

HS Law Corp.
Otavio Haverroth Silva, SBN#343486
P.O. Box 90487
San Diego, CA 92169
(510) 241-9336

Non-Detained

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW
IMMIGRATION COURT
1855 Gateway Blvd., Suite 850
Concord, CA 94520

_____	)	
In the Matter of	)	
	)	
Gabriel de Freitas Silva	)	File No. A. 226-068-578
Camila Beatriz Oliveira Santos	)	File No. A. 226-068-637
	)	
In Removal Proceedings	)	
	)	
_____	)	

Immigration Judge: **Star, Shadee M.** Next Hearing Date: **August 11, 2026 at 9:00 a.m.**

**RESPONDENTS' COUNTRY CONDITIONS IN SUPPORT OF ASYLUM AND
WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL**

Exhibit list

Exhibits:

Pages:

Exhibit 1

Brief Explanation

1-5

Exhibit 2

Excerpts from Country Conditions Reports

6-20

Exhibit 3 - CC1

CC1 - Brazil 2024 Human Right Report - U.S.
Department of State

21-34

Exhibit 4 - CC2

CC2 - World Report 2026: Brazil - Human Rights
Watch

35-41

Exhibit 5 - CC3

CC3 - Brazil: Revamp Public Security Policies -
Human Rights Watch

42-43

Exhibit 6 - CC4

CC4 - Brazil: Prosecutors Should Lead Police Killings
Inquiries - Human Rights Watch

44-46

Exhibit 7 - CC5

CC5 - Why Is It So Difficult to Investigate Police
Abuses? Learn 5 reasons - BBC News Brazil

47-49

Exhibit 8 - CC6

CC6 - "Isolated Cases": Exclusive Survey Indicates
that Military Police Officers Commit at Least One
Unnecessary Act of Violence Every 2 Days in 2024 -
Laboratório Jornalismo

50-53

Exhibit 9 - CC7

CC7 - Impunity Helps Explain Abuse Of Power by 'Bad Cops', Says Expert - O Tempo 54-55

Exhibit 10 - CC8

CC8 - Brazil's profile - Insight Crime 56-60

Exhibit 11 - CC9

CC9 - Brazil Case Illustrates Struggle With Corrupt Police - Insight Crime 61-62

Exhibit 12 - CC10

CC10 - Brazil: Freedom in the World 2025 Country Report - Freedom House 63-74

Exhibit 13 - CC11

CC11 - Debate Indicates That Enforcement Failure of Protective Measures Boosts Violence - The Senate Agency 75-76

Exhibit 14 - CC12

CC12 - Public Prosecutor Denounces 9% of Death Cases by Police Intervention in SP, Says Survey - Folha de Sao Paulo 77-82

Exhibit 15 - CC13

CC13 - Military Personnel Arrested With Illegal Weapons in an Operation by the Internal Affairs Department Are Released - Estado de Minas 83-84

Exhibit 1

BRIEF EXPLANATION OF COUNTRY CONDITIONS REGARDING POLICE CORRUPTION AND VIOLENCE, CORPORATIVISM AND POLICE IMPUNITY, AND STATE (UN)PROTECTION IN BRAZIL

1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. CRIMINALITY WITHIN THE MILITARY POLICE AND THE CULTURE OF IMPUNITY.....	1
3. FAILURE OF STATE PROTECTION MECHANISMS.....	3
4. CONCLUSION.....	4

1. INTRODUCTION

Brazil's Military Police operates within a structural environment of documented institutional criminality, entrenched impunity, and systematic failure to protect those who report or are threatened by law enforcement officers. Police killed 6,393 people in 2023 alone, and between January and November 2025 that figure had already reached 5,920 (Exh. 4 – CC2) (Exh. 12 – CC10).

Despite the scale of these abuses, formal accountability remains exceptional: prosecutors file charges in only 9% of police-involved killing cases, officers are rarely convicted, and witnesses who attempt to report misconduct face documented retaliation by the very agents they seek to hold accountable. (Exh. 6 – CC4) (Exh. 7 – CC5) (Exh. 12 – CC10)

The sections below address each of these dimensions: the criminality embedded within the Military Police and the culture of institutional self-protection that sustains it, and the structural failure of Brazil's enforcement and protective mechanisms to provide meaningful recourse to those targeted by officers.

2. CRIMINALITY WITHIN THE MILITARY POLICE AND THE CULTURE OF IMPUNITY

Credible reporting establishes that criminal conduct within Brazil's Military Police (*Policia Militar*) is not limited to individual bad actors but reflects an organized and systemic

problem. The U.S. Department of State's Country Report on Human Rights Practices documents that military police officers across multiple Brazilian states have been investigated for participating in unlawful killings, torture, and criminal associations with armed groups. InSight Crime further notes that Brazilian police forces carry a well-documented "*reputation for abusiveness, lack of accountability, and low levels of public trust*", and that some officers have formed or joined criminal organizations that engage in extortion, extrajudicial killings, and territorial control. (Exh. 3 – CC1) (Exh. 10 – CC8).

InSight Crime's reporting on Operation Genesis in the state of Ceará provides one of the most detailed documented examples of organized criminality within the institution. Since the operation began in 2016, at least 63 military police officers have been formally charged with drug trafficking, robbery, weapons trafficking, and criminal association. In the most recent phase of the operation, 17 active-duty military police officers were detained for accepting bribes from a drug trafficking gang in exchange for providing privileged law enforcement intelligence that enabled the gang to dominate the drug trade across multiple municipalities in the Fortaleza metropolitan area. Those same officers were found to have sold weapons and ammunition previously seized from criminals back into the illegal market (Exh. 11 – CC9).

A culture of institutional self-protection systematically prevents accountability for officers who commit crimes or abuse their authority. Freedom House reports that police officers in Brazil are "*rarely prosecuted for abuses, and those charged are almost never convicted*" and that under a 2017 law, members of the Military Police accused of serious crimes against civilians may be tried in military rather than civilian courts, further insulating officers from meaningful accountability. (Exh. 12 – CC10)

Prosecution data confirms the scope of this impunity. Between 2011 and 2023, police officers in São Paulo were responsible for 7,920 deaths; of the 7,641 resulting inquiries, prosecutors filed charges in only 691 cases, approximately 9%. In Rio de Janeiro the proportion was lower, 3.7%, with 147 charges out of 4,014 proceedings arising from 12,789 deaths by police intervention over the same period. Paulo Malvezzi, executive coordinator of the Justice Forum, described the low rate of charges as a sign of impunity for state agents who kill. (Exh. 14 – CC12)

Expert analysis attributes this pattern directly to institutional complicity. Researcher Marcos Rolim, commenting on data showing that Military Police in Brazil committed at least 183 recorded instances of unjustifiable violence in 2024, averaging one every two days. Documented incidents include an episode in Contagem, Minas Gerais, in which officers

entering a residence pushed a woman four months pregnant to the ground and discharged a stun gun against her leg. Noted that police commands are complicit in this violence: officers act with the belief that "nothing will happen" to them, and that the recorded cases represent only the "tip of the iceberg" of actual abuses (Exh. 8 – CC6).

Public security expert Luiz Flávio Saporì similarly attributes the pattern to the absence of institutional consequences: officers who believe they will face no repercussions feel "free" to commit crimes, a dynamic further enabled by the failure of political authorities to issue clear condemnation. In its statement accompanying the World Report 2026, Human Rights Watch concluded that Brazil's public security strategy has *"failed again and again to make Brazilian neighborhoods safer; and instead have resulted in more violence and insecurity"*, calling for the dismantling of criminal organizations linked to state agents and greater independence in police investigations, an implicit acknowledgment that internal oversight mechanisms are insufficient. (Exh. 5 – CC3) (Exh. 9 – CC7)

This culture of impunity has a direct and documented effect on the ability of victims and witnesses to seek accountability. Human Rights Watch has documented numerous cases in which police officers intimidated witnesses and destroyed evidence following misconduct allegations. HRW specifically noted that victims, families, and witnesses *"may fear that providing statements to police investigators could put them at risk"* of retaliation, and that authorities have recognized the need for explicit guidelines to prevent retaliation operations by officers. (Exh. 6 – CC4)

Reporting by BBC News Brazil documents that witnesses fear being killed if they report police crimes, and that officers who have committed crimes have made direct threats by phone and driven past the homes of investigators while firing shots from vehicles. (Exh. 7 – CC5)

3. FAILURE OF STATE PROTECTION MECHANISMS

The prosecution, conviction, or formal dismissal of a police officer does not, under Brazilian conditions, translate into effective state protection for those the officer threatened. Multiple layers of the criminal enforcement system present documented, structural failures that allow offenders to remain active threats even after formal legal proceedings are initiated.

Brazilian courts also fail to execute protective orders reliably. In a public hearing before the Senate Human Rights Commission, an auxiliary judge of the National Council of Justice reported that, according to the CNJ's assessment on the application of protective

measures, 30% of courts still experience congestion in analyzing protective orders, meaning that after the 48-hour legal deadline nearly a third remain unexamined. She further reported that in 2022 alone, of 1.3 million warrants issued for protective measures of urgency, only 745,000 — 58% — were delivered to their recipients and successfully complied with, while 232,000 were returned uncomplied. Participants identified difficulty locating and subpoenaing aggressors as a chronic obstacle, noting that defendants have numerous means of evading service. (Exh. 13 – CC11)

Reporting from Minas Gerais illustrates how limited the practical consequences are. On July 1, 2025, three active-duty Military Police officers were arrested in flagrante in Belo Horizonte, Contagem, and Governador Valadares during an Internal Affairs operation investigating misconduct within the force. The charges included illegal possession of firearms and ammunition and embezzlement, and seven grenades belonging to the Military Police of Minas Gerais were found in one officer's home. All three were released one week later, on July 8, 2025, with the corporation confirming they were at liberty "awaiting due legal process." Weeks earlier, on June 17, 2025, an active-duty corporal and a retired lieutenant were arrested in Belo Horizonte on suspicion of involvement with a criminal organization and drug trafficking, with a pistol bearing a scratched-off serial number recovered at the property. This pattern of arrest followed by prompt release illustrates that formal legal action against police officers does not guarantee their removal from duty or the cessation of the threat they pose. Freedom House similarly documents that serious police abuses continued in 2024 despite existing legal frameworks. (Exh. 12 – CC10) (Exh. 15 – CC13)

Even in cases that reach the prosecution stage, charges are filed in only 9% of police-involved killing cases. In April 2025, Brazil's Supreme Court was compelled to order that prosecutors must lead investigations whenever police killings are suspected to be unlawful, an implicit recognition that prior police-led investigations systematically produced impunity rather than accountability. (Exh. 4 – CC2) (Exh. 14 – CC12)

4. CONCLUSION

Objective documentation from the U.S. Department of State, Human Rights Watch, Freedom House, InSight Crime, and Brazilian investigative media and academic researchers establishes that Brazil's Military Police operates within a structural environment characterized by: documented criminality within police ranks, including drug trafficking and weapons resale by active-duty officers operating in organized units, an entrenched culture of institutional

self-protection that systematically suppresses accountability and produces prosecution rates of only 9% for police-involved killings, reinforced by witness intimidation and retaliation that renders formal complaint mechanisms inaccessible to ordinary victims, and judicial and enforcement mechanisms that are chronically congested, delayed, and unable to guarantee the effective execution of protective orders or the removal of accused officers from active duty.

Critically, the same institutional access and authority that enables officers to commit abuses also enables them to identify, locate, monitor, and retaliate against those who report them. These conditions are consistent across multiple independent sources and reflect structural, systemic features of Brazil's public security environment.

Exhibit 2

GABRIEL DE FREITAS SILVA A#226-068-578
CAMILA BEATRIZ OLIVEIRA SANTOS A#226-068-637

EXCERPTS FROM COUNTRY CONDITIONS REPORTS

CC1

**BRAZIL 2024 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT - U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

The government did not always take credible steps to identify and punish officials who committed human rights abuses.

Section 1.

Life

a. Extrajudicial Killings

There were several reports police committed arbitrary or unlawful killings during the year.

In April, Roraima State Civil Police reported it launched an operation to dismiss a group of officers from the military police of Roraima suspected of being part of a militia and an extermination group, according to a Globo news report. More than 100 officers were investigated, and several arrests were made. The investigation examined cases in which police officers allegedly provided armed security for illegal miners, robbed and tortured competing invaders, and robbed the miner bosses themselves.

Section 3.

Security of the Person

a. Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Military police officers in Porto Alegre, capital of the state of Rio Grande do Sul, were accused of torturing Vladimir Abreu de Oliveira for approximately 40 minutes before attempting to hide his body by throwing him from a bridge in May. An investigation revealed Abreu de Oliveira suffered multiple severe injuries while alive, leading to his death. Five officers were indicted, with charges ranging from torture resulting in death to omission of assistance, and two were in preventive detention. Civil police were conducting a separate investigation.

CC2

WORLD REPORT 2026: BRAZIL - HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

Police killed 5,920 people between January and November 2025. A court ruling and a resolution that instructed prosecutors to lead investigations into police killings, instead of leaving them in the hands of the police themselves, offered hope of improved investigations.

While some police killings are in self-defense, many result from illegal use of force. Inadequate investigations into those cases, carried out by the police themselves, result in impunity for abuses.

In April, the Supreme Court ordered prosecutors to lead investigations whenever there is “suspicion” that police

were responsible for an unlawful killing. In May, the CNMP published a resolution detailing how prosecutors should conduct these investigations to ensure they are thorough and independent.

In February, Rio de Janeiro's new attorney general reestablished a unit of prosecutors tasked with overseeing police conduct.

In seven states and the federal district, official forensic units remain fully subordinated to civil police, a set-up that does not accord them the necessary independence, particularly in police abuse cases. Forensic units in other states have varying degrees of independence from police.

CC3

BRAZIL: REVAMP PUBLIC SECURITY POLICIES - HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

Brazilian authorities should adopt new public security strategies that dismantle criminal organizations and their alleged links with state agents, enhance independent criminal investigations, and spur reforms to make police more effective at upholding the law.

Public security strategies based on unchecked use of lethal force by police have failed again and again to make Brazilian neighborhoods safer, and instead have resulted in more violence and insecurity,” said César Muñoz, Brazil director at Human Rights Watch.

Abuses committed by police, as well as corruption within

the force, make communities distrust law enforcement and less likely to report crimes and collaborate with investigations.

CC4

BRAZIL: PROSECUTORS SHOULD LEAD POLICE KILLINGS INQUIRIES - HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

Human Rights Watch has documented scores of cases in which police officers intimidated witnesses, or manipulated and destroyed evidence, including by taking bodies to hospitals falsely claiming the victims were still alive and removing the victim's clothes; as well as cases in which civil police failed to conduct adequate investigations into police killings, for instance by not visiting the crime scene.

The resolution should also call on prosecutors to take statements from victims, families, and witnesses, some of whom may fear that providing statements to police investigators could put them at risk. The resolution should also allow victims and relatives to obtain key information about the investigations, within the bounds of the law, and require states to create accessible complaint mechanisms to report police misconduct, including anonymously.

Human Rights Watch has found that police abuse takes a heavy toll not only on the victims and their families, but also on the police force itself. Prosecutors should work with police forces to assess the working conditions and address the high levels of stress.

They should also review state police protocols, and work with police command and secretaries of public security to

enact guidelines to prevent that police officers conduct retaliation operations after the killing of a police officer.

CC5

WHY IS IT SO DIFFICULT TO INVESTIGATE POLICE ABUSES? LEARN 5 REASONS - BBC NEWS BRAZIL

Investigating and punishing police officers who commit crimes is one of the biggest challenges facing Brazilian public security agencies, according to experts interviewed by BBC Brazil. Among the greatest difficulties involved in the process are confronting police corporatism and convincing witnesses to overcome their fear and testify against law enforcement officers responsible for crimes.

"Investigating abuses and crimes committed by police officers is difficult because a culture of self-protection and immunity regarding these crimes prevails," says Átila Roque, executive director of Amnesty International in Brazil.

Across the country, cases of police officers being caught accepting bribes, involved in robberies, and even acting as "bodyguards" for criminals are relatively common. However, the crime that most worries human rights organizations and police officers tasked with investigating their own colleagues is murder committed by police officers.

Fear of witnesses

One of the most difficult tasks in investigating homicides committed by police officers is finding witnesses willing to come forward to the authorities. Especially in more peripheral regions, people who have witnessed police abuses fear being murdered if they report these crimes to oversight bodies or the courts.

Corporateism

Corporate solidarity is one of the factors that weakens the performance of oversight bodies and makes it difficult for police officers to report colleagues who commit illegal acts.

But the silence of colleagues and the lack of action are not the only problems faced by those investigating their own police force. **According to police officers interviewed for this report, the political climate in a state can, on certain occasions, influence the willingness of superiors to encourage or discourage the investigation and punishment of police officers who have committed a crime.**

In some more serious cases, the threats made by suspected police officers are not limited to witnesses of their crimes. Police officers in charge of investigating colleagues told reporters that they have either received threats themselves or have friends who have been victims of this type of action.

According to them, police officers who have committed crimes go so far as to make threats by phone and even drive by in vehicles firing shots near the homes of investigators.

**“ISOLATED CASES”: EXCLUSIVE SURVEY
INDICATES THAT MILITARY POLICE OFFICERS
COMMIT AT LEAST ONE UNNECESSARY ACT OF
VIOLENCE EVERY 2 DAYS IN 2024 -
LABORATÓRIO JORNALISMO**

183 incidents were recorded in 2024 in which one or more military police officers acted in a brutal manner or with excessive violence. The average is one incident every two days. These are only the cases where the actions of the Military Police are not justifiable and the fact is related to the exercise of the profession or to the culture of violence and abuse of power established within the corporation. Approximately 400 military police officers actively participated in the acts that victimized more than 270 people throughout Brazil.

In Contagem, Minas Gerais, a young woman, four months pregnant and whose identity was not revealed, was at home with her boyfriend, a 20-year-old supermarket stocker, when police entered the house looking for the man, allegedly involved in an attempted homicide. The police officers tried to forcibly remove the young woman from the sofa where she was sitting, provoking an aggressive reaction from her boyfriend. During the ensuing struggle, one of the officers pushed the pregnant woman, who fell to the ground. Furthermore, a stun gun was discharged, hitting her leg.

IMPUNITY HELPS EXPLAIN ABUSE OF POWER BY 'BAD COPS', SAYS EXPERT - JORNAL O TEMPO

The number of prior offenses committed by the military police officer suspected of killing Marcos Vinicius Vieira Couto, 29, in Vila Barraginha, Contagem, in the metropolitan region of Belo Horizonte, exemplifies the impunity enjoyed by some officers, which ultimately leads to the commission of other crimes. This analysis comes from public security expert Luiz Flávio Saporì, who calls for a more forceful condemnation of this type of practice by public authorities.

According to Saporì, the abuse of power occurs because some professionals feel "free" to act in this way and end up receiving approval even from the President of the Republic. "Bad professionals are coming to light more often," he comments.

To change this reality, the expert advocates for a "strong message" from public authorities. "I see a certain lack of leadership from the Military Police and the Minas Gerais government. They are not being very forceful in condemning the abuses. A strong statement from the Secretary of Security and the Governor is needed, emphasizing that they will not tolerate such attitudes. Those on the front lines understand the message from the political authority. They are very much sitting on the fence," he reflects.

BRAZIL'S PROFILE - INSIGHT CRIME

Militias, largely comprised of current and former police officers, are another source of violent crime, extorting whole neighborhoods and committing extrajudicial killings.

Security Forces

Brazil's military is the largest in Latin America. Its primary role is enforcing border control, but the country's large size, combined with the remoteness of its border regions and a lack of capacity on the part of neighboring nations, makes this difficult.

Brazilian police forces have a reputation for abusiveness, lack of accountability, and low levels of public trust. They frequently face accusations of extrajudicial killings, and innocent bystanders are often caught in the crossfire of shootouts between security forces and criminals.

Corruption also poses a challenge for many Brazilian security institutions. Police and soldiers often work with organized crime groups, or form their own criminal organizations, as in the case of the militias.

Judicial System

Brazil's judicial system has federal and state courts, as well as courts specialized in military, labor-related, and electoral

matters. The country's highest court is the Supreme Federal Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal).

Most courts are slow, corrupt, and generally ineffective. Pretrial detention is common for criminal suspects, contributing to problems in the prison system.

CC9

BRAZIL CASE ILLUSTRATES STRUGGLE WITH CORRUPT POLICE - INSIGHT CRIME

On February 2, 17 members of the military police and 14 suspected drug traffickers were detained in the state of Ceará during the latest round of Operation Genesis, an ongoing security operation aiming to dismantle corruption within the police.

The detained officers were allegedly bribed by a drug trafficking gang for “privileged information” on their criminal rivals, allowing the gang to dominate the drug trade in parts of Ceará’s state capital, Fortaleza, as well as in the municipalities of Caucaia, Pacatuba, and Maranguape, according to a press release by the Ceará Attorney General’s Office. The officers also sold weapons and ammunition that they had seized from criminals, the press release stated.

The number of arrested police has piled up since Operation Genesis began in 2016. At least 63 military police officers have faced charges of drug trafficking, robbery, weapons trafficking, and criminal association.

In parallel, 120 police officers, prison guards, and firefighters have been fired in Ceará on suspicion of various criminal and administrative charges.

In November 2022, a three-part podcast, “Maçãs Podres” (Rotten Apples), by Brazil’s regional newspaper, Diário do Nordeste, detailed how deep these connections run. **In the podcast, the newspaper explained that specialized squads of complicit police officers and prison guards form corrupt relationships with criminal groups inside prison and on the streets.**

“Criminal groups within police forces across Brazil have grown, [and] many cases have been identified in states such as Pará, Amazonas, Mato Grosso do Sul, and Ceará,” said Bruno Paes Manso, an expert on Brazilian organized crime dynamics at the University of São Paulo’s Center for the Study of Violence (Núcleo de Estudos da Violência – NEV).

CC10

BRAZIL: FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2025 COUNTRY REPORT - FREEDOM HOUSE

Brazil saw 22.8 intentional violent deaths per 100,000 inhabitants in 2023 according to the Brazilian Public Security Yearbook, which was most recently released by the Brazilian Public Security Forum (FBSP) in July 2024. According to the report, 46,328 such deaths were recorded in 2023.

The police force remains mired in corruption, and serious police abuses, including extrajudicial killings, continued in 2024. Police officers are rarely prosecuted for abuses, and those charged are almost never convicted. The FBSP counted 6,393 deaths caused by police in 2023 in its Brazilian Public Security Yearbook.

CC11

**DEBATE INDICATES THAT ENFORCEMENT
FAILURE OF PROTECTIVE MEASURES BOOSTS
VIOLENCE - THE SENATE AGENCY**

The effectiveness of these judicial measures finds some gaps that often benefit defendants, aggressors. We have trouble subpoenaing the defendant. He has a thousand subterfuges to escape.

According to the National Council of Justice's (CNJ) Assessment on the Application of Protective Measures (CNJ) report, 30% of the courts still have a "congestion" in the analysis of protective measures.

- So, the 48 hours pass, 30% of them have not yet been analyzed. You can't have that congestion not analyzed. The time of the process, for us the National Council of Justice, means protection for women - prevention and protection - said the auxiliary judge of the presidency of the National Council of Justice (CNJ), Luciana Lopes Rocha.

In 2022 alone, 1.3 million warrants were served on a protective measure of urgency, of which 745 thousand were

delivered to the recipients (58%), were successfully complied with, and 232 thousand were returned due to the non-compliance with this diligence. We have, here, to draw attention to the importance of updated data in the process. As a titular judge of domestic and family violence, in every hearing, in every contact with the parties, we need to ask: What is your updated address? What is your updated phone? And the judicial officers also always have to bring that information,” he warned.

CC12

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR DENOUNCES 9% OF DEATH CASES BY POLICE INTERVENTION IN SP, SAYS SURVEY - FOLHA DE SAO PAULO

Police officer from São Paulo were responsible for 7,920 deaths in the state from 2011 to 2023. But the 7,641 inquires turned prosecution complaint in 691 cases, about 9% of the total. In Rio de Janeiro this proportion was lower, of 3.7% with 147 complaints compared to 4,014 open procedures amid 12,789 deaths from police intervention in the same period.

Wanted by Folha, the agency stated that it is still systematizing this type of data according to April resolution of the National Council of the Public Ministry of April this year that organizes “crimes occurred as a result or in the context of interventions of public security agencies.”

The low proportion of complaints in relation to the procedures is a sign of impunity for state agents who kill,

according to the lawyer and executive coordinator of the Justice Forum, Paulo Malvezzi.

CC13

**MILITARY PERSONNEL ARRESTED WITH
ILLEGAL WEAPONS IN AN OPERATION BY THE
INTERNAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT ARE
RELEASED - ESTADO DE MINAS**

The three active-duty military police officers arrested in the act of illegally carrying a firearm on July 1st have been released. This information was confirmed to the press by the Military Police of Minas Gerais on Tuesday (July 8th). **The men were detained in Belo Horizonte, Contagem, and Governador Valadares, in the Vale do Rio Doce region, during an operation by the corporation's Internal Affairs Department investigating misconduct by officers.**

In Belo Horizonte, a police officer was arrested for illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition. In the metropolitan area, a second officer was arrested for the same crime as the first. In addition, he was arrested for embezzlement.

Misconduct

In less than two months, other active and reserve military police officers were arrested for misconduct. On June 17, two officers, an active-duty corporal and a retired lieutenant, father and son in this case, were arrested in the São Geraldo neighborhood, in the

eastern region of Belo Horizonte. They are suspected of involvement with a criminal organization and drug trafficking.

Exhibit 3 - CC1

Brazil 2024 Human Rights Report

Executive Summary

The human rights situation in Brazil declined during the year. The courts took broad and disproportionate action to undermine freedom of speech and internet freedom by blocking millions of users' access to information on a major social media platform in response to a case of harassment. The government undermined democratic debate by restricting access to online content deemed to "undermine democracy," disproportionately suppressing the speech of supporters of former president Jair Bolsonaro as well as journalists and elected politicians, often in secret proceedings that lacked due process guarantees. The government also suppressed politically disfavored speech on the basis that it constituted "hate speech," a vague term untethered to international human rights law.

Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: arbitrary or unlawful killings; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest or detention; and serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against journalists.

The government did not always take credible steps to identify and punish officials who committed human rights abuses.

Section 1. Life

a. Extrajudicial Killings

There were several reports police committed arbitrary or unlawful killings during the year. Some killings were attributed to a police operation against transnational criminal organizations in Sao Paulo State in the first half of the year and a police operation that took place from July 2023 to April in Baixada Santista, a coastal area including the port city of Santos.

In July, a São Paulo court charged two officers from a police shock battalion (ROTA) with aggravated homicide and obstructing evidence in the death of Fábio Oliveira Ferreira, who was killed in the operation in July 2023. One defendant was Captain Marcos Correa de Moraes Verardino, one of the coordinators of the operation, who allegedly fired three shots at Ferreira after he had surrendered. The other defendant, Corporal Ivan Pereira da Silva, also of ROTA, allegedly shot the victim twice in the chest while the victim was lying on the ground. In December, the two defendants were acquitted by courts in São Paulo State. The São Paulo Public Prosecutor's Office of appealed the decision, and higher courts were considering that appeal at year's end.

In April, Roraima State Civil Police reported it launched an operation to dismiss a group of officers from the military police of Roraima suspected of being part of a militia and an extermination group, according to a *Globo*

news report. More than 100 officers were investigated, and several arrests were made. The investigation examined cases in which police officers allegedly provided armed security for illegal miners, robbed and tortured competing invaders, and robbed the miner bosses themselves.

There were developments in the politically motivated 2018 killing of city councilwoman Marielle Franco and her driver Anderson Gomes, in Rio de Janeiro. In March, police arrested Chiquinho Brazão, a Federal Chamber deputy (representative), and his brother, Domingos Brazão, a member of the Rio de Janeiro State Audit Court, for their alleged role in ordering the 2018 killing of Franco. The brothers remained in custody and were charged with qualified homicide and attempted homicide. Rivaldo Barbosa, who was the chief of police of Rio de Janeiro when Franco was killed, was also arrested in March for allegedly helping plan the killing and for obstruction of justice. In November, two former police officers were sentenced for the killings. Ronnie Lessa was sentenced to 78 years and nine months for firing the shots that killed Franco and Gomes and injured one of Franco's aides. Élcio de Queiroz was sentenced to 59 years and eight months for driving the getaway car.

b. Coercion in Population Control

There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.

Section 2. Liberty

a. Freedom of the Press

The constitution and law provided for freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media. Supreme Court (STF) rulings, however, restricted the freedom of expression for individuals it deemed to be in violation of the law prohibiting antidemocratic speech.

Censorship by Governments, Military, Intelligence, or Police Forces, Criminal Groups, or Armed Extremist or Rebel Groups

The law prohibited politically motivated judicial censorship, but there were reports of censorship. The government censored online content deemed in violation of STF orders, which instructed platforms to remove content that allegedly spread misinformation related to the electoral system or judicial institutions or to disparage judicial officials with online threats or harassment. Court records reveal that Justice Alexandre de Moraes personally ordered the suspension of more than 100 user profiles on the social media platform X (formerly Twitter), disproportionately suppressing the speech of advocates of former president Jair Bolsonaro instead of taking narrower measures to penalize content that incited imminent lawless action or harassment. The government telecommunications regulator Anatel ordered internet service providers to block X by order of the STF on August

31, after the company failed to appoint a legal representative and pay outstanding fines for failure to remove content in compliance with orders issued by the STF and the Superior Electoral Court. The STF authorized fines of 50,000 reais (\$9,000) per day to individuals or companies who accessed the platform via a virtual private network (VPN), although no fines were reportedly assessed. The STF authorized X to resume its operations in the country on October 8 after the company complied with court orders and paid outstanding fines. Other media companies were subject to similar content removal orders. This broad repression blocked Brazilians' access to information and viewpoints on a range of national and global issues. Additionally, the court's temporary prohibition on the use of a VPN, under penalty of fine, further eroded freedom of the press by removing privacy protections from individuals whose ability to blow the whistle on government corruption hinged on their capacity to do so anonymously.

Nongovernmental criminal elements at times subjected journalists to threats or violence due to the journalists' reporting on their criminal activities.

b. Worker Rights

Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining

The law provided for freedom of association for all workers (except members of the military, military police, and firefighters), the right to

bargain collectively with some restrictions, and the right to strike. The law prohibited antiunion discrimination, including the dismissal of employees who were candidates for, or holders of, union leadership positions, and it required employers to reinstate workers fired for union activity.

New unions were required to register with the Ministry of Labor, which would accept the registration unless objections were filed by other unions. The law stipulated certain restrictions, such as *unicidade* (in essence, one union per occupational category per city), which limited freedom of association by prohibiting multiple, competing unions of the same professional category in a single geographical area. Unions that represented workers in the same geographical area and professional category could contest another union's registration.

The law stipulated a strike could be ruled "disruptive" by the labor court and the union could be subjected to legal penalties if the strike violated certain conditions, such as if the union failed to notify employers at least 48 hours before the beginning of a walkout or end a strike after a labor court decision. Employers were not allowed to hire substitute workers during a legal strike or fire workers for strike-related activity, provided the strike was not ruled abusive as defined in the law.

The law obliged a union to negotiate on behalf of all registered workers in the professional category and geographical area it represented, regardless of whether an employee paid voluntary membership dues. The law included

collective bargaining rights, such as the ability to negotiate a flexible hourly schedule and work remotely. The law permitted the government to reject clauses of collective bargaining agreements that conflicted with government policy.

Freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining were generally respected, according to observers. Collective bargaining was widespread in establishments in the private sector.

In the view of nongovernmental organization (NGO) experts, the government usually effectively enforced applicable laws, and penalties were commensurate with those for other laws involving denials of civil rights, such as discrimination. Penalties were regularly applied against violators.

Forced or Compulsory Labor

See the Department of State's annual *Trafficking in Persons Report* at <https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/>.

Acceptable Work Conditions

Wage and Hour Laws

The law provided for a minimum wage, which was higher than the official poverty income level. The law limited the workweek to 44 hours and specified a weekly rest period of 24 consecutive hours, preferably on Sundays. The law also provided for paid annual vacation, prohibited

excessive compulsory overtime, limited overtime to two hours per workday, and stipulated any hour worked above the monthly limit had to be compensated with at least time-and-a-half pay; these provisions generally were enforced for all groups of workers in the formal sector. The constitution also provided for the right of domestic employees to work a maximum of eight hours per day and 44 hours per week, and to receive a minimum wage, a lunch break, social security, and severance pay.

Occupational Safety and Health

The Ministry of Labor set occupational safety and health (OSH) standards that were consistent with internationally recognized norms, although unsafe working conditions were prevalent throughout the country, especially in construction, according to media reports. The law required employers to establish internal committees for accident prevention in workplaces. Inspectors identified unsafe conditions and responded to worker complaints, but the number of inspections conducted was lower than necessary. The law also prohibited firing employees for their committee activities. Workers could remove themselves from situations that endangered their health or safety without jeopardy to their employment, although those in forced labor situations without access to transportation were particularly vulnerable to situations that endangered their health and safety.

Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement

The Ministry of Labor addressed problems related to minimum wage, overtime, and OSH laws. In the view of NGO experts, officials effectively enforced OSH laws. Penalties for violations included fines that varied widely depending on the nature of the violation. Penalties were in general commensurate with similar crimes such as fraud or negligence. Penalties were regularly applied against violators. The number of labor inspectors was insufficient to enforce compliance, according to the Labor Inspectors Union. Inspectors had the authority to make unannounced inspections and initiate sanctions.

According to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, the informal sector represented almost 40 percent of the workforce.

Gig workers were not considered employees, and food delivery and ride-share companies did not consider the workers who provided services through their platforms to be employees. These workers were not protected by labor laws.

c. Disappearance and Abduction

Disappearance

There were no reports of enforced disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.

In July, President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva reinstated the Special Commission on Political Deaths and Disappearances to deal with state crimes and political repression that occurred from 1961 to 1979. The commission was created in 1995 but was closed in 2022 by the government of then President Bolsonaro.

Prolonged Detention without Charges

The constitution prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of persons to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court. The government generally observed these requirements; however, political figures and rights groups alleged the government held hundreds of individuals accused of participation in protests that led to the invasion of government buildings on January 8, 2023, in detention for several months without filing charges. They also alleged these protesters were denied access to legal counsel.

Lengthy pretrial detention was a problem. The length of pretrial detention frequently equaled or exceeded the maximum sentence for the alleged crime, according to the National Security Forum. As of 2023, approximately one-quarter of the prison population was awaiting court trial, according to the Brazilian Forum on Public Security.

d. Violations in Religious Freedom

See the Department of State's annual *International Religious Freedom Report* at <https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/>.

e. Trafficking in Persons

See the Department of State's annual *Trafficking in Persons Report* at <https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/>.

Section 3. Security of the Person

a. Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The constitution prohibited such practices, but there were credible reports government officials employed them.

Military police officers in Porto Alegre, capital of the state of Rio Grande do Sul, were accused of torturing Vladimir Abreu de Oliveira for approximately 40 minutes before attempting to hide his body by throwing him from a bridge in May. An investigation revealed Abreu de Oliveira suffered multiple severe injuries while alive, leading to his death. Five officers were indicted, with charges ranging from torture resulting in death to omission of assistance, and two were in preventive detention. Civil police were

conducting a separate investigation.

b. Protection of Children

Child Labor

See the Department of Labor's *Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor* at <https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings/>.

Child Marriage

The legal minimum age of marriage was 18, or 16 with parental or legal representative consent. While child marriage declined in recent years, the practice of early marriage (marriage before age 18), especially among girls, was common, according to UNICEF. The government did not always effectively enforce the law.

In March, a report from the newspaper *Econômico Valor* noted approximately one in five women married before turning 18.

c. Protection to Refugees

The government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, or asylum seekers, as well as other persons of concern.

Provision of First Asylum

The law provided for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government had a system for providing protection to refugees.

d. Acts of Antisemitism and Antisemitic Incitement

According to the Brazilian Israelite Federation, there were approximately 120,000 Jewish Brazilian citizens, of whom approximately 70,000 lived in the state of São Paulo, according to 2021 data, and 34,000 in the state of Rio de Janeiro.

The law criminalized the manufacture, sale, distribution, or broadcast of symbols, emblems, ornaments, badges, or advertising that used the swastika for purposes of publicizing Nazism. The penalty was two to five years' imprisonment.

In June, the Brazilian Israelite Confederation (CONIB) and the Israelite Federation of the State of São Paulo (FISESP) reported a sharp increase in the number of cases of antisemitism after the Hamas attack on Israel in October 2023. From January to May, 886 cases of antisemitism were recorded, almost six times more than in the same period in 2023. Most of the attacks occurred in digital environments, such as social networks and messaging apps.

Following Israel's military response in Gaza to the Hamas October 2023

terrorist attacks, on February 18, President Lula da Silva stated that “what is happening in the Gaza Strip... it’s a genocide.” In the speech, he then compared what was occurring in Palestine with “when Hitler decided to kill the Jews.” On February 19, CONIB stated it “repudiated the unfounded statements by President Lula comparing the Holocaust to the State of Israel’s defense against the terrorist group Hamas,” saying the government had adopted an “extreme and unbalanced posture in relation to the tragic conflict in the Middle East.”

On October 21, the Public Ministry of Santa Catarina’s Special Task Force to Combat Organized Crime arrested four individuals, allegedly members of a neo-Nazi group, for inciting discrimination and planning violent acts in different regions of the country. The arrests were part of “Operation Overlord,” which took place in the states of Santa Catarina, São Paulo, Sergipe, Paraná, and Rio Grande do Sul. According to CNN Brasil, the operation aimed to combat antisemitism and hate speech and prevent the planning of violent acts. The individuals arrested allegedly were part of a band that performed at neo-Nazi events in several regions.

For further information on incidents in the country of antisemitism, whether or not those incidents were motivated by religion, and for reporting on the ability of Jews to exercise freedom of religion or belief, please see the Department of State’s annual *International Religious Freedom Report* at <https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/>.

Exhibit 4 - CC2

World Report 2026: Brazil | Human Rights Watch

 [hrw.org/world-report/2026/country-chapters/brazil](https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2026/country-chapters/brazil)

January 5, 2026

In a landmark ruling, the Brazilian Supreme Court convicted former President Bolsonaro and other former officials of plotting a coup. It was the first time in Brazil's history that the leaders of a coup were tried.

Amazon deforestation fell 11 percent in the last year. Cattle raised in illegally deforested land kept on entering the legal supply chain. The government sought a sharp increase in oil production, ignoring its impacts on the global climate.

Police killed 5,920 people between January and November 2025. A court ruling and a resolution that instructed prosecutors to lead investigations into police killings, instead of leaving them in the hands of the police themselves, offered hope of improved investigations.

Brazil became the first Latin American country to pass a law to protect children's rights online.

Democratic Rule

In September, a panel of five Supreme Court justices [sentenced](#) former President Jair Bolsonaro to more than 27 years in prison for plotting to remain in office after losing the 2022 election and other crimes. The plan included killing President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the vice-president, and a Supreme Court justice investigating Bolsonaro. The Supreme Court also convicted seven others, including active and retired military officers.

Charges included involvement in the ransacking of federal buildings in Brasília carried out by a crowd calling for a coup on January 8, 2023. As of August, the Supreme Court had [convicted 638 people](#) who participated in the attack and another 552 had signed plea agreements. Bolsonaro allies in Congress promoted a bill to [grant amnesty](#) to all.

In September, the attorney general [charged](#) congressman Eduardo Bolsonaro, former President Bolsonaro's son, and a businessman with coercion for seeking US government interference in the trial against Bolsonaro. The Trump administration [imposed tariffs](#) on Brazil and [sanctions and visa restrictions](#) on Supreme Court judges who took decisions against Bolsonaro, their relatives and other officials.

Also in September, the Supreme Court [ordered](#) an investigation into Bolsonaro's conduct during the Covid-19 pandemic, after a [Congressional inquiry concluded](#) his policies endangered the health and lives of Brazilians.

Corruption and Transparency

[Budget allocations](#) decided by lawmakers have increased eight-fold since 2014, to 50 billion reais (US\$9 billion) in 2025. The Supreme Court had suspended such disbursements in 2024 due to lack of transparency, but allowed them to resume in 2025 after approving [a plan](#) drafted by Congress and the government that required, among other measures, public identification of the lawmakers responsible for the allocations and of those receiving the funds. Yet in August, a Supreme Court justice [ordered](#) federal police to investigate disbursements totaling 694 million reais (\$129 million) allocated by lawmakers between 2020 and 2024 that were registered in the official system without providing sufficient information about their use.

In April, federal police and the comptroller-general [uncovered unauthorized deductions](#) from pensions paid to 3.3 million retirees totaling more than 6 billion reais (\$1 billion). Media [reported](#) successive governments had received allegations of fraud but failed to act.

Freedom of Expression

In June, a comedian was [sentenced](#) to eight years in prison for public comments a court labeled “discriminatory.” Brazil's penal code includes criminal defamation provisions that are incompatible with the obligation to protect [free speech](#).

Also in June, the Supreme Court expanded the [liability regime](#) applicable to social media platforms in ways that digital rights experts fear could incentivize them to censor legitimate speech to avoid possible fines.

In July, a Supreme Court justice temporarily [banned](#) Bolsonaro from using social media over allegations he used them to obstruct justice, and, in August, the justice [ordered](#) that the former president be placed under house arrest for violating the ban.

Children's Rights

In September, Brazil [passed its first-ever law](#) to protect children's rights online, which establishes sweeping safeguards for children's data, and compels companies to provide children with the highest levels of privacy and safety by default.

In August, the government [requested](#) that Meta remove chatbots created with Meta AI Studio that mimic children and engage in sexually explicit dialogue. Meta [stated](#) that

its policies prohibit such use and that the company removes artificial intelligence software that violates its policies.

In 2023, [13,117 students, teachers, and others](#) experienced violence in schools, more than triple the number in 2013. Fifty percent of the cases involved physical violence, followed by psychological and sexual violence at 23 percent each.

In December 2024, the National Council of Prosecutors (CNMP) [established guidelines](#) orienting prosecutors on how to address violence at school, including respecting teachers' freedom and obligations to teach comprehensive sexuality education in line with international human rights standards.

Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity

In February, the Supreme Court [ruled](#) that Brazil's anti-domestic-violence law applies to same-sex couples and trans women.

In July, a federal court [suspended](#) a Federal Council of Medicine resolution that had raised the minimum age for hormone therapy and gender-affirming surgeries, and had banned puberty blockers for minors.

Public Security and Police Conduct

[Homicides](#), not counting killings by police, fell 10 percent, to 30,159, between January and November, compared to the same period in 2024.

Police [killed](#) 5,920 people from January to November 2025; police killed 5,725 during the same period in 2024. Black Brazilians are [three and a half times](#) more likely to become a victim than white individuals.

In October, police [conducted the most lethal raid](#) in Rio de Janeiro's history, which left 122 people dead, including 5 police officers.

While some police killings are in self-defense, many result from illegal use of force. Inadequate investigations into those cases, carried out by the police themselves, result in impunity for abuses.

In April, the Supreme Court [ordered](#) prosecutors to lead investigations whenever there is "suspicion" that police were responsible for an unlawful killing. In May, the CNMP [published a resolution](#) detailing how prosecutors should conduct these investigations to ensure they are thorough and independent.

In February, Rio de Janeiro's new attorney general [reestablished a unit of prosecutors](#) tasked with overseeing police conduct.

[In seven states and the federal district](#), official forensic units remain fully subordinated to civil police, a set-up that does not accord them the necessary independence, particularly in police abuse cases. Forensic units in other states have varying degrees of independence from police.

Detention Conditions

More than [674,500](#) people were incarcerated as of December 2024, exceeding the capacity of Brazilian facilities by [35 percent](#).

In April, the Supreme Court [prohibited](#) invasive body searches of visitors to prisons. Strip searches can be conducted only in exceptional cases and only with the visitor's consent.

The number of children and young people held in youth detention—[12,054](#)—increased nearly 3 percent in 2024 compared to 2023, after several years of reduction.

Gender-Based Violence

In October 2024, Brazil [enacted a law](#) classifying “feminicide,” defined as killings “on account of being persons of the female sex,” as a stand-alone crime instead of an aggravating factor of homicide. From January through November 2025, 3,286 women and girls were [killed](#), a 4 percent decrease compared with the same period in 2024. Of those, police registered 1,350 as femicide, a 3 percent increase.

There were 64,276 [reported rapes](#) of women and girls from January through November, a reduction of 8 percent compared with the same period in 2024. Between January and November 2025, [70 percent](#) of the victims were under 14 or lacked capacity to express consent due to illness or for other reasons.

Abortion

Abortion is legal in Brazil only in cases of rape, to save a woman's life, or in cases of fetus anencephaly. Access to abortion services even in such cases is highly restricted.

Criminalization of abortion pushes women, girls, and pregnant people out of the healthcare system. People who have illegal abortions can face up to three years in prison, and those who perform them face up to four years in prison. Police [arrested](#) at least 218 people in the context of illegal abortion investigations between 2012 and 2022, a study showed. Health providers reported women to police in dozens of cases.

[Politicians](#) around the country have introduced dozens of bills in recent years to further restrict legal abortion. The Chamber of Deputies [approved a bill](#), now pending in the Senate, that would suspend [guidelines](#) for care for child survivors of sexual violence, including access to abortion.

Military-Era Abuses

In February 2025, the Supreme Court agreed to examine whether Brazil's amnesty law applies to [enforced disappearance, kidnapping, and unlawful imprisonment](#). The law, enacted by the dictatorship (1964-1985), has shielded officials responsible for grave human rights abuses and been ruled in violation of international law by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

In April, Indigenous organizations and federal prosecutors [called on the government](#) to create a new National Truth Commission to investigate human rights abuses against Indigenous peoples during the dictatorship.

As of November, the Ministry of Human Rights [had issued 84](#) new death certificates attesting that the victims had been forcibly disappeared and killed during the dictatorship.

In August, a court [found](#) German company Volkswagen had subjected workers to slave-like conditions during Brazil's dictatorship and ordered a fine of 165 million reais (\$30 million). The company [said](#) it had complied with labor laws and would appeal.

Indigenous and Afro-Descendant People, and Environmental Defenders

In 2023, the Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional the *marco temporal* doctrine, which posits that Indigenous peoples have no right to their traditional land if they cannot prove they were physically on the land when Brazil's Constitution was adopted in 1988. Congress responded by enshrining the doctrine in law. At time of writing, the Supreme Court had not yet ruled on a challenge to the new law. The impasse stalled administrative procedures to demarcate Indigenous territories.

As of November, the Lula administration had [titled 7 Indigenous territories](#) in 2025, bringing the total to 20 since it took office in 2023. Recognition of more than [800 territories](#) claimed by Indigenous peoples was pending.

The government conducted operations to evict landgrabbers and illegal loggers in [several Indigenous territories](#), in compliance with a Supreme Court decision. In some cases, illegal occupants took [reprisals](#) against communities.

In November, [gunmen](#) killed an Indigenous man and injured four others during an attack within an Indigenous territory that is in the process of being demarcated in Mato Grosso do Sul state.

The Lula administration has titled [4 territories](#) of Afro-descendant (*quilombolas*) rural communities since 2023, but [more than 2,000](#) applications remained pending at time of writing. In 2025, as of November, it had [recognized](#) the official limits of 5 *quilombola* territories and [declared](#) the area occupied by another 28 as “of social interest,” but had not titled any.

In November, the [Chamber of Deputies approved the Escazú agreement](#), which strengthens the protection of environmental defenders, among other measures. At time of writing, it was pending before Senate.

Also in November, the government published the [National Plan to Protect Human Rights Defenders](#), following pressure from human rights organizations for 20 years.

Environment

The government took measures to protect the environment but continued with plans to massively expand fossil fuel production.

Between August 2024 and July 2025, [5,796 square kilometers of Amazon rainforest](#) were razed, an 11 percent decrease over the same period a year earlier.

Cattle ranching is the main driver of deforestation in the Amazon. Illegal ranching in protected areas and the territories of traditional communities often leads to violence and environmental harm. Illegally raised cattle [enters the beef and leather supply chains](#), reaching national and international markets. In December 2024, the government announced a program to individually trace cattle, but full implementation would only be achieved in 2032.

In June, the government [auctioned 34 blocks for oil and gas exploration](#) and in October environmental authorities [approved a license](#) for an exploratory well near the mouth of the Amazon River. The government plans to increase oil production by [56 percent](#) by 2030 compared to 2023. In July, Congress approved a [bill](#) that would have effectively dismantled the environmental licensing process. Lula vetoed the most harmful provisions, but retained the creation of a “[special environmental license](#)” allowing speedy approval of “strategic” projects. In November, Congress [reinstated](#) almost all vetoed provisions.

During the United Nations Climate Change Conference held in Belém, Brazil [launched](#) the Tropical Forest Forever Facility, an investment fund that would pay

tropical countries to keep their forests standing.

In June, Brazil created the [National Program to Reduce the Use of Pesticides](#), which civil society groups had pushed for over a decade. Authorities are [failing to protect](#) against health and environmental harms caused by these chemicals, especially impacting Indigenous and quilombola people, and small farmers.

Disability and Older People's Rights

In 2025, [14.4 million Brazilian adults and children](#) over the age of 2 had disabilities. Thousands are [confined](#) in institutions—sometimes for life—where some face neglect and abuse.

In July, the government [published](#) a national care policy that includes support for people with disabilities and older people.

Migrants, Refugees, and Asylum Seekers

Over [700,000 Venezuelans](#) have crossed the border into Brazil in recent years, fleeing hunger, lack of health care, or persecution.

Between January and July, Brazil [granted](#) residency permits to 44,278 Venezuelans, while 11,578 [requested](#) refugee status.

In total, Brazil has [granted](#) asylum to 145,276 Venezuelans and residency permits to 575,918 since 2010.

As of June, a voluntary relocation program initiated in 2018 had benefited [150,000 Venezuelans](#).

Browse countries

Exhibit 5 - CC3

Brazil: Revamp Public Security Policies

[hrw.org/news/2026/02/04/brazil-revamp-public-security-policies](https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/02/04/brazil-revamp-public-security-policies)

February 4, 2026

Police Abuses Undermine Public Safety



Penha favela residents protest in front of the Guanabara Palace against a deadly police operation that resulted in 122 killings, in Rio de Janeiro, October 29, 2025. © 2025 Silvia Izquierdo/AP Photo

(São Paulo) – [Brazilian](#) authorities should adopt new public security strategies that dismantle criminal organizations and their alleged links with state agents, enhance independent criminal investigations, and spur reforms to make police more effective at upholding the law, Human Rights Watch said today in its [World Report 2026](#).

In the 529-page *World Report 2026*, its 36th edition, Human Rights Watch reviews human rights practices in more than 100 countries. In his [introductory essay](#), Executive Director Philippe Boloïon writes that breaking the authoritarian wave sweeping the world is the challenge of a generation. With the human rights system under unprecedented threat from the Trump administration and other global powers, Boloïon calls on rights-respecting democracies and civil society to build a strategic alliance to defend fundamental freedoms.

Brazilians cited violence as their main concern in recent polls, and security is expected to be a major issue in the electoral campaign for president, governors, and legislators, who will be elected in October.

“Public security strategies based on unchecked use of lethal force by police have failed again and again to make Brazilian neighborhoods safer, and instead have resulted in more violence and insecurity,” said [César Muñoz](#), Brazil director at Human Rights Watch. “Candidates in the upcoming elections should put forward proposals to effectively protect people’s rights, which are threatened by organized crime but also by police in many low-income, predominantly Black communities.”

- Between January and November 2025, [police killed](#) 5,920 people. Black Brazilians are [three-and-a-half times](#) more likely to become a victim than white people. While some police killings are in self-defense, many others are extrajudicial executions. Abuses committed by police, as well as corruption within the force, make communities distrust law enforcement and less likely to report crimes and collaborate with investigations.
- Public security strategies that lead to shootouts also put officers at risk. Official data show that between January and November 2025, 171 [police officers were killed](#) and another 119 died by suicide, a rate much higher than the rest of the population that reflects exposure to violence and inadequate mental health support, among other factors.
- Investigations into police killings are often deficient. For instance, [police failed to take crucial investigative steps](#) to determine the circumstances of the killing of at least 122 people, including 5 police officers, during the deadliest raid in Rio de Janeiro’s history, on October 28, 2025.
- Rio de Janeiro is one of the seven states, together with the federal district, that still have official forensic units fully subordinate to civil police, a set up that does not accord them the independence necessary to do effective work, particularly in cases of alleged police abuse.
- The Supreme Federal Court has ruled that prosecutors should lead investigations into suspected unlawful killings by police. A resolution adopted by the National Council of Public Prosecutors instructed prosecutors to ensure those investigations comply with international standards, including adequate forensic analysis.

Candidates should put forward security and justice proposals grounded on human rights and scientific evidence that improve coordination between federal and state agencies, and target arms trafficking, money laundering, and criminal organizations’ income streams, Human Rights Watch said.

Exhibit 6 - CC4

Brazil: Prosecutors Should Lead Police Killings Inquiries

[hrw.org/news/2023/09/12/brazil-prosecutors-should-lead-police-killings-inquiries](https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/09/12/brazil-prosecutors-should-lead-police-killings-inquiries)

September 12, 2023

Prosecutor's Office Should Ensure That New Guidelines Reflect International Standards



[Click to expand Image](#)

People gathered in a protest against police violence and structural racism hold signs, one of them reading "Black Lives Matter", Rio de Janeiro, May 31, 2021 © 2021 AP Photo/Silvia Izquierdo

(São Paulo) – [Brazil](#) should urgently address the chronic problem of police abuse and impunity by ensuring that prosecutors lead investigations and that those investigations comply with international standards, Human Rights Watch said today in a [letter](#) to the attorney general, Augusto Aras.

Police killed more than [6,400](#) people in 2022, according to the nonprofit Brazilian Forum of Public Security, which compiles the data from official sources at the state level. In less than a month between the end of July and August 2023, at least 62 people were killed during police operations in Bahia, Rio, and São Paulo states alone.

“The deadly law enforcement operations in recent months underscore the urgent need to improve investigations into police conduct,” said [Maria Laura Canineu](#), Brazil director at Human Rights Watch. “Prosecutors should carry out effective oversight of the police by leading investigations into police killings and cases of suspected police abuse, instead of relying on the police to investigate themselves.”

While some police killings are in self defense, many result from illegal use of force that goes largely unpunished. Currently, civil police carry out investigations into police abuses. This raises serious questions of impartiality as civil police investigate their own personnel, as well as military police personnel with whom they may have worked in other cases.

In 2017, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ordered Brazil to ensure that investigations of police killings, torture, or sexual violence are “entrusted to an independent body, distinct from the police force involved in the incident.” In 2021, the Court [said](#) that both the Brazilian state and representatives of victims agreed that the prosecutor’s office is that independent body. Brazil has an obligation to comply with the Court’s decisions.

On March 10, the National Council of Prosecutors, which oversees the work of federal and state prosecutors, [established](#) a working group to draft a resolution to guide prosecutors’ investigations into cases of death, torture, and sexual violence “in the context of police operations.” The resolution should make clear that prosecutors have not only authority, but the obligation to conduct their own investigations into all cases of police abuse, Human Rights Watch said.

Human Rights Watch has documented scores of cases in which police officers intimidated witnesses, or manipulated and destroyed evidence, including by taking bodies to hospitals falsely claiming the victims were still alive and removing the victim’s clothes; as well as cases in which civil police failed to conduct adequate investigations into police killings, for instance by not visiting the crime scene.

The new resolution should include robust requirements for conducting the investigations, Human Rights Watch said. Prosecutors have often failed to meet their obligation to ensure civil and military police abide by the law and that investigations into abuses are prompt, thorough, and independent.

Crucially, the investigations should observe international standards, in particular the UN Manual on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, known as the Minnesota Protocol. The protocol provides detailed guidelines to ensure investigations include adequate photographs, descriptions of external wounds and their trajectory, and detection of firearm discharge residue on the hands of victims, among other necessary steps.

The resolution should also include steps that state attorneys general should take, such as employing full-time forensic experts who are independent of the civil police; as well as establishing well-resourced specialized units of prosecutors dedicated to developing and enforcing police protocols to prevent abuses, and carrying out the resulting investigations and prosecutions. State attorneys general should also establish a system of shifts so that on-duty prosecutors and forensic experts respond in real time to complaints of police misconduct, allowing them to intervene immediately and prevent further abuses during ongoing police operations.

The resolution should also call on prosecutors to take statements from victims, families, and witnesses, some of whom may fear that providing statements to police investigators could put them at risk. The resolution should also allow victims and relatives to obtain key information about the investigations, within the bounds of the law, and require states to create accessible complaint mechanisms to report police misconduct, including anonymously.

Human Rights Watch has found that police abuse takes a heavy toll not only on the victims and their families, but also on the police force itself. Prosecutors should work with police forces to assess the working conditions and address the high levels of stress; promote the use of body cameras to help shield other officers from pressure by peers and protect them from false accusations; as well as to address systemic racism in the context of law enforcement.

They should also review state police protocols, and work with police command and secretaries of public security to enact guidelines to prevent that police officers conduct retaliation operations after the killing of a police officer.

Once the working group drafts the resolution, it will open a period of comment on the text by prosecutors' offices around the country. The National Council of Prosecutors will need to approve or reject the final resolution. In the meantime, the president of the Council may change, as the term of the current attorney general ends on September 26. President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva will have to either select a new attorney general or renew the mandate of the current one. Brazil's Senate needs to approve the selection.

"Prosecutors have a key role to play in breaking a cycle of violence and impunity by ensuring adequate police oversight and independent investigations into abuses," Canineu said. "For that to happen, whoever is appointed as attorney general should not only promote the adoption of a strong resolution, but ensure that state attorneys general and state prosecutors implement it."

Exhibit 7 - CC5



Why is it so difficult to investigate police abuses? Learn 5 reasons.



Modificação de cenas de crimes é um dos maiores obstáculos nas investigações de abusos.

Luis Kawaguti

Da BBC Brasil em São Paulo

18 setembro 2014

Investigating and punishing police officers who commit crimes is one of the biggest challenges facing Brazilian public security agencies, according to experts interviewed by BBC Brazil. Among the greatest difficulties involved in the process are confronting police corporatism and convincing witnesses to overcome their fear and testify against law enforcement officers responsible for crimes.

"Investigating abuses and crimes committed by police officers is difficult because a culture of self-protection and immunity regarding these crimes prevails," says Átila Roque, executive director of Amnesty International in Brazil.

Across the country, cases of police officers being caught accepting bribes, involved in robberies, and even acting as "bodyguards" for criminals are relatively common. However, the crime that most worries human rights organizations and police officers tasked with investigating their own colleagues is murder committed by police officers.

According to Roque, although there are some cases of competent and active oversight bodies, controlling police violence is still a distant reality in Brazil. "How can this be done in a country where it's not even known for sure how many people are killed by police officers each year?"

BBC Brazil spoke with police officers involved in investigating crimes committed by law enforcement. Without identifying themselves (to avoid reprisals from their superiors), they pointed to five factors that make it more difficult to obtain evidence and solve crimes committed by law enforcement agents.

Fear of witnesses

One of the most difficult tasks in investigating homicides committed by police officers is finding witnesses willing to come forward to the authorities.

Especially in more peripheral regions, people who have witnessed police abuses fear being murdered if they report these crimes to oversight bodies or the courts.

Witness protection programs exist, but many prefer silence to joining them. This is because the programs imply that the person must change their home, name, job, and completely cut ties with family and friends for extended periods of time.

Therefore, even when identified by investigative bodies, witnesses generally prefer not to get involved, even after receiving all guarantees of protection and anonymity.

Crime scene

A proper analysis of a crime scene by experts can provide the necessary evidence to prosecute a police officer who has committed irregularities, even if there are no witnesses.

Ballistics tests can, for example, determine that a shot came from a specific police officer's weapon and not from a criminal. Experts can also tell if the victim was shot during a shootout with the police, if they were executed without a chance to defend themselves, when the crime occurred, among other information.

The analysis of the crime scene therefore serves to reinforce the version of events given by a police officer involved in a suspicious action, or to expose a fraud created by him to cover up a murder.

However, sometimes police officers who commit crimes try to alter the crime scene in order to reinforce their version of the facts.

Some of the practices already identified include introducing elements into the crime scene (weapons, drugs, among others) or removing corpses from the scene. In other words, corrupt police officers kill a suspect and, instead of preserving the crime scene for forensic experts, take the body to a hospital – later claiming that the person died en route.

Police officers in São Paulo told reporters that they estimate that around 80% of the locations where alleged confrontations between police and suspects occurred are compromised in some way before forensic experts arrive.

Use of "cold" weapons



Para burlar controle de armas e munições, policiais que cometem crimes usam armas frias.

Some Brazilian states control the amount of ammunition used by police officers and adopt a specific caliber to be used by security forces, the use of which is prohibited to civilians.

Measures like these help investigation teams obtain evidence of police involvement in murder crimes.

However, to make identification more difficult, authorities have found that some police officers use weapons illegally seized from suspects to commit crimes. These weapons are then discarded so that they cannot be analyzed by forensic experts.

Corporateism

Corporate solidarity is one of the factors that weakens the performance of oversight bodies and makes it difficult for police officers to report colleagues who commit illegal acts.

But the silence of colleagues and the lack of action are not the only problems faced by those investigating their own police force. According to police officers interviewed for this report, the political climate in a state can, on certain occasions, influence the willingness of superiors to encourage or discourage the investigation and punishment of police officers who have committed a crime.

Reprisals

In some more serious cases, the threats made by suspected police officers are not limited to witnesses of their crimes. Police officers in charge of investigating colleagues told reporters that they have either received threats themselves or have friends who have been victims of this type of action.

According to them, police officers who have committed crimes go so far as to make threats by phone and even drive by in vehicles firing shots near the homes of investigators.

The acts of intimidation do not prevent investigators from continuing their work, but they discourage them and make their activities more difficult.

Exhibit 8 - CC6

"Isolated Cases": Exclusive survey indicates that Military Police officers commit at least one unnecessary act of violence every 2 days in 2024.

Assaults, abuses of power, threats, torture, and even murders are part of the repertoire of the Military Police throughout Brazil.

23/04/2025 | 17:05

By Lucas Azeredo

(Everton Henrique, delivery driver attacked with a knife and arrested after an attempt on his life/Lucas Azeredo)

"They came only at me, as if I were just any thief, a nobody," says Everton Henrique da Silva, a motorcycle delivery driver in the city of Porto Alegre. He was the protagonist of an emblematic case illustrating the different treatment the police give depending on who is involved. Everton, a Black man, was standing near a building with some other motorcycle delivery drivers waiting for a delivery call. An elderly resident of the building, Sérgio Kupstaitis, began complaining about the workers from his window. "He complained about everything, everything," says Everton. After a while, his colleagues left the area. That's when the resident saw an opportunity. "He said from his balcony: 'Ah, now you're alone. Now you'll see.' And, in the meantime, he came down," recounts the motorcycle delivery driver.

The elderly man suddenly pulled out a pocketknife and attacked Everton in the neck. Although he dodged, the delivery driver was only superficially wounded. The Military Police were called to respond to the attempted homicide and to contain the fight that had broken out after the elderly man's violent act, since Everton responded by throwing stones. The Military Police arrived, and the elderly resident, a white man, was not immediately handcuffed and arrested. It was the Black delivery driver, Everton Henrique, who was charged with being "altered," handcuffed, and taken to the police station in the trunk of a police car. "He was the one who was wrong, and he left calmly. And I came out looking outraged at the end of the story," he recounts. The elderly man received a "ride" from the Military Police to give his statement after putting his pocketknife away at home. At the police station, the situation was no different.

closed room. In that closed room, he handcuffed me, pressing hard enough to hurt my wrist, and I was locked up alone for between an hour and a half and two hours," he recounts. The entire police action was filmed; however, the internal investigation opened by the Military Police's internal affairs department stated that "there was no physical aggression on the part of the police officers towards the prisoners, and that there was no verbal aggression or any type of discrimination."

Both Everton and Sérgio were indicted for the same crime: bodily harm. The Military Police stated that the delivery driver's actions could not be considered self-defense. Furthermore, the Military Police indicted the attacked delivery driver for resisting arrest, which resulted in him being placed in the trunk of a car. But Everton was not the only one. 21 motorcyclists or delivery drivers were assaulted by the Military Police in 2024. Five died, with another 12 seriously injured. According to research published in 2023 by the Brazilian Center for Analysis and Planning (Cebap) and the Brazilian Association of Mobility and Technology (Amobitec), the delivery driver category is predominantly composed of adult men (97%), Black or mixed-race (68%), with only a high school education (61%), and who earn between 2,000 and 3,000 reais per month. Everton is one of the names in the "Isolated Cases" category.

(Reproduction/Government of the State of São Paulo)

183 incidents were recorded in 2024 in which one or more military police officers acted in a brutal manner or with excessive violence. The average is one incident every two days. These are only the cases where the actions of the Military Police are not justifiable and the fact is related to the exercise of the profession or to the culture of violence and abuse of power established within the corporation. Approximately 400 military police officers actively participated in the acts that victimized more than 270 people throughout Brazil. ([See here](#) all the records collected by Lab J)

Breaking down the numbers, most cases involve men suffering violent acts. However, it's not as if women escape unscathed. 52 women were victims of police violence, with four deaths. The targets had diverse profiles: adults, teenagers, elderly women, workers, students, white, black, mixed-race, and even two pregnant women. Both cases of aggression against pregnant women are very similar: two 18-year-old girls trying to protect someone from a brutal approach by the Military Police.

In Contagem, Minas Gerais, a young woman, four months pregnant and whose identity was not revealed, was at home with her boyfriend, a 20-year-old supermarket stocker, when police entered the house looking for the man, allegedly involved in an attempted homicide. The police officers tried to forcibly remove the young woman from the sofa where she was sitting, provoking an aggressive reaction from her boyfriend. During the ensuing struggle, one of the officers pushed the pregnant woman, who fell to the ground. Furthermore, a stun gun was discharged, hitting her leg.

The other case, this one more tragic, also occurred in Minas Gerais, in the city of Governador Valadares, and culminated in the death of Thainara Vitória Francisco Santos. She was defending her autistic brother, only 15 years old, from a violent approach by the Minas Gerais Military Police when she supposedly felt unwell after being detained. However, the coroner's report, obtained exclusively by [The Intercept Brasil](#), reveals that the 18-year-old pregnant woman was violently beaten and died of asphyxiation caused by strangulation. The case report presented by the Military Police states that Thainara was alive when she was placed in the car and that she became ill inside the vehicle, but the report indicates that the victim died before even reaching the Emergency Care Unit. The military police officers did not feel the urgency of the situation, since they took two minutes to remove her from the patrol car and take her inside the emergency room, as revealed by security camera footage.

Young people were not spared from the violence and brutality either. At least 52 victims were confirmed, since attacks against large groups of people do not count the number of those assaulted in these cases. Of this total, 21 were minors. Most were between 15 and 17 years old, but three children under 10 years old are registered as victims. In 2024, five minors died as a result of the actions of the Military Police in Brazil.

In Ibirama (SC) and Salvador (BA), two teenagers, one 15 and the other 17 years old, were executed after surrendering to the Military Police. In both incidents, the police officers stated that they used firearms in self-defense, despite videos proving that the youths no longer posed a threat to the officers. They were not the only minors summarily shot to death in 2024.

Glicério de Souza Filho, 15, wanted to have a soda after class. A night school student, he stopped at a liquor store on his way home from school when he was fatally shot by military police officers during an operation in Morro São Bento, on the outskirts of Santos (SP). The police said they were met with gunfire. Also in Morro São Bento, the youngest victim, Ryan da Silva, 4, died from a bullet fired from a police rifle during a confrontation with criminals, according to PM spokesman Emerson Massera.

But the Military Police don't need weapons to kill minors. In Guarapari (ES), a 16-year-old boy was taken by Military Police officers to a secluded location and brutally assaulted, according to witnesses who saw the incident. They were trying to extract information about drug trafficking, as they suspected the young man was involved in crime. Two days later, the teenager was declared brain dead. The Military Police officers claimed he slipped on a slope and hit his head on a wall.

Place of residence also influences a person's chances of becoming a victim at the hands of the Military Police. 30 of the 183 incidents occurred within peripheral neighborhoods and communities, not counting residents attacked in other areas of their cities. In these episodes, Black and mixed-race people became permanent targets for the Military Police. This included women and young people,

(Manuel being attacked by police officers/Image from video recorded by witnesses)

It's June, mid-afternoon in the Tatuapé neighborhood, an upscale area in the eastern part of São Paulo. Manuel Ferreira de Albuquerque, a 42-year-old vendor, is selling his popcorn to passersby on Vilela Street when he is approached by military police. The officers ask Manuel if he has authorization from the São Paulo city hall to sell food on the street, which he does not. Suddenly, the popcorn vendor wakes up face down on the asphalt, having fainted during the encounter.

One of the police officers applied a chokehold called a "mata-leão," which has been banned in the São Paulo Military Police since 2020, causing Manuel to faint. Not content with that, the officer then placed his knee on the unconscious man's chest. "Why go through this? Especially when you're working? I passed out, urinated, I don't remember anything. Humiliating, everyone can see it," the shopkeeper lamented at the time to the [TV Record program "Balanço Geral"](#). The case was referred to the Police Internal Affairs Department at the request of the Ombudsman, who denounced not only the assault but also the improper use of pepper spray by another officer, who was trying to disperse the people filming the incident.

"We trust in the rigorous investigation by the correctional body and will follow the developments of the case until its final conclusion, as procedures that violate the corporation's practices and human dignity must be condemned, including in favor of the majority of the police force, which does its job with professionalism and respect for the population of our state," stated the São Paulo Corregedoria in a note. The violent act was considered by the police as a "procedural error," and the investigation has not yet been concluded. Six months later, also in São Paulo, a Black woman and man in a vulnerable situation, in separate cases, were victims of the same "rear naked choke" hold, without punishment for the officers.

(Chief Nailton and his sister, Nega Pataxó, lying down, wounded during the attack/Photograph obtained by The Intercept Brazil)

Besides Black people and residents of marginalized communities, other preferred targets of the Brazilian Military Police are Indigenous villages. Three "isolated cases" were recorded in the survey which, in total, resulted in the deaths of two people, an Indigenous leader and a 23-year-old, more than 20 people injured, including children and the elderly, and even allegations of torture. One of these cases was a cruel trap.

On January 21, 2024, the Pataxó Hã-Hã-Hãe people were victims of a brutal attack by ranchers supported by the Bahia state military police. The ranchers forcibly expelled the indigenous people from their occupation of the Inhuma Farm, in southwestern Bahia, which was part of the original Pataxó territory and had been illegally sold decades earlier. According to Chief Nailton, 20 police officers arrived in patrol cars. The commander, Paulo Augusto Santanna, wanted to talk. After the chief presented land ownership documents, Santanna returned to his men and, suddenly, they began to clear a path for the ranchers, who then fired at the indigenous people.

Nailton was shot in the abdomen and lay on the ground next to his sister, Nega Pataxó, who was also wounded by a gunshot. Chief Nailton shouted for the police to provide assistance, especially to his sister, who was at the end of her strength. Ultimately, the chief survived after undergoing surgery and being hospitalized, but Nega Pataxó arrived at the hospital already dead. The attackers belonged to the rural militia movement called Invasão Zero (Zero Invasion), which has 5,000 supporters, including Jair Bolsonaro and former Environment Minister Ricardo Salles. Nearly 200 farmers were in the messaging group created for the offensive, which had a military tone, against the Pataxó people.

On the eve of the attack, Itamar Cardoso Oliveira, a member of the indigenous community, was driving five relatives to the Inhuma Farm. That's when a police car began chasing the six of them. Itamar decided to stop. "They called us vagrants. They told us to lower our heads and be quiet. They hit me on the back with pieces of wood and kicked my toes. The whole time they kept asking where we had hidden the weapons. But we didn't have any weapons," Cardoso told [The Intercept Brasil](#). Itamar's back was covered in bruises, a victim of torture in the fight for the right to live on his land.



(Reproduction/Paraná Association of Public Prosecutors)

"I think that at this point there is a serious responsibility on the part of the commands, of the military police, because they are complicit in this. If they weren't complicit, it wouldn't happen. It's that these frontline police officers realize that nothing will happen, so it's as if this acts as an incentive," says Marcos Rolim, PhD in Sociology and researcher in Public Security. "It's a conception, an anti-humanist, criminal conception of public security. Of people who beat their chests saying they are against criminals, but commit crimes and are complicit with crime all day long," he concludes. Marcos also draws attention to an important point in the survey of "Isolated Cases".

"These 183 cases are just the tip of the iceberg. It's what was caught on camera by someone who filmed or reported what was happening. There are far more scenes of violence and abuse that aren't filmed, that are part of everyday life, and that we'll never know about," says Rolim. When there's no filming, the complaints don't reach the media, which then don't report them due to a lack of concrete evidence, creating a cycle of underreporting of violent actions by the Military Police.

Today, one resource for mitigating police violence is the universal adoption of body cameras, devices that record police actions and cannot be turned off by the officer. In Rio Grande do Sul, in six months, the number of investigations and disciplinary proceedings opened against military police officers fell by 42%, according to the RS Seguro Program. Marcos Rolim says that the body camera initiative is "a super important initiative. Police cameras are resources used worldwide, with much research already done on the impact of this technology on police activity. When the camera is permanently operational, all studies worldwide on the impact of this technology on policing activity clearly show very positive things."

This report is part of Lab J's special project "[50 Years of ROTA 66: The Police That Kills \(and Talks\)](#)", which includes two reports and a special podcast about the 50th anniversary of the ROTA 66 case.

Supervision: Fabio Canatta

Exhibit 9 - CC7

Impunity helps explain abuse of power by 'bad cops', says expert.

T otempo.com.br/cidades/impunidade-ajuda-explicar-abuso-de-poder-de-maus-policiais-diz-especialista-1.2718375

Vitor Fórneas

August 18, 2022

Following the results of the Civil Police's forensic investigation into the case in Vila Barraginha, O TEMPO spoke with a public security researcher to understand these practices.

The [number of prior offenses](#) committed by the military police officer suspected of [killing Marcos Vinicius Vieira Couto](#) , 29, in Vila Barraginha, Contagem, in the metropolitan region of Belo Horizonte, exemplifies the impunity enjoyed by some officers, which ultimately leads to the commission of other crimes. This analysis comes from public security expert Luiz Flávio Sapori, who calls for a more forceful condemnation of this type of practice by public authorities.

The O TEMPO newspaper spoke with the researcher after the Civil Police's forensic report indicated that Marquinhos did not attempt to take the officer's weapon, as alleged by the corporation after the homicide. "The feeling of impunity makes some bad police officers feel entitled to commit abuse of power," said the expert.

Although the military in Minas Gerais [does not yet use body cameras](#) , the service ends up being recorded, since there is always someone filming the actions. In the most recent cases, such as that of Paineiras, not even this deterred the [use of force against a young man](#) who was already immobilized.

According to Sapori, the abuse of power occurs because some professionals feel "free" to act in this way and end up receiving approval even from the President of the Republic. "Bad professionals are coming to light more often," he comments.

To change this reality, the expert advocates for a "strong message" from public authorities. "I see a certain lack of leadership from the Military Police and the Minas Gerais government. They are not being very forceful in condemning the abuses. A strong statement from the Secretary of Security and the Governor is needed, emphasizing that they will not tolerate such attitudes. Those on the front lines understand the message from the political authority. They are very much sitting on the fence," he reflects.

'I'm not surprised'

Regarding the Vila Barraginha case, Sapori says he is not surprised by the forensic report's finding that the victim [did not attempt to take the police officer's weapon](#) . "I expected this conclusion. The images that were made available to everyone clearly showed the violent act, which was almost a summary execution."

A broader investigation is necessary, as analyzed by the expert. "Everything points to the assertion of abuse of power. We need an investigation by the Public Prosecutor's Office of Minas Gerais and the Military Police to confirm the hypothesis of the report, which is not the definitive answer. It is necessary to hear the witnesses and the police officer himself to gather evidence, but there is no other possible conclusion," he concludes.

The news outlet contacted the Military Police and the Government of Minas Gerais and is awaiting a response.

Exhibit 10 - CC8

Brazil's Profile

 insightcrime.org/brazil-organized-crime-news/brazil-profile

InSight Crime

November 24, 2023



As well as being Latin America's largest country by population, economy, and area, Brazil is also home to some of the region's most powerful criminal organizations.

The country shares porous borders with every nation in South America except Ecuador and Chile, and its many major ports make it a key hub for global cocaine trafficking. It is also a major drug consumer.

Brazil's two largest gangs, the [First Capital Command](#) (Primeiro Comando da Capital – PCC) and the [Red Command](#) (Comando Vermelho – CV), have used prisons as bases of operations, becoming increasingly involved in international drug trafficking as well as arms and contraband trafficking.

[Milícias](#), largely comprised of current and former police officers, are another source of violent crime, extorting whole neighborhoods and committing extrajudicial killings.

Geography

Brazil has a 16,000-kilometer land border and an 8,000-kilometer coastline, and its busy ports are [used to ship](#) cocaine to Europe, Asia, and Africa.

Brazil's neighbors include the world's three main cocaine producers, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, as well as one of the top marijuana producers, Paraguay.

Additionally, Brazil contains most of the Amazon basin, an ecologically critical region that has attracted timber traffickers, unauthorized miners, wildlife smugglers, and drug runners, among other criminals.

History

Brazil's origins as a colony of the Portuguese, rather than the Spanish, empire lend it a different linguistic and cultural heritage compared to most of its Latin American neighbors. It became an independent country in the first half of the Nineteenth Century.

Brazil saw a massive exodus of rural dwellers towards the main urban centers of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro from the 1950s to 1970s, which led to the growth of informal settlements known as “favelas.” The concentrated inequality and poverty in the favelas, which lacked a clear state presence, made them ideal breeding grounds for organized crime.

In the 1950s, a powerful criminal mafia began to form around *jogo do bicho*, or the [animal game](#), an illegal gambling racket that became hugely popular. The bosses who ran the game built up large fortunes, laundering their profits through legitimate companies. Eventually, they branched out into contract killing and prostitution rings, buying off police and politicians. The power of the bicheiros, or animal game bosses, peaked in the 1980s, when they [began laundering money](#) through Rio de Janeiro's famous Carnival celebrations.

Meanwhile, organized criminal groups also began to form amid the strong state repression and brutal squalor that characterized the country's prisons during a period of military rule lasting from 1964 to 1985. Brazil's two most powerful gangs, the Red Command and the PCC both began in prisons in the early 1970s and the 1990s, respectively, later hitting the streets of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.

During the 1970s, links began to emerge among the bicheiros, international drug smuggling networks, and local traffickers. As the global cocaine market boomed in the 1980s, Brazil attracted South America's most prominent drug producers as a transit point for drugs bound for European and US markets. Colombian groups moved into Brazilian territory, attracted by its location and the availability of precursor chemicals. They began smuggling cocaine into the country in base form and setting up laboratories close to domestic points of sale as well as international ports used to send the drug to markets abroad.

Under the premise of fighting drug gangs, vigilante groups known as militias, made up of current and former members of the police, began to emerge in urban areas. Today, these vigilante groups represent an important criminal threat. They [operate](#)

[their own rackets](#), including extortion and kidnapping, primarily in the Rio de Janeiro metropolitan area. Some have also moved into the drug trade.

Since the start of the 21st Century, Brazil's criminal groups have solidified their presence in their traditional strongholds of prisons and favelas, while expanding into the Amazon and neighboring countries – particularly [Paraguay](#). In response, recent national governments have largely [followed anti-crime policies](#) focused on heavy-handed police and military operations, and mass incarceration.

Environmental crime surged from 2019 to 2022 during the administration of President Jair Bolsonaro, who staunchly opposed environmental protection measures, claiming they hindered economic growth. Bolsonaro's administration also significantly relaxed gun restrictions, allowing criminals easier access to powerful firearms.

Bolsonaro's successor, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who had previously served as president from 2003 to 2010, took steps early in his term to reverse those aspects of his predecessor's legacy. Lula launched hard-hitting military operations against environmental criminals in the Amazon and promised to roll back loosened gun laws. However, his overall anti-crime posture [has remained](#) largely traditional.

Criminal Groups

Brazil's two main prison gangs, the [PCC](#) and the [Red Command](#), have long dominated the country's organized crime landscape.

The PCC was born in the 1990s in the prisons of Latin America's largest city, São Paulo, and is now [firmly established](#) as one of the region's most powerful [criminal actors](#). The gang has become a transnational threat, moving much of the cocaine [flowing](#) from Brazil to Europe and having set up a [secondary power base](#) in neighboring Paraguay.

The Red Command was created in the 1970s as a self-protection group for prisoners in Rio de Janeiro, and served as an inspiration for the PCC. The two groups maintained a truce throughout the 2000s and early 2010s, but it broke down in 2016, setting off a violent, nationwide underworld realignment.

The Red Command has used its strong presence in its home turf of Rio de Janeiro to gain major influence in prisons across the country. It also has a foothold inside Bolivia, from where it sources much of its cocaine. However, it faces competition in Rio from two gangs that formed as splinter groups: the [Pure Third Command](#) (Terceiro Comando Puro) and [Amigos dos Amigos](#).

The [Family of the North](#) (Familia do Norte – FDN) has long been Brazil's third-largest criminal group, with a strong presence in northern Brazil but not matching the nationwide presence of the PCC and Red Command. In early 2020, the FDN came under [sustained attack](#) by the Red Command in Manaus, the biggest city in the Amazon. While the fallout of this war has not been fully measured, it is likely the FDN has been left greatly weakened.

[Bullet in the Face](#) (Bala na Cara – BNC) is a prominent criminal group headquartered in Brazil's southernmost state of Rio Grande do Sul, with a presence in southern Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Argentina.

[Escritório do Crime](#) and the Justice League (Liga da Justiça) are among the largest and most powerful militia groups in Rio de Janeiro, controlling many aspects of life in western parts of the city. Their criminal portfolio extends to drug trafficking, extortion and other organized crime activities. In the last couple of years, these militia groups have begun setting aside their traditional rivalries with the Red Command and morphing into hybrid criminal structures.

Brazil also is home to sophisticated [corruption networks](#), many of which have organized around politics and the construction industry.

Additionally, foreign crime groups – primarily Nigerian networks and the Italian 'Ndrangheta — have a presence in Brazil.

Security Forces

Brazil's military is the largest in Latin America. Its primary role is enforcing border control, but the country's large size, combined with the remoteness of its border regions and a lack of capacity on the part of neighboring nations, makes this difficult.

Brazilian police are divided into federal and state forces, which include military and civilian forces. The Federal Police are responsible for investigating international and state crimes. The Military Police are responsible for enforcing public order within the states. The Civilian Police manages criminal investigations on the state level. The Federal Highway Police have also begun to take on crime-fighting functions.

Brazilian police forces have a reputation for abusiveness, lack of accountability, and [low levels](#) of public trust. They frequently face accusations of extrajudicial killings, and innocent bystanders are often caught in the crossfire of shootouts between security forces and criminals.

Corruption also [poses a challenge](#) for many Brazilian security institutions. Police and soldiers often work with organized crime groups, or form their own criminal

organizations, as in the case of the militias.

Judicial System

Brazil's judicial system has federal and state courts, as well as courts specialized in military, labor-related, and electoral matters. The country's highest court is the Supreme Federal Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal).

Most courts are [slow, corrupt, and generally ineffective](#). Pretrial detention is common for criminal suspects, contributing to problems in the prison system.

Prisons

Brazil has one of the world's largest prison populations, divided into federal and state systems. The facilities are often overcrowded, under-resourced, and controlled by one or more gangs. They are frequently the scene of [prisoner abuse](#) and bloody battles between criminal groups, which use them as bases of operations.

Exhibit 11 - CC9

Brazil Case Illustrates Struggle With Corrupt Police

 insightcrime.org/news/brazil-ceara-large-scale-criminal-networks-police

Chris Dalby

February 14, 2023



Dozens of police officers and over 100 alleged drug traffickers have been arrested over six years in northeast Brazil, spreading fears that security forces are colluding with criminals in increasingly complex ways across the country.

On February 2, 17 members of the military police and 14 suspected drug traffickers [were detained](#) in the state of Ceará during the latest round of Operation Genesis, an ongoing security operation aiming to dismantle corruption within the police.

The detained officers were allegedly [bribed](#) by a drug trafficking gang for “privileged information” on their criminal rivals, allowing the gang to dominate the drug trade in parts of Ceará’s state capital, Fortaleza, as well as in the municipalities of Caucaia, Pacatuba, and Maranguape, [according](#) to a press release by the Ceará Attorney General’s Office. The officers also sold weapons and ammunition that they had seized from criminals, the press release stated.

The number of arrested police has piled up since Operation Genesis began in 2016. At least 63 military police officers have faced charges of drug trafficking, robbery, weapons trafficking, and criminal association.

In parallel, [120 police officers](#), prison guards, and firefighters have been fired in Ceará on suspicion of various criminal and administrative charges.

In November 2022, a [three-part podcast](#), “Maças Podres” (Rotten Apples), by Brazil’s regional newspaper, Diário do Nordeste, detailed how deep these connections run. In the podcast, the newspaper explained that specialized squads of complicit police

officers and prison guards form corrupt relationships with criminal groups inside prison and on the streets.

The spread of police involvement has been a significant security concern for Brazil in recent years, especially in Rio de Janeiro, where “militias” — criminal groups made up of active and retired police and prison guards — [dominate criminal economies](#) in much of the city. Members of these militia groups have also been connected to [high-profile assassinations](#), including that of Rio Councilwoman Marielle Franco, in 2018.

“Criminal groups within police forces across Brazil have grown, [and] many cases have been identified in states such as Pará, Amazonas, Mato Grosso do Sul, and Ceará,” said Bruno Paes Manso, an expert on Brazilian organized crime dynamics at the University of São Paulo’s Center for the Study of Violence (Núcleo de Estudos da Violência – NEV).

InSight Crime Analysis

Police networks in Ceará do act in some ways similar to Rio de Janeiro’s militias, but they do not yet have anywhere near the same level of influence or power. They remain largely service providers to existing criminal groups, as opposed to dominant players themselves.

Rio’s militias grow wealthy through territorial control and are often in charge of almost all public services within specific neighborhoods. In [poorer communities](#) of Rio, they have control over real estate; the delivery of electricity, gas, and internet; and the assignment of parking spaces. They also extort some businesses a “protection” fee, which can be a blanket permission to stay open later.

In contrast, Ceará’s police offered specific services to criminal clients, irrespective of territory.

“The police involved in organized crime in Ceará are not so territorial, they carry out extortion or murder-for-hire,” said Ricardo Moura, a public security journalist with O Povo, a newspaper in Fortaleza.

However, both types of involvement have sent the number of homicides attributed to police soaring, according to the experts.

“When police are ready to kill, it gives them an advantage in the criminal landscape. They become very strong criminal figures as they have carte blanche to kill and grow rich,” said Paes Manso.

Exhibit 12 - CC10

Brazil: Freedom in the World 2025 Country Report

 freedomhouse.org/country/brazil/freedom-world/2025

Freedom House



Overview

Brazil is a democracy that holds competitive elections. Its political arena, though polarized, is characterized by vibrant public debate. However, independent journalists and civil society activists risk harassment and violent attack and political violence is high. Minority groups suffer from crime, disproportionate violence, and economic exclusion, issues the government struggles to address. Corruption is endemic at top levels, contributing to widespread disillusionment among the public. Societal discrimination and violence against LGBT+ people remain serious problems.

Key Developments in 2024

- In August, Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes ordered X to be blocked nationwide after its owner, Elon Musk, ignored a court order to name a new in-country legal representative. The order was reversed in October, after X complied and paid a fine.
- In November, the Federal Police indicted former President Jair Bolsonaro and 36 other for orchestrating a coup to prevent Bolsonaro's successor, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, from taking office. No charges were officially filed against Bolsonaro by year's end.

Political Rights

Electoral Process

Was the current head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections?

Brazil is a federal republic governed under a presidential system. The president is elected by popular vote for a four-year term and is eligible for reelection to a second consecutive term.

In the 2022 race, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the Workers' Party (PT), who served as president from 2003 to 2011, and incumbent Jair Bolsonaro of the Liberal Party (PL) were the two leading candidates. Lula campaigned on economic concerns and social policy, while Bolsonaro's campaign focused attention on evangelical support. Lula won 50.9 percent of the vote in an October runoff.

The highly polarized campaign was marred by disinformation, aggressive rhetoric on social networks and online messaging services, and political violence. Bolsonaro did not explicitly concede after losing the election, initially remaining silent while his supporters blocked major roads and called for new elections and military intervention. Bolsonaro unsuccessfully challenged the results in court, calling for some runoff results to be "invalidated." Lula was sworn in on January 1, 2023, with some of Bolsonaro's supporters still camping outside military headquarters asking for intervention. On January 8, 2023, thousands of Bolsonaro's supporters stormed the National Congress, Supreme Court, and presidential palace in Brasília, occupying government buildings and calling on the military to keep Bolsonaro in power. Police forces responded by retaking occupied buildings, using tear gas to disperse rioters, and with mass arrests.

Were the current national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?

Legislative elections are generally free and fair. The bicameral National Congress is composed of an 81-member Senate and a 513-member Chamber of Deputies. Senators serve staggered eight-year terms, with one- to two-thirds coming up for election every four years. Members of the Chamber of Deputies serve four-year terms.

In the October 2022 elections, the PL became the largest single party in the Chamber of Deputies with 99 seats, while the PT won 69. The *Centrão* ("Big Center"), an array

of patronage-based parties without clear ideological positions that provided legislative support to Bolsonaro, became the largest force in the Chamber of Deputies; the five parties understood to make up the Centrão won a combined 231 seats. The PL became the largest party in the Senate.

Local elections were held in October 2024 with parties in the Centrão faring well, though the PL performed relatively poorly. The elections were marred by reports of widespread harassment and political violence compared to local polls in the past.

Are the electoral laws and framework fair, and are they implemented impartially by the relevant election management bodies?

Brazilian election laws are generally well enforced. The Superior Electoral Court (TSE) presides over cases related to violations of electoral law.

While Brazilian voters have cast ballots electronically since 1996, Bolsonaro repeatedly claimed that the country's ballot system was vulnerable to fraud ahead of the 2022 elections, though no evidence has been found. The Defense Ministry inspected several hundred voting machines that October but found no irregularities, though its report did not explicitly declare whether potential fraud was possible.

Political Pluralism and Participation

Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system free of undue obstacles to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?

Brazil has an unfettered multiparty system marked by vigorous competition among rival parties. The electoral framework encourages the proliferation of parties, a number of which are based in a single state. Ahead of the 2022 elections, 32 parties were registered, 23 of which won seats in the Chamber of Deputies.

Some parties display little ideological consistency. Lawmakers often switch parties, rendering electoral coalitions fragile. The executive branch must assemble diverse and often ideologically incoherent coalitions to pass legislation due to the large number of parties.

Political parties operate with little transparency and under no governance rules and often are targets of investigations into the misuse of public funds.

Is there a realistic opportunity for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?

Opposition parties can compete and gain power through elections at both the federal and subnational levels. The PL and PT both received significant support in the 2022 elections. The Bolsonaro administration used public programs to lessen the opposition's power to compete freely.

Are the people's political choices free from domination by forces that are external to the political sphere, or by political forces that employ extrapolitical means?

Powerful business interests undermine democratic accountability by facilitating or encouraging corruption among elected officials. Criminal groups have carried out attacks against political candidates and representatives, especially women and LGBT+ politicians.

Brazilian voters face high levels of political violence, which increased by 400 percent between 2018 and 2022 according to a survey conducted by two nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In November 2022, Agência Pública recorded 15 murders and 23 attempted murders over that year's election period. By September 2024, authorities recorded 319 complaints of harassment related to the year's local elections. In December, NGOs Justiça Global and Terra de Direitos recorded 558 incidents of political violence during those polls; 46 cases were recorded in 2016.

Militias and other criminal organizations—which may exercise significant control over campaigning and other political activity within their territories—have been blamed for a rise in violence in recent years. In August 2024, the Regional Electoral Court in Rio de Janeiro State said it would move polling stations to lessen armed actors' influence on the local elections.

The January 2023 riots in Brasília were mainly conducted by ordinary citizens, but some security officers and officials were accused of either supporting the riots, displaying inaction as they occurred, or otherwise backing former President Bolsonaro openly. President Lula accused elements of the country's intelligence agency, police, and military of either mounting a lax response or of complicity. In November 2024, the Federal Police indicted Bolsonaro and 36 other people for orchestrating a coup to prevent Lula from taking office, though no charges were officially filed against Bolsonaro by year's end. In December, Walter Braga Netto—one of the indicted individuals, a former defense minister, and Bolsonaro's running mate in 2022—was arrested for allegedly interfering in the investigation into the alleged coup.

Do various segments of the population (including ethnic, racial, religious, gender, LGBT+, and other relevant groups) have full political rights and electoral opportunities?

The constitution guarantees equal rights without prejudice, but some groups have greater political representation than others, and there is great unevenness in exercising de facto political rights. Afro-Brazilians and women and their interests remain underrepresented in electoral politics and in government. Women held 18.1 percent of Chamber of Deputies seats as of December 2024, and female presentation in that chamber has consistently increased in the 21st century. Afro-Brazilian representation also improved in 2022. Two transgender federal deputies were elected in 2022. That December, Lula announced a cabinet that featured more racial and gender diversity.

Functioning of Government

Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government?

Widespread corruption undermines the government's ability to make and implement policy without undue influence from private or criminal interests. During the 2010s, the functioning of government was severely hampered by a rolling political crisis due to corruption scandals.

The presence of active-duty and retired military officials in the Bolsonaro administration prompted unease about the military's influence in politics under Bolsonaro. The Defense Ministry was additionally responsible for examining a number of voting machines during the 2022 elections, though that responsibility was shifted elsewhere in late 2023. Lula's administration reduced the participation and influence of the military in government.

Are safeguards against official corruption strong and effective? 2.002 4.004

Corruption and graft are endemic in Brazil, especially among elected officials. Between 2014 and 2021, an investigation known as Operation Car Wash focused on bribery, money laundering, and bid-rigging involving state oil company Petrobras and private construction companies. However, a series of investigative reports known as the Car Wash Leaks, published by the *Intercept Brasil* in 2019, exposed an improper relationship between Sérgio Moro—a judge who later became a Bolsonaro-era justice

minister and won a Senate seat in 2022—and federal prosecutors. The Supreme Court annulled the convictions in 2021.

Criminal inquiries have targeted members of Bolsonaro's family in recent years. In August 2023, Jair Renan Bolsonaro, the former president's youngest son, had his devices seized by police in the course of an embezzlement investigation. In March 2024, Jair Renan and a business associate were charged with falsifying financial documents and money laundering. In July, the Federal Police accused former President Bolsonaro of attempting to illegally sell \$1.2 million worth of gifts provided to the Brazilian government from counterparts, including Saudi Arabia's government, between 2019 and 2022.

Does the government operate with openness and transparency?

Brazil enacted the Freedom of Information Act (LAI) in 2012, but compliance varies among the country's states and municipalities. In 2019, the Bolsonaro administration modified the LAI by decree, giving a larger group of officials the power to classify information as secret. The Bolsonaro administration often decreed 100 years of secrecy on information it considered sensitive.

The Lula administration began rescinding those instructions and stripping secrecy from some Bolsonaro-era decisions after taking office. It also created a transparency policy and formed a working group on official transparency. However, authorities are known to deny access to data requested by NGOs.

While in office, the Bolsonaro administration used a "secret budget," an opaque system of financial grants that routed billions of reais through a rapporteur. Observers criticized the arrangement, which allowed lawmakers to receive added funding in exchange for backing the administration without transparency or oversight. In late 2022, the Supreme Court ruled the arrangement unconstitutional. Some of these grants were still implemented under Lula in 2024, though to a lesser extent than under Bolsonaro. In August 2024, the Supreme Court ordered that lawmakers' budget amendments be suspended until transparency was guaranteed, while ordering the Federal Court of Accounts and Office of the Comptroller General to investigate transfers. Both legislative chambers appealed the ruling later that month.

Civil Liberties

Freedom of Expression and Belief

Are there free and independent media?

The constitution guarantees freedom of expression and the country's media environment is vibrant. However, investigative journalists, particularly those who cover corruption and crime, face threats, harassment, obstruction, and sometimes deadly violence. The legal framework provides inadequate protection for freedom of expression. Defamation is subject to criminal penalties. Journalists who criticized former President Bolsonaro faced online and offline harassment, and outlets that carried criticism faced economic pressure from his administration.

In January 2023, the federal government announced the creation of the National Observatory of Violence Against Journalists, which is meant to monitor violent incidents, refer cases to the Program for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, and perform other functions. In January 2024, the National Federation of Journalists noted a 51.9 percent decline in violent incidents against journalists from 2022 to 2023, though it also reported that journalists increasingly faced lawsuits meant to curtail their activity.

Are individuals free to practice and express their religious faith or nonbelief in public and private?

The constitution guarantees freedom of religion, and the government generally respects this right in practice. However, Afro-Brazilian religious groups face considerable discrimination. Violence against Afro-Brazilian religious groups is frequent, especially in Rio de Janeiro's favelas. In recent years, Afro-Brazilian temples ("terreiros") have closed after assaults or threats from evangelical drug dealers, who claim territory and seek to repress faiths other than their own.

Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free from extensive political indoctrination?

Education policy was politicized under Bolsonaro, with his administration placing persistent pressure on academia and scientific organizations, especially by reducing funds and by mobilizing supporters to harass teachers and researchers. The Lula administration moved to reinstate public education and scientific research funding and has refrained from placing pressure on academics.

Are individuals free to express their personal views on political or other sensitive topics without fear of surveillance or retribution?

People are generally able to express personal views in public without fear of institutional surveillance or retaliation. However, recent electoral periods have been affected by the fear of political violence. Violent homophobic rhetoric contributes to a

sense of fear among many that open discussion of LGBT+ rights and issues could be met with harassment or attack.

Social media intimidation and harassment by troll groups has proven to be a serious problem in Brazil. Bolsonaro allies, including family members, have faced investigations over their involvement in disinformation campaigns but continued to spread disinformation after Bolsonaro left office.

In October 2022, the TSE gave its then-chief, Supreme Court Justice Moraes, the unilateral authority to order the removal of online content that did not comply with previous TSE rulings as part of an antidisinformation effort. Bolsonaro supporters and legal experts criticized the move, fearing that it could allow for censorship. Moraes cited the proliferation of false information and hate speech when initially proposing the move to the TSE. In August 2024, Moraes ordered X to be blocked nationwide after its owner, Elon Musk, ignored a court order to name a new in-country legal representative. Brazilian internet users were prohibited from using virtual private networks to access X, risking a daily fine of up to 50,000 reais (\$8,900). The order was reversed in October, after X complied and paid a fine.

Is there freedom of assembly?

While freedom of assembly is generally respected, police or other security agents sometimes use excessive force against demonstrations.

Some police personnel appeared unresponsive or friendly to pro-Bolsonaro protesters during the January 2023 riots in Brasília. Lula criticized some elements of the police and the military for their response.

Is there freedom for nongovernmental organizations, particularly those that are engaged in human rights– and governance-related work?

NGOs operate freely in a variety of fields. However, activists working on land rights and environmental protection issues have faced harassment, threats, and violence in recent years, along with verbal hostility from former President Bolsonaro and officials in his administration. In a September 2024 report, Global Witness noted that 25 environmental activists were killed in Brazil in 2023.

In June 2022, British journalist Dominic “Dom” Phillips and activist Bruno Araújo Pereira, who were documenting the exploitation of the Amazon rainforest, went missing in Amazonas State; their bodies were discovered that month, when a fisherman confessed to killing them and directed authorities to their remains. In November 2024, the Federal Police completed its investigation into their deaths,

saying that nine people had been involved in the murders and one was charged with orchestrating them. Brazilian press outlets reported that Ruben Dario da Silva Villar, who allegedly leads an illegal fishing enterprise and was detained over an unrelated matter in 2022, was the charged individual. Another three individuals had been charged for their involvement before the investigation closed.

Is there freedom for trade unions and similar professional or labor organizations?

Industrial labor unions are well organized, and although they are politically connected, Brazilian unions tend to be freer from political party control than their counterparts in other Latin American countries. However, controversial labor reforms enacted in 2017 diminished the strength and role of unions in collective bargaining with businesses.

Rule of Law

Is there an independent judiciary?

The judiciary, though largely independent in many parts of the country, is overburdened, inefficient, and often subject to intimidation and other external influences, especially in rural areas. Corruption allegations against judges are not uncommon. Despite these shortcomings, the country's constitution has resulted in an active judiciary that often rules in favor of citizens over the state.

The Supreme Court serves as an autonomous counterweight to the executive. Tensions between the court and the executive were high during the 2022 election, with Bolsonaro frequently issuing threats against the court. The court remained independent, issuing several decisions against Bolsonaro. In 2023, the Supreme Court issued the first conviction related to the Brasília riots, convicting a man of charges including attempting a coup and handing that defendant a 17-year prison sentence. In November 2024, the Supreme Court reported that 265 people had been convicted in relation to the riots while 476 people who were not directly involved in storming government buildings had received lesser punishments.

Also in 2023, the TSE barred Bolsonaro from office until 2030, saying that he abused his power when telling foreign ambassadors that the country's electronic voting system was untrustworthy in 2022.

Does due process prevail in civil and criminal matters?

The judiciary generally upholds the right to a fair trial. However, federal, state, and appellate courts are severely backlogged. Access to justice varies greatly due to income inequality, and the state struggles to provide legal counsel for defendants and prisoners who cannot afford an attorney. Under a 2017 law, members of the armed forces and military police accused of certain serious crimes against civilians can be tried in military, rather than civilian, courts. In the vast majority of homicides committed by police, there is no due process.

Is there protection from the illegitimate use of physical force and freedom from war and insurgencies?

Brazil saw 22.8 intentional violent deaths per 100,000 inhabitants in 2023 according to the *Brazilian Public Security Yearbook*, which was most recently released by the Brazilian Public Security Forum (FBSP) in July 2024. According to the report, 46,328 such deaths were recorded in 2023.

The police force remains mired in corruption, and serious police abuses, including extrajudicial killings, continued in 2024. Police officers are rarely prosecuted for abuses, and those charged are almost never convicted. The FBSP counted 6,393 deaths caused by police in 2023 in its *Brazilian Public Security Yearbook*. Some 82.7 percent of the victims whose race was known were Black. Police in the states of Amapá, Bahia, and Sergipe had some of the highest lethality rates in the country. Conditions in overcrowded prisons are life-threatening, characterized by disease, inadequate food, and deadly gang-related violence. Violence is more likely to affect poor, Black prisoners.

In its July 2024 report, the Indigenous Missionary Council (CIMI) counted 411 incidents of violence against Indigenous people in 2023, including 208 murders and 35 attempted murders.

Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population?

While Brazilian society is largely tolerant, some populations are not able to fully exercise their human rights in practice.

Just over half of the population identifies as Black or of mixed race. Afro-Brazilians suffer from high rates of poverty and illiteracy, and almost 80 percent of Brazilians living in extreme poverty are Black or mixed-race. Victims of violence in Brazil are predominantly young, Black, and poor. The FBSP also counted 1,467 femicides in 2023, a 0.8 percent increase from 2022; 63.3 percent of femicide victims were Black. There were 83,988 cases of rape in 2023, a 91.5 percent increase from 2011.

In 2019, despite intense pressure from some religious and political leaders, the Supreme Court ruled LGBT+ people are protected under a criminal law that prohibits discrimination on the basis of “race, color, ethnicity, religion, and national origin.” However, Brazil has one of the world’s highest-recorded levels of anti-LGBT+ violence. According to a May 2024 report by the Observatory of LGBTI+ Deaths and Violence in Brazil, 184 LGBT+ people were murdered in 2023 while another 18 died by suicide.

Many Indigenous communities—who comprise about 1 percent of the population—suffer from poverty and lack adequate sanitation and education services. The Indigenous population faces considerable discrimination, and their lands were subject to increased pressure under Bolsonaro, encouraged by his rhetoric and support for easing environmental laws.

Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights

Do individuals enjoy freedom of movement, including the ability to change their place of residence, employment, or education?

Brazilians enjoy freedom to travel within and outside of the country, and to make decisions about their places of residence and employment, though access to high-quality education across all levels remains a challenge.

Gang violence, militias, and police violence in parts of Brazil, especially favelas, have impeded free movement and access to education. According to a report by Fogo Cruzado, which tracks gun violence in parts of Brazil, there were 1,346 gun-related incidents in the first six months of 2024 in the Rio de Janeiro metropolitan area, though that represents a 24 percent fall from the first half of 2023.

Movement within the state of Bahia and especially in the state capital of Salvador has been affected by violent clashes between organized criminal groups between each other and with police.

Are individuals able to exercise the right to own property and establish private businesses without undue interference from state or nonstate actors?

While property rights are generally enforced, laws granting Indigenous populations exclusive use of certain lands are not always upheld, sometimes leading to violent conflicts. In a report on rural conflict released in April 2024, the Pastoral Land Commission said that it registered 2,203 conflicts in 2023, the highest number since its surveys began in 1985. It also recorded 31 killings in 2023, a 34 percent decrease

from 2022. In its July 2024 report, which covered the events of 2023, CIMI counted 276 cases of illegal exploitation or property damage against Indigenous people.

Requirements for starting new businesses are often onerous, but authorities have taken steps to ease the process. Corruption and organized crime can pose obstacles to private business activity.

Do individuals enjoy personal social freedoms, including choice of marriage partner and size of family, protection from domestic violence, and control over appearance?

The government generally does not restrict social freedoms. Same-sex marriage became legal in 2013. Gender-based violence remains widespread, though legislation has been introduced to combat it. A 2006 law sought to address high rates of impunity for domestic violence. Law 14.188 amended the penal code to criminalize simple bodily harm due to gender and criminalize psychological violence against women.

Abortion is legal only in the case of rape, a threat to the mother's life, or a rare and usually fatal brain deformity in the fetus. However, women and young girls are denied their legal right to abortion due to discretionary acts from the bureaucracy and judicial system. The sale of misoprostol, a drug that induce an abortion, is illegal in Brazil, though the drug is sold on the black market. As many as one million Brazilians seek abortions through clandestine means annually, including by traveling abroad. In November 2024, a Chamber of Deputies committee supported a proposed constitutional amendment that would fully ban abortion.

Do individuals enjoy equality of opportunity and freedom from economic exploitation?

Slavery-like working conditions pose a significant problem in rural and urban zones. A 2012 constitutional amendment allows the government to confiscate all property of landholders found to be using slave labor. The federal government maintains a list of employers who subject workers to slavery-like conditions.

State spending to address inequality was obstructed when a 20-year budgetary spending cap was enacted in 2016, though the Bolsonaro administration increased aid payments for part of 2022. In 2023, Brazil saw its lowest levels of poverty and extreme poverty since 2012. The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics reported in December 2024 that the percentage of people living in poverty fell from 31.6 in 2022 to 27.3 in 2023.

Exhibit 13 - CC11

Debate indicates that enforcement failure of protective measures boosts violence

The Senate Agency | 01/12/2023, 18h46

One of the instruments provided for in the Maria da Penha Law (Law 11,340/06), the protective measure of urgency is not always complied with in time to ensure the protection of victims of domestic violence. The accumulation of cases in courts and the difficulty in locating and subpoenaing the aggressors are some of the challenges to ensure a reduction of cases of aggression and death of women, as pointed out participants of a public hearing promoted by the Human Rights Commission (CDH) on Tuesday (28).

In the debate entitled "Law Maria da Penha: absence of data related to the performance of the Justice Officers", it was also pointed out the need for collection and systematization of data on domestic violence in order to help the Public Power to know the real needs of the victims.

Author of the request for a hearing, Senator Augusta Brito (PT-CE) highlighted that the bailiff is fundamental in the network of coping with domestic violence, since she is responsible for compliance with protective measures and removals of aggressors from homes. She pointed out that empowering these professionals on an ongoing basis, improving legislation and creating data-driven public policies are some of the ways to reduce domestic violence and femicide rates.

"It's no use just you have the issue of the protective measure if the officer can't deliver it with a timely manner. The monitoring of this protective measure is also necessary to ensure that the woman does not suffer violence again and femicide happens, especially. We know that violence will reach, unfortunately, femicide if it is not stopped, barred and controlled, finally, in its progress phase, because it begins from psychological violence, material violence, heritage and sexual violence," he said.

A lawyer specializing in Family Law and Successions, Senator Soraya Thronicke (Podemos-MS) reported having faced a lot of difficulty in relation to subpoena in cases of protective measure.

—The effectiveness of these judicial measures finds some gaps that often benefit defendants, aggressors. We have trouble subpoenaing the defendant. He has a thousand subterfuges to escape. So it's happened that I had a woman who suffered domestic violence on Christmas Eve, and had to spend Christmas night, New Year's Eve, all inside a shelter. And another, we couldn't subpoena, so she could come home, and the offender was at home in a good way, and the lawyer only said to him like this: "Look, you just run away" – he pointed out.

Soraya suggested the possibility of subpoena not only by the bailiff but by other actors such as the defender of the offended and the police officer. She also assessed that it is necessary for state courts to increase the number of officers on duty on weekends and holidays.

"It is in the moments of celebration that these facts take shape and happen at a level far higher than the day to day, in which people are usually working. So we still need to face this, which is the budget of the courts of justice and the understanding of those courts, so that they increase the number of competent and exclusively domestic violence officers," he said.

Congestion

According to the National Council of Justice's (CNJ) Assessment on the Application of Protective Measures (CNJ) report, 30% of the courts still have a "congestion" in the analysis of protective measures.

—So, the 48 hours pass, 30% of them have not yet been analyzed. You can't have that congestion not analyzed. The time of the process, for us of the National Council of Justice, means protection for women – prevention and protection – said the auxiliary judge of the presidency of the National Council of Justice (CNJ), Luciana Lopes Rocha

The judge reinforced the need for permanent updating of the data of victims and aggressors to comply with protective measures and also data on the profile of violence.

— In 2022 alone, 1.3 million warrants were served on a protective measure of urgency, of which 745 thousand were delivered to the recipients (58%), were successfully complied with, and 232 thousand were returned due to the non-compliance with this diligence. We have, here, to draw attention to the importance of updated data in the process. As a titular judge of domestic and family violence, in every hearing, in every contact with the parties, we need to ask: What is your updated address? What is your updated phone? And the judicial officers also always have to bring that information," he warned.

Delay

The director of the Union of Justice Officers of the State of Ceará (SINDOJUS-CE), Fernanda Garcia Gomes, stated that the lapse between the request for the protective measure and the arrival of the decision for compliance by the bailiff can leave the victim exposed to more violence:

"We observe, in a few moments, that the decision takes time to reach the hand of the bailiff. Between the decision handed

down by the magistrate and his actual execution, the execution of the warrant, there is a lapse there, there is a distance. And we believe, as with the special judges, with the specialized courts, it is also necessary specialized centrals, in which these servants, these bailiffs, will be able to optimize this distance between the decision and the execution, will be able to be qualified, trained, to be able to have a reception of this victim – evaluated.

One of the authors of the book *Femicide: mapping, prevention and technology*, the judge of Law of the Court of Justice of the State of Ceará and researcher Tiago Dias da Silva pointed out that the collection of data on cases can help in the construction of more effective public policies:

— According to the data we found from the Protection in Measure, around 10% of the victims, even with a protective measure in force, undergo a revictimization. So our purpose, as a judiciary, is to zero this index of revictimization. It is to ensure that those who actually seek the government can have a follow-up according to their needs, that prevents this aggressor from effectively coming to practice new conduct.

Senate Agency (Reproduction authorized by citation of the Senate Agency)

Exhibit 14 - CC12

FOLHAJUS ([HTTPS://WWW1.FOLHA.UOL.COM.BR/PODER/FOLHAJUS/](https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/folhajus/))

VIOLENCE ([HTTPS://WWW1.FOLHA.UOL.COM.BR/FOLHA-TOPICOS/VIOLENCIA/](https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha-topicos/violencia/))

Public prosecutor denounces 9% of death cases by police intervention in SP, says survey

Fee is lower in Rio de Janeiro; São Paulo prosecutor's office says that it works with specialized group and technical expertise

20.Jul.2025 at 16:53

Updated: 22.jul.2025 at 3:57 p.m

Lucas Lacerda

SÃO PAULO Police (<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha-topicos/sao-paulo-estado/>) officers from São Paulo (<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha-topicos/sao-paulo-estado/>) were responsible for 7,920 deaths in the state from 2011 to 2023. But the 7,641 inquiries turned prosecution (<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha-topicos/ministerio-publico/>) complaint in 691 cases, about 9% of the total. In Rio de Janeiro (<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha-topicos/rio-de-janeiro/>), this proportion was lower, of 3.7%, with 147 complaints compared to 4,014 open procedures amid 12,789 deaths from police intervention in the same period.

In São Paulo, prosecutors called for the filing of 4,768 cases. In Rio, there were 2,029 of those requests.

The data is part of the new edition of the research "Who Controls the Police? The Performance of the Public Ministry Before Police Lethality", of the Justice Forum, an organization that works in the area of Justice and human rights. The survey specifically analyzes the cases of death within the work of control of police activity.

The Public Ministry of the State of São Paulo took, on average, two years to ask for the filing and a year and a half to offer the complaint to the Justice. In the Public Ministry of the State of Rio de Janeiro, there were, on average, 1,163 days

for filing and 1,199 days for denunciation.

The calculation is impaired, the survey says, because 8 out of 10 2021 to 2023 procedures did not have the date of the fact, which can distort the time taken for each type of measurement.

The data were obtained through requests for the Access to Information Act made to the units of the Public Ministry in the states. The research also included the Public Ministry of the State of Bahia (<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha-topicos/bahia-estado/>), which said, according to the Justice Forum, "not having categorized data on the topic."



Movement of military police in Guarujá, in the Baixada Santista, during Operation Shield - - Danilo Verpa - 31.jul.23/Folhapress

Wanted by **Folha**, the agency stated that it is still systematizing this type of data according to April resolution of the National Council of the Public Ministry of April this year that organizes "crimes occurred as a result or in the context of interventions of public security agencies."

The low proportion of complaints in relation to the procedures is a sign of impunity for state agents who kill, according to the lawyer and executive coordinator of the Justice Forum, Paulo Malvezzi.

"Our research signals, and other research signals in the same sense, that the rule today in Brazil, and is no different in Rio de Janeiro, in São Paulo and Bahia, is the irresponsibility of the agents of the state who kill."

For the lawyer, the survey shows that external control of police activity is not being done to the satisfaction. An ideal work situation, he evaluates, would have a detailed follow-up made by prosecutors from the first moments after a death, the analysis of reports and against reports and access to all information about these homicides.

Malvezzi says that it would also be ideal to act in an independent forensics institute – both of the Civil Police (<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha-topicos/policia-civil/>) and of the Public Prosecutor's Office itself –, so that there would be more evidence than those produced by the police investigations and that the processes would not be subjected, in large part, to the testimonies of those involved (<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2021/07/policia-copiou-e-colou-depoimentos-de-agentes-envolvidos-nas-mortes-em-operacao-no-jacarezinho.shtml>).

An example cited by him is the Center for Anthropology and Forensic Archaeology of Unifesp (Federal University of São Paulo), which acted in the case known as the massacre of Paraisópolis, from 2023 (<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/monicabergamo/2024/11/eu-luto-para-punir-assassinios-do-meu-filho-diz-mae-nos-5-anos-da-tragedia-em-paraisopolis.shtml>).

In addition, the survey advocates the creation, in all states, of specialized groups of the Public Ministry, such as the Gaesp (Special Action Group of Public Security and External Control of Police Activity) and Geosp (Special Operational Performance Group of Public Security). With data from February 2025, the research indicates that only Rondônia, Tocantins, Goiás, Piauí, Bahia, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Paraná and Rio Grande do Sul had these groups.

In the (<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2021/03/mp-rj-dissolve-grupo-de-investigacao-que-mira-flavio-e-carlos-bolsonaro.shtml>) case of Rio de Janeiro, Gaesp was extinguished, along with other groups, in 2021 (<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2021/03/mp-rj-dissolve-grupo-de-investigacao-que-mira-flavio-e-carlos-bolsonaro.shtml>) by the (<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2021/03/mp-rj-dissolve-grupo-de-investigacao-que-mira-flavio-e-carlos-bolsonaro.shtml>) then Attorney General of Justice Luciano Mattos, amid investigations involving Senator Flávio Bolsonaro (PL), at the time in Republicans, and Councilman Carlos Bolsonaro (Republicans).

At the time, the justification was that specialized structures embezzle other areas. The group was recreated in February this year (<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2025/02/promotoria-do-rj-recria-grupo-voltado-para-atuacao-policial-na-vespera-de-julgamento-no-stf.shtml>), on the eve of the resumption of the trial of the so-called FAVELAS (<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2025/04/stf-chega-a-consenso-e-amplia-poder-da-policia-federal-no-combate-a-faccoes-no-rio.shtml>) ADPF, which discussed the use of force in police operations in

communities in the state.

According to Malvezzi, the back and forth is harmful. "You consolidate a knowledge and a structure, undo and then recreate. All this shows that the extinction of the Gaesp was a mistake without any justification. Now you try to correct it, but we still can't assess the impact."

Wanted last Wednesday (17), the Rio de Janeiro Public Prosecutor's Office responded on Tuesday (22), after the publication of the report, which recreated Gaesp (Specialized Action Group in Public Security) after recognizing the need for specialized action in the security system, including external control of police activity. He said he monitors police operations and receives information and reports of possible real-time breaches, with a channel open for reporting. It also offers support to victims through a core with psychological and legal guidance.

The MPRJ cited the reduction of deaths caused by the state in May this year, but acknowledged that control of police activity is a challenge in Rio de Janeiro, "given the urgency and nature of the use of force, combined with structural needs of the judicial police and with the presence of criminal factions in dominated areas."

"These difficulties partly explain the upper average time for completion of procedures compared to other states. The GAESP/MPRJ was recreated, with the aim of improving this performance."

Also sought, the São Paulo Public Prosecutor's Office stated that the control of police activity is done in a concentrated way, through Gaesp, in the capital – which deals with protocols of operation of the police, the training of police officers and other topics –, and also in the diffuse, through the work of each prosecutor, with openings of inquiry after deaths committed by police officers.

A new unit of Gaesp is planned for the Baixada Santista, after the experience of ascertaining deaths caused by police officers in the Escudo and Summer operations, according to the agency.

"The MPSP established a Criminal Investigatory Procedure for each of the

deaths resulting from police intervention, conducting an investigation independent of that made by the Civil Police (<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha-topicos/policia/>) of the State of São Paulo, which supported the provision of seven complaints against 13 military police officers," he highlights.

The agency also cited the work of the Execution Support Center, which does expertise. "Every time the prosecutor detects insufficiency in the investigation, he takes the appropriate measures, thus enabling the offer of the complaint."

The Public Ministry of Bahia points out structural difficulties in the action in cases of deaths caused by police officers. "There are weaknesses in the protocols of action, either at the moment immediately after the occurrence, such as the preservation of the crime scene and the chain of custody of the evidence and production of reliable technical evidence with brevity."

Among the projects listed by the agency to face lethality are a working group to create standards of action of the Prosecutor's Office, the construction of a plan for the diagnosis, monitoring and supervision of lethality and a project to evaluate the performance of institutions in investigations on the subject.

PAGE ADDRESS

<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2025/07/ministerio-publico-denuncia-9-dos-casos-de-morte-por-intervencao-policia-em-sp-diz-pesquisa.shtml>

Exhibit 15 - CC13

Military personnel arrested with illegal weapons in an operation by the internal affairs department are released.

 em.com.br/gerais/2025/07/7195213-militares-presos-com-armas-ilegais-em-operacao-da-corregedoria-sao-soltos.html

Clara Mariz

July 8, 2025

UNDER INVESTIGATION

Men were arrested last Tuesday (July 1st) for illegal possession of firearms. One of them was also arrested for diverting seven grenades from the Military Police of Minas Gerais (PMMG).



The [three active-duty military police officers arrested in the act of illegally carrying a firearm](#) on July 1st have been released. This information was confirmed to the press by the Military Police of Minas Gerais on Tuesday (July 8th). The men were detained in Belo Horizonte, Contagem, and Governador Valadares, in the Vale do Rio Doce region, during an operation by the corporation's Internal Affairs Department investigating misconduct by officers.

Last week, during a press conference, the spokesperson for the Military Police, Captain Rafael Veríssimo, stated that these were the first arrests in the military police investigation being handled by the Internal Affairs Department.

Due to the confidentiality of the investigation, information such as the motivation for the investigation and the specific crimes being investigated could not be released. In a statement, the Military Police of Minas Gerais (PMMG) informed that the officers are at liberty, "awaiting due legal process."

In Belo Horizonte, a police officer was arrested for illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition. In the metropolitan area, a second officer was arrested for the same crime as the first. In addition, he was arrested for embezzlement.

According to the corporation, in the second case, seven grenades used by the Military Police were also found in the suspect's home. In Governador Valadares, the officer was arrested for illegal possession of ammunition.

In addition to the arrests, the operation executed ten search and seizure warrants. Among the materials found and collected were approximately 290 rounds of ammunition, five firearms, precision scales, and a replica firearm.

"The institution reaffirms its commitment to society, to be a transparent institution that seeks, in any situation of misconduct, to implement measures through the ombudsman's system so that criminal and administrative accountability are taken to curb any type of illegality," Veríssimo stated.

Misconduct

In less than two months, other active and reserve military police officers were arrested for misconduct. On June 17, two officers, [an active-duty corporal and a retired lieutenant, father and son in this case, were arrested in the São Geraldo neighborhood](#), in the eastern region of Belo Horizonte. They are suspected of involvement with a criminal organization and drug trafficking.

The pair were found at an address targeted by search and seizure warrants. At the property, one of them tried to flee upon seeing the police officers, but was pursued and apprehended. During the arrest, the older man assaulted the officers, attempting to force them to release the younger man. He was also arrested.

The men were then identified, and the military found a 9mm pistol with the serial number scratched off inside the property.

Gabriel de Freitas Silva
Camila Beatriz Oliveira Santos

File No. A. 226-068-578
File No. A. 226-068-637

Proof of Service

On this day, I, Otavio Haverroth Silva, served a copy of the following documents:

**RESPONDENTS' COUNTRY CONDITIONS IN SUPPORT OF ASYLUM AND
WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL**

To the following:

Office Location:	Mailing Address:
Office of the Principal Legal Advisor Department of Homeland Security 100 Montgomery Street, Suite 200 San Francisco, CA 94104	US Immigration and Customs Enforcement US Department of Homeland Security Office of the Principal Legal Advisor P.O. Box 26449 San Francisco, CA 94126-644

by:

☒ Through the EOIR Courts and Appeals System (ECAS), which will automatically send service notification to both parties that a new document has been filed.



Otavio Silva (Bar N. 343486)
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 90487
San Diego, CA 92169
Counsel for Respondents