at 237, 251; *Matter of S-S-F-M-*, 29 I&N Dec. 207, 210 (A.G. 2025). Instead, the IJ described the groups as ones "all of which turn on his resistance to their authority" and treated them as composed of "victims of crime or those who fear crime," mischaracterizing groups defined by a completed act of open refusal that preceded, and exists independently of, the harm Respondent suffered. The IJ also relied on authorities addressing materially different groups, *see Matter of K-E-S-G-*, 29 I&N Dec. 145 (BIA 2025); *Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey*, 509 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2007), and failed to engage with the record evidence bearing on whether Ecuadorian society perceives these groups as distinct, resting instead on a generalized characterization of the claim as one of crime victimization.

11. The IJ erred as a matter of law in pretermitting Respondent's application for withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3)(A) without independent analysis, denying this mandatory form of protection solely because the asylum claim failed. Because the asylum ruling rests on the errors identified above, the withholding ruling cannot stand.

12. The IJ erred as a matter of law in failing to determine whether the harm Respondent suffered rose to the level of past persecution, which would give rise to a presumption of a future threat to his life or freedom that DHS must rebut. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(1), 1208.16(b)(1)(i)–(ii); *see Matter of C-G-T-*, 28 I&N Dec. at 744 n.5.

13. The IJ erred as a matter of law in denying protection under the CAT without independent analysis. The IJ reasoned that because Respondent had not made a prima facie showing for asylum, "it follows" that he could not satisfy the CAT standard, even though asylum was denied on nexus and state-protection grounds that are not elements of CAT protection, and the authority the IJ invoked addresses an applicant who fails to show the likelihood of harm required for asylum. *See Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft*, 357 F.3d 169, 185 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[B]ecause the CAT inquiry is independent of the asylum analysis, however, the BIA's decision with respect to an

alien's claims for asylum and withholding of removal pursuant to the INA should never, in itself, be determinative of the alien's CAT claim"). The IJ also failed to consider the evidence of past harm, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)(i), and misapplied the acquiescence standard by focusing on the absence of state actors rather than on whether public officials would acquiesce, including through willful blindness. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7); *Khouzam v. Ashcroft*, 361 F.3d 161, 171 (2d Cir. 2004); *Pierre v. Gonzales*, 502 F.3d 109, 118-119 (2nd Cir. 2007).

This appeal warrants review by a three-member panel under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(6)(ii), (iii), and (vii) because: (1) the IJ's decision is not in conformity with *Matter of H-A-A-V-*, *Matter of C-G-T-*, and binding Second Circuit precedent; (2) the appeal presents the need to clarify the limits of pretermission under *Matter of H-A-A-V-* where the material facts are disputed and DHS has reserved a challenge to credibility, as well as the application of *Matter of D-G-E-A- & N-G-G-E-* within the Second Circuit; and (3) the IJ's pretermission of Respondent's applications without a full evidentiary hearing deprived him of a meaningful opportunity to be heard, in violation of INA § 240(b)(4)(B), 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(c)(3) and the Due Process Clause, thereby requiring remand for a full and fair hearing.

Respondent reserves the right to raise additional arguments and authorities in support of these grounds in a separate written brief after review of the complete record of proceedings.



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Attorney at Law
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San Diego, CA 92109
Counsel for Respondent

Exhibit list

Exhibits: Pages:

Exhibit 1

Order of the Immigration Judge - Motion to Pretermit 1-4

Exhibit 1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW
BUFFALO IMMIGRATION COURT

Respondent Name:
AZOGUE-MARTINEZ, OSCAR PATRICIO

To:
Silva, Otavio Haverroth
5051 La Jolla BLVD
Suite 202
San Diego, CA 92109

A-Number:
245-892-413
Riders:
In Removal Proceedings
Initiated by the Department of Homeland Security
Date:
10/13/2026

ORDER OF THE IMMIGRATION JUDGE

The Department of Homeland Security has ☑ filed a motion or ☐ orally moved to pretermit the following application(s):

Asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the convention against torture

Upon considering the motion, and any opposition from the non-moving party, the motion is:

☑ granted for the following reason(s):
- ☑ Respondent has failed to establish *prima facie* eligibility for relief.
- ☑ Other:

For the purpose of the motion to pretermit, all the facts presented in the record are considered undisputed. The court finds that even viewed in the light most favorable to the respondent(s) and as undisputed, the facts and record do not establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought such that a full evidentiary hearing is warranted. Matter of H-A-A-V, 29 I&N Dec. 233 (BIA 2025).

The respondent, per his application, is afraid to return to Ecuador because he was targeted by the Los Choneros when he refused to submit to their authority and to comply with their demands for "protection payments". Exh. 2b. The respondent does not claim to have ever sought the assistance of the police or government in Ecuador. He says he did not seek assistance because he was afraid of retaliation. Id.

The court finds the respondent failed to meet his burden to establish the government of Ecuador as a whole is unable/unwilling to protect him from the Los Choneros. The respondent submitted ample country conditions evidence at Exhibits 5b. The Court has carefully reviewed the country conditions and

finds the submitted country conditions establish the high rate of crime and general violence in Ecuador, but also gives multiple examples of how the Ecuadorian government is attempting to fight gang crime and protect its citizens. Id. "Since January 2024, the government has repeatedly invoked the existence of an "internal armed conflict" in the country, which the Constitutional Court has called into question, to justify loosening human rights protections in its fight against crime. " Id. at CC 2. "Ecuador's President Noboa doubled down on his hardline security policy as violence reached record levels there. The government now plans to attack suspected drug boats off the coast." Id. at CC 13. "On January 9, President Daniel Noboa decreed a state of emergency to stem On January 9, President Daniel Noboa decreed a state of emergency to stem escalating violence from local and transnational organized crime groups. The president directed police and military forces to conduct enhanced security operations against these groups to address security threats." Id. at CC1. An applicant seeking to establish persecution based on violent conduct of a private actor must show more than the government's difficulty controlling private behavior. Matter of A-B- (I), 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G., 2018). The applicant must show that the government condoned the private actions or demonstrated an inability to protect the victims. Id. [T]he unable-or-unwilling standard requires an applicant to show more than government failure to act on a particular report of an individual crime or difficulty controlling private behavior. Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 3 16, 332 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal quotations and citation omitted). As no country, not even our own, provides its citizens with complete security from private criminal activity . . . an alien must show either that the government condoned the action or, even if it did not, that it was completely helpless to protect the victims. Id. (citing Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018)). As the respondent did not seek assistance of the police, they did not demonstrate an inability to protect the respondent. The country conditions evidence do not support the respondent's claim the government as a whole is unable/unwilling to protect him.

The court finds the respondent(s), have not met the burden to establish their membership in a protected ground was one central reason they were targeted. The facts of this case makes a prima facie showing the motive of the actors was criminal. The term "persecution" in the definition of a refugee under the Act means harm or suffering that is inflicted upon an individual in order to punish him for possessing a belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome; the word does not encompass the harm that arises out of civil or military strife in a country. Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985). One reason the respondent says he was targeted was due to his refusal to pay protection fees. The BIA has held, when criminals and criminal organizations direct harm “against anyone and everyone perceived to have interfered with, or who might present a threat to, their criminal enterprises,” a particular individual generally does not fear persecution on account of his membership in some group. See Matter of S-E-G-, 21 I&N Dec. 579, 87 (BIA 2008).

Instead, the person fears general crime conditions. Random violence and general crime are not grounds for asylum and withholding of removal. See Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 313–14 7 (2d Cir. 1999). Criminal extortion efforts do not constitute persecution "on account of" a protected ground where it is reasonable to conclude that those who threatened or harmed the respondent were not motivated by a desire to overcome a protected characteristic or belief, rather financial motivation. Matter of T-M-B-, 21 I&N Dec. 775 (BIA 1997). In Garcia-Aranda v. Garland, 53 F.4th 752 (2d Cir. 2022), the Second Circuit found that seeking money from an individual had more to do with the needs of the gang than the target. See also Quituizaca v. Garland, 52 F.4th 103 (2d Cir. 2022). The respondent also says he was targeted based on his membership in a particular social group, all of which turn on his resistance to their authority. However, the respondent does not claim to have ever been targeted or harmed until he resisted their criminal efforts to extort him. Matter of K-E-S-G, 29 I&N Dec. 145 (BIA 2025) :-It is well settled that victims of crime or those who fear crime are not members of valid social groups." Matter of H-L-S-A-, 28 I&N Dec. 228, 231 (BIA 2021); see also Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007) ("When the harm visited upon members of a group is attributable to the incentives presented to ordinary criminals rather than to persecution, the scales are tipped away from considering those people a 'particular social group' . . . ."). Matter of D-G-E-A- & N-G-G-E-, 29 I&N Dec. 570 (BIA 2026) Disapproval of or opposition to criminal gangs is not sufficient to establish a political opinion under the Immigration and Nationality Act. To establish a political opinion under the INA, an alien must have an actual or imputed belief or conviction regarding a discrete cause that is tied to a government of a country, including a de facto government. Id.

The respondent(s)' request for withholding and Convention Against Torture protection are based on the same set of facts and fear of Los Choneros in Ecuador as those presented for his request for asylum. Therefore, inasmuch as the respondent(s) have not made prima facie showing to meet the lower burden of proof required for asylum, it follows that they have also not made a prima facie showing to meet the higher clear probability standard of eligibility required for withholding of removal and protection under the convention against torture. See, e.g., Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 2010) (Because when a respondent fails to demonstrate the 'slight, though discernable, chance of persecution' required for the grant of asylum, [] he necessarily fails to demonstrate the 'clear probability of future persecution' required for withholding of removal and the more likely than not to be tortured standard required for CAT"). See also See Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439 (BIA 1987), and Matter of T-M-B, 21 I&N Dec. 775, 780 (BI A1997),

Also, the respondent(s) do not claim fear of harm by state actors. Matter of M-S-I-, 29 I&N Dec. 61 (BIA 2025), the acquiescence standard for protection

under the regulations implementing the Convention Against Torture differs from the unable-or-unwilling standard for asylum and withholding of removal; the potential for private actor violence coupled with a speculation that police cannot or will not help is insufficient to prove acquiescence. Evidence that a government has been generally ineffective in preventing or investigating criminal activities does not alone establish that a public official will acquiesce to torture. See Matter of O-A-R-G-, 29 I&N Dec. 30 (BIA 2025). The respondents therefore did not make a prima facie showing it is more likely than not they will be tortured by or at the acquiescence of the government of Ecuador, if they are returned.

☐ denied for the following reason(s):

- ☐ Respondent has established *prima facie* eligibility for the relief requested.
- ☐ Other:



Immigration Judge: Lohr, Brandi 10/13/2026

Appeal:	Department of Homeland Security:	☑	waived	☐	reserved
	Respondent:	☐	waived	☑	reserved

Appeal Due: 11/12/2026

Certificate of Service

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Respondent Name : AZOGUE-MARTINEZ, OSCAR PATRICIO | A-Number : 245-892-413

Riders:

Date: 10/13/2026 By: Cavar, Sandi, Court Staff