HS Law Corp.
Otavio Haverroth Silva, SBN#343486
P.O. Box 90487
San Diego, CA 92169
(510) 241-9336

Non-Detained

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW
IMMIGRATION COURT
1855 Gateway Boulevard, Suite 850,
Concord, CA 94520

In the Matter of	)	
Jose Carlos Pereira dos Santos	)	**File No. A 240-169-089**
Jaqueline das Neves Dantas Maia	)	**File No. A 240-169-090**
Jose Carlos Pereira dos Santos Junior	)	**File No. A 240-169-091**
In Removal Proceedings	)	

Immigration Judge: Espana, Patrick A. **Next Hearing Date:** October 27, 2026 at 1:00 PM.

RESPONDENTS' COUNTRY CONDITIONS IN SUPPORT OF ASYLUM AND WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL

Exhibit list

Exhibits:	Pages:
Exhibit 1	
Brief Explanation	1-9
Exhibit 2	
Excerpts from Country Conditions Reports	10-24
Exhibit 3	
CC1: Brazil 2024 Human Rights Report - United States Department Of State	25-33
Exhibit 4	
CC2: Brazil Country Security Report - Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC)	34-50
Exhibit 5	
CC3: Brazilian Yearbook of Public Security 2025 - Brazilian Forum on Public Security	51-63
Exhibit 6	
CC4: Deadly democracy: Lethal political violence in Brazil - Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime	64-67
Exhibit 7	
CC 5: World Report 2023: Brazil - Human Rights Watch	68
Exhibit 8	
CC 6: Brazil: Authorities Must Guarantee Respect For Human Rights In Electoral Process - Amnesty International	69

Exhibit 9

CC 7: Brazil: Freedom in the World 2024 - Freedom House 70-72

Exhibit 10

CC 8: Brazil’s Profile - Insight Crime 73-75

Exhibit 11

CC 9: Insight Crime's 2025 Homicide Round-Up: Brazil - Insight Crime 76-77

Exhibit 12

CC 10: Less Than 40% Of Homicides In Brazil Are Solved, According To Research - CNN Brazil News Portal 78-79

Exhibit 13

CC 11: Political Violence Is Widespread Throughout The Country, And The Victims Include Professional Politicians And Activists - USP Journal 80-82

Exhibit 14

CC 12: Political Violence Is Surging Ahead Of Brazil’s Election On Sunday - TIME News Portal 83-84

Exhibit 15

CC 13: A Member Of The Workers' Party (PT) Stabbed A Friend To Death During A Political Argument - BBC News Portal 85-86

Exhibit 16

CC 14: Bolsonaro Supporter Stabbed In Political Fight And Dies In SC - O GLOBO News Portal 87

Exhibit 17

CC 15: Six Out of Ten Fear Aggression Due to Their Political Affiliation - Tribuna De Minas News Portal 88-91

Exhibit 18

CC 16: Third Edition of the Political and Electoral Violence Survey Points to Record Number of Cases in 2024 - Justiça Global 92-94

Exhibit 1

BRIEF EXPLANATION REGARDING URBAN AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE, STATE PROTECTION FAILURE AND HUMANITARIAN IMPLICATIONS FOR PERSECUTED INDIVIDUALS IN BRAZIL

1. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF URBAN VIOLENCE AND POLITICAL CRIME IN BRAZIL1
2. IMPUNITY AND THE LIMITED CAPACITY OF THE STATE TO IDENTIFY AND PUNISH PERPETRATORS…… 2
3. POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND PERSECUTION BASED ON POLITICAL OPINION IN BRAZIL ……..3
4. THE CONTINUING AND CURRENT CHARACTER OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN BRAZIL ……..5
5. THE UNAVAILABILITY OF INTERNAL RELOCATION……6
6. STATE FAILURE AND INABILITY TO INTERVENE ……7
7. CONCLUSION ……..8

1. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF URBAN VIOLENCE AND POLITICAL CRIME IN BRAZIL

Brazil continues to face pervasive urban violence arising from widespread access to firearms, the territorial influence of criminal organizations, and substantial disparities in access to public security. Although national homicide rates have declined in recent years, violent deaths remain frequent, and northern and northeastern regions continue to experience disproportionately high levels of violence (CC 2, CC 9).

Criminal organizations and armed groups maintain substantial influence in several Brazilian cities and in drug, arms, and contraband trafficking, while militias exercise control over entire neighborhoods through extortion and extrajudicial violence (CC 2, CC 8). Their territorial influence may also interfere with political activity and campaigning in the communities under their control (CC 7).

These conditions are aggravated by significant deficiencies within the criminal justice system. Limited institutional coordination and persistent impunity restricted the ability of law enforcement agencies to prevent violence and provide effective protection to individuals facing identifiable threats (CC 1, CC 8).

Within this broader environment of insecurity, political polarization has created an additional motive for violence. This problem predates the 2022 presidential election but became particularly visible during that period, when political disagreements repeatedly resulted in threats, physical assaults, shootings, and killings (CC 5, CC 6).

The available evidence does not support treating political violence as an isolated feature of that election. A study covering two decades recorded incidents in every Brazilian state and found that political violence has been present throughout the entire period examined (CC 11). The number of documented cases subsequently reached its highest recorded level in 2024 (CC 16), and a majority of the Brazilian population continued to fear physical aggression on account of political affiliation in 2026 (CC 15). Political hostility therefore remains an ongoing feature of Brazil's present country conditions.

2. IMPUNITY AND THE LIMITED CAPACITY OF THE STATE TO IDENTIFY AND PUNISH PERPETRATORS

The relevant question for an individual who has already been attacked is not the aggregate volume of violence in Brazil but the probability that the State will identify and punish the person responsible. On that measure, the record discloses no meaningful improvement. Only thirty-six percent of the homicides committed in Brazil in 2023 had been solved by the end of 2024, and, according to data requested from the Public Prosecutor's Offices and Courts of Justice of all Brazilian states, the proportion of solved cases has remained at approximately thirty-five percent since 2015, peaking in 2018 at forty-four percent (CC 10).

The stability of that figure across a decade is significant. Even as homicide indicators declined, the likelihood that an attacker would be identified and held accountable did not change. The institute responsible for the research attributed the result to structural neglect, observing that the historical series of the indicator expresses the low priority that state institutions give to solving homicides (CC 10). The same research found that only thirteen percent of the 670,792 persons held in Brazilian prisons are imprisoned for homicide (CC 10).

Data on missing persons confirm that the reduction in recorded homicides overstates the improvement in public safety. Brazilian authorities received 81,873 missing-person reports in 2024, an increase of 4.9 percent and the highest total recorded since 2018, corresponding to an average of four reports every hour (CC 3). The states located in the country's most violent regions also experienced the largest increases in disappearances during the period analyzed (CC 3), and Brazil has registered a record number of disappearances since 2015, which suggests that the drop in its homicide rate may be due at least in part to undetected murders (CC 9).

That dynamic is not incidental to the impunity problem but an instrument of it. Criminal factions and militias dispose of the bodies of executed individuals in clandestine graves as a means of eliminating rivals without drawing the attention of the State, and, as the research states, if there is no body, there is no crime, nor an investigation (CC 3). Because such reports are not treated a priori as criminal offenses, they frequently do not result in the opening of a police investigation and lack material evidence (CC 3).

For a private individual attacked by a person who is not apprehended at the scene, these conditions have a direct and measurable consequence. The investigation is statistically unlikely to identify the aggressor, and the victim is left without the protective measures that depend on the aggressor's identification. Public confidence reflects that reality, with only seventeen percent of residents in Rio de Janeiro's favelas saying they trusted the military police (CC 9). Individuals threatened by persons within their neighborhood, workplace, or social environment may therefore file a police report without obtaining continuous protection or preventing further contact with the aggressors (CC 2).

3. POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND PERSECUTION BASED ON POLITICAL OPINION IN BRAZIL

Political affiliation is a documented motive for lethal violence in Brazil, and the evidence establishes that the phenomenon operates in both political directions. A study conducted by the University of São Paulo and the Brazilian Center for Analysis and Planning recorded 760 deaths from political violence over two decades, an annual average of 61.4 cases, covering violence committed against professional politicians and against activists (CC 11). Men constituted seventy-four percent of the victims of lethal political violence, and over half of the assassinations occurred in visible public spaces, such as streets and roads (CC 4).

The manner in which these attacks are carried out is central to the present case. The study found that political violence is generally planned and that almost ninety percent of the crimes committed involved firearms. The researcher responsible for the project described the characteristic pattern as a situation of shooting, and especially execution-style shooting, shooting in the head, in the heart, from a distance, by people who have no direct relationship with the victim (CC 11). Many of these crimes occur in broad daylight, in the middle of the city, and inside public buildings (CC 11).

The absence of any prior relationship between the aggressor and the victim is therefore a defining characteristic of political violence in Brazil rather than an anomaly that would cast doubt on the political character of an attack. An assault committed by an unknown assailant who expresses a political motive conforms to the documented national pattern, and the fact that such an assailant is never identified is consistent with the clearance rates described in Section 2 above (CC 10, CC 11).

The 2022 electoral period produced extensive documentation of this phenomenon. Human Rights Watch reported that four persons were killed during the electoral campaign season in circumstances suggesting that they had been targeted for their political views, and the Observatory of Political and Electoral Violence at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro compiled 426 cases of threats and violence against individuals engaged in politics or their relatives between January and September 2022 (CC 5). Freedom House recorded fifteen murders and twenty-three attempted murders over that year's election period, while Justiça Global and Terra de Direitos recorded 247 cases of political violence in the same period (CC 7). The Observatory identified at least 214 incidents involving candidates, officials, and government workers in 2022, including forty-five alleged homicides, a figure that represented an increase of twenty-three percent since 2020 (CC 12).

The scale of that escalation is established by the same source. Freedom House reported that Brazilian voters face high levels of political violence, which increased by 400 percent between 2018 and 2022 (CC 7). In an August 2022 survey conducted ahead of the legislative elections and the presidential runoff, almost seventy percent of Brazilian respondents feared threats and harassment for their political views (CC 7). Political violence in Brazil is therefore not confined to persons who hold or seek office; it reaches the general population, and a substantial majority of that population perceived itself to be at risk.

Amnesty International characterized the escalation of politically motivated violence and threats as alarming and documented electoral coercion against working people who were under pressure to define or declare their vote, including threats of losing their jobs if they failed to do so. The organization further observed that electoral intimidation had flooded social media, where more and more people, including public figures, assault and persecute those who express an opinion different from their own (CC 6).

Private individuals aligned with either side of the political divide have been subjected to lethal violence. Hildor Henker, who had publicly identified himself as a supporter of Jair

Bolsonaro on social media, was fatally stabbed in Rio do Sul, Santa Catarina, in a crime that the Military Police attributed to political motivations, and the perpetrator fled and remained a fugitive whose identity had not been revealed (CC 14). José Roberto Gomes Mendes, another supporter of Jair Bolsonaro, was killed after a political argument with a supporter of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, in what was reported as the fifth assassination, possibly politically motivated, to occur in those elections (CC 13).

Taken together, these reports demonstrate that political violence in Brazil has involved the deliberate selection of individuals on the basis of their political participation or expressed views, rather than merely incidental exposure to generalized urban violence, and that this selection has operated irrespective of which political side the victim supported (CC 11, CC 12, CC 13, CC 14).

4. THE CONTINUING AND CURRENT CHARACTER OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN BRAZIL

Political violence in Brazil did not recede after the 2022 election. The third edition of the Political and Electoral Violence in Brazil survey, developed by Justiça Global and Terra de Direitos, recorded 714 cases between November 1, 2022 and October 27, 2024, the highest number since the beginning of the historical series in 2016 (CC 16). The year 2024 alone accounted for 558 cases, including twenty-seven murders, 129 attacks, 224 threats, seventy-one physical assaults, eighty-one offenses, sixteen criminal charges, and ten invasions (CC 16).

The trajectory of the series establishes escalation rather than dissipation. In the 2018 presidential elections, one person was a victim of political violence every eight days. In 2022, political violence victimized three people every two days. By 2024, the research recorded almost two victims of political violence per day. The series therefore reaches its highest recorded values in its most recent year rather than in 2022 (CC 16).

Conditions in the present electoral cycle confirm that the risk remains current. Research conducted by the Datafolha Institute and commissioned by the Brazilian Forum on Public Security, published under the title Fear of Crime and the 2026 Elections: The Triggers of Insecurity, found that 59.6 percent of Brazilians aged sixteen or older fear being physically assaulted because of their political or partisan choices (CC 15). A researcher at the Federal

University of Minas Gerais quoted in the same study observed that political violence could make the 2026 elections even more tense than the last ones (CC 15).

The same research supplies the figure most directly relevant to the Respondent's circumstances. Beyond perceived risk, 2.2 percent of the population, representing a projection of 3.6 million people, stated that they had been physically assaulted because of their political or partisan choice in the preceding year. The survey was conducted among Brazilians aged sixteen or older, so that figure describes the general population rather than candidates, officeholders, or other public figures (CC 15).

The distribution of that victimization further corresponds to the Respondent's profile. Men reported physical assault on political grounds at a rate of 2.9 percent, as against 1.5 percent for women, and the highest rate of victimization occurred among persons in economic classes D and E, at 3.5 percent (CC 15).

Read against the 2022 evidence, these figures establish continuity rather than change. Almost seventy percent of respondents feared threats and harassment for their political views in August 2022 (CC 7), and 59.6 percent continued to fear physical aggression on political grounds in 2026 (CC 15). A majority of the Brazilian population has therefore reported apprehension of violence on account of political affiliation across two consecutive electoral cycles (CC 7, CC 15).

5. THE UNAVAILABILITY OF INTERNAL RELOCATION

The conditions that give rise to political violence in Brazil operate nationally rather than locally. The study conducted by the University of São Paulo and the Brazilian Center for Analysis and Planning identified incidents of political violence in every Brazilian state, and the researcher responsible for the project stated that political violence is distributed throughout the entire country and that it is present in all states, throughout all these twenty years that the study covered (CC 11).

The geographic findings of that study foreclose the relocation alternatives that might otherwise appear available. The research established that political violence is more concentrated in urban areas than in rural areas, contrary to what one might think, and that it is less common in large metropolises, with the tendency being for such crimes to concentrate in small towns and to remain confined to the circuit of local politics. Neither a smaller

municipality nor a major urban center therefore corresponds to an area in which the recorded incidence of political violence is lower (CC 11).

The failure of investigation is likewise national in scope. The clearance data described above were compiled from the Public Prosecutor's Offices and Courts of Justice of all Brazilian states, and the resulting rate of approximately thirty-five percent since 2015 is a national figure. The record identifies no state or region in which the proportion of solved homicides departs meaningfully from that national rate (CC 10).

The armed actors that sustain these conditions likewise operate across state lines. The First Capital Command has affiliations in many parts of the country, and the Red Command is present in twenty-three of Brazil’s states (CC 2). Militias, largely comprised of current and former police officers, extort whole neighborhoods and commit extrajudicial killings (CC 8), and militias and other criminal organizations may exercise significant control over campaigning and other political activity within their territories (CC 7). The same categories of armed actor, exercising the same forms of territorial control, are present across the regions of the country (CC 2, CC 7, CC 8).

The deficiencies of the security forces are national in the same sense. The association of Brazilian police with abusiveness, lack of accountability, low public trust, and collaboration with organized crime is described as a characteristic of Brazilian policing generally rather than of any particular state force (CC 2, CC 8), and the judicial system is described as slow, corrupt, and generally ineffective without regional qualification (CC 8).

Relocation within Brazil accordingly leaves an individual within the same national environment of political violence, documented as present in all states throughout the twenty years examined (CC 11). It leaves that individual subject to the same rate of investigative failure, which has remained at approximately thirty-five percent nationwide since 2015 (CC 10), and dependent upon the same police and judicial institutions, whose deficiencies the record describes without regional qualification (CC 2, CC 8).

6. STATE FAILURE AND INABILITY TO INTERVENE

Brazilian authorities publicly condemned political violence and investigated several prominent incidents. Nevertheless, the continuation and geographic dispersion of attacks throughout the 2022 campaign demonstrate that these measures were insufficient to prevent politically motivated harm (CC 5, CC 7, CC 12).

Politically motivated violence occurred through different patterns that could complicate preventive intervention. A nationwide study found that political attacks were generally planned, that almost 90 percent involved firearms, and that many were carried out as execution-style shootings (CC 11). Other documented killings arose during interpersonal political arguments in private residences, workplaces, bars, political gatherings, and public streets (CC 13, CC 14).

The 2024 U.S. Department of State report documents persistent impunity for abuses, including the government's failure to consistently 'identify and punish officials who committed human rights abuses' (CC 1). This culture of impunity is compounded by concrete gaps in protection: individuals who report threats 'may file a police report without obtaining continuous protection or preventing further contact with the aggressors,' and 'formal avenues of protection may fail to provide a meaningful safeguard against further harm' (CC 1, CC 2). These limitations are especially acute for individuals targeted because of their political affiliation, who face private aggressors the State is unable or unwilling to restrain.

Furthermore, local law-enforcement agencies may have limited capacity to respond to serious crimes, while Brazilian police forces have been associated with low public trust, inadequate accountability, and corruption (CC 2). Some police officers and soldiers have also collaborated with criminal organizations or formed militias, while courts have been described as slow and generally ineffective (CC 8).

Therefore, the existence of police, prosecutorial, and judicial institutions does not necessarily establish that protection is effective in practice. Where preventive measures are unavailable, investigations are delayed, and aggressors retain access to the victim, formal avenues of protection may fail to provide a meaningful safeguard against further harm (CC 1, CC 10).

7. CONCLUSION

Political violence in Brazil constitutes a continuing condition arising within a broader context of urban insecurity and institutional limitation. It became particularly visible during the 2022 presidential election, but the documentary record establishes that it did not end with that election. The number of recorded cases reached its highest level in the historical series in 2024, when the research documented almost two victims per day (CC 16), and in the present electoral cycle 59.6 percent of Brazilians report fearing physical aggression on account of

political affiliation while 3.6 million report having experienced it within the preceding year (CC 15).

The evidence further establishes that political affiliation is a documented motive for lethal violence in Brazil in both political directions (CC 13, CC 14), and that the characteristic form of such violence is a planned firearm attack, frequently execution-style, carried out by a person who has no direct relationship with the victim (CC 4, CC 11). The absence of a prior relationship between assailant and victim is accordingly a defining characteristic of political violence as the research describes it, and not a circumstance that distinguishes an attack from the documented pattern (CC 11).

The capacity of the Brazilian State to respond to such an attack has not improved as violence has declined. Approximately thirty-five percent of homicides have been solved each year since 2015, and only thirty-six percent of the homicides committed in 2023 had been solved by the end of 2024 (CC 10). Record levels of disappearance indicate that a portion of lethal violence is never recorded as homicide at all (CC 3, CC 9). Protective measures that depend upon identification of the aggressor are unavailable where the aggressor is never identified (CC 2, CC 10).

These conditions are national. Political violence is present in all states (CC 11), the rate of investigative failure is a national rate (CC 10), and the criminal organizations and militias that sustain the environment of impunity operate across the country (CC 2, CC 8). Relocation within Brazil would not reduce the Respondent's exposure or improve his access to protection.

For an individual who has been publicly identified with one side of Brazil's political divide, who was fired upon by assailants who articulated a political motive, and whose assailants were never identified, these conditions present a danger greater than the generalized violence affecting the Brazilian population. The persistence of political hostility, combined with the documented limitations of preventive State protection and the national scope of both, permits an individualized threat to continue without an effective means of protection (CC 2, CC 8, CC 10, CC 11, CC 15, CC 16).

Exhibit 2

Jose Carlos Pereira dos Santos A#240-169-089
Jaqueline das Neves Dantas Maia A#240-169-090
Jose Carlos Pereira Dos Santos Júnior A#240-169-091

EXCERPTS FROM COUNTRY CONDITIONS REPORTS

CC 1

BRAZIL 2024 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT - UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Executive Summary

The human rights situation in Brazil declined during the year. The courts took broad and disproportionate action to undermine freedom of speech and internet freedom by blocking millions of users' access to information on a major social media platform in response to a case of harassment. The government undermined democratic debate by restricting access to online content deemed to "undermine democracy," disproportionately suppressing the speech of supporters of former president Jair Bolsonaro as well as journalists and elected politicians, often in secret proceedings that lacked due process guarantees. The government also suppressed politically disfavored speech on the basis that it constituted "hate speech," a vague term untethered to international human rights law.

Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: arbitrary or unlawful killings; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest or detention; and serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against journalists.

The government did not always take credible steps to identify and punish officials who committed human rights abuses.

Section 2. Liberty

a. Freedom of the Press

The constitution and law provided for freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media. Supreme Court (STF) rulings, however, restricted the freedom of expression for individuals it deemed to be in violation of the law prohibiting antidemocratic speech.

CC 2

BRAZIL COUNTRY SECURITY REPORT - OVERSEAS SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL (OSAC)

The U.S. Department of State has included a Crime "C" Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Brazil, indicating that there may be widespread violent crime and/or organized crime present in the country, and/or that local law enforcement may have limited ability to respond to serious crimes.

Violent crime remains a key concern for large parts of the country, with several large cities having high homicide rates. Almost every year since 2017 overall homicides have gone down, reaching the lowest levels in over a decade. However, some areas like the northern and northeastern regions of Brazil have seen higher rates than the rest of the country. The national homicide rate in 2023 was around 18.5 homicides per 100,000 residents. In 2023, there were 37,639 homicides, a 3.3% decrease from 2022. Around 90% of homicide victims are male. Conflicts between armed criminal factions competing for territorial control between each other and state security forces play a major role in driving homicide numbers.

Organized crime exists on a large scale. The largest Brazilian criminal organization, Primeiro Comando da Capital (First Capital Command, or PCC), is based in São Paulo, but has affiliations in many parts of the country. PCC is a violent prison gang that controls the majority of illegal contraband and drugs coming into/out of the prisons in São Paulo, and remains an organization of great interest to the government of Brazil and the police.

Comando Vermelho (Red Command, or CV) is Brazil's second largest criminal group with a presence in 23 of Brazil's states. It similarly has roots in the prison system, with a base in Rio de Janeiro. PCC, CV, and other similar groups participate in a variety of illicit markets in Brazil.

CC 3

BRAZILIAN YEARBOOK OF PUBLIC SECURITY 2025 - BRAZILIAN FORUM ON PUBLIC SECURITY

The rate of reported missing persons increased by 4.9% in Brazil in 2024, totaling 81,873 cases reported to Civil Police authorities nationwide. After a sharp decline in 2020 and 2021, during the Covid-19 pandemic period, the number of reports began to rise again, reaching, in the most recent year, the highest figure since 2018. **Based on recent statistics, an average of four missing persons reports per hour were filed with law enforcement authorities.**

The increase in missing persons in Brazil coincides with a period in which a significant decline in intentional violent deaths has been observed, alongside the expansion of criminal organizations such as the PCC - First Capital Command (Primeiro Comando da Capital) and the Red Command (Comando Vermelho). Following conflicts stemming from internal splits in previous years, these groups began consolidating new territories in partnership with local criminal organizations. It is therefore noteworthy that the states currently located in the most violent regions of the country also present the largest increases in the number of missing persons during the period analyzed.

Even during the democratic period, the practice of disposing of the bodies of executed individuals in clandestine graves has persisted, although research on the subject remains scarce. This practice has been primarily adopted by criminal factions and militias as a means of eliminating rivals without drawing the attention of the State. If there is no body, there is no crime, nor an investigation.

Most of these individuals end up appearing in the statistics as "missing persons" which is considered by the police to be an atypical occurrence, that is, not a crime. And since it

does not constitute, a priori, a criminal offense, this type of report frequently does not result in the opening of a police investigation, lacks material evidence, and is not subject to statutes of limitation (Ferreira, 2013).

(...) In light of the significant increase in missing persons reports in Brazil, particularly in regions marked by high homicide rates and disputes among criminal organizations, it is urgent to recognize that this dynamic may be concealing an even more perverse dimension of criminality: execution followed by concealment of the body. The absence of specific legislation defining forced disappearance as a crime hampers the institutional response to the problem, contributing to the invisibilization of victims and to the suffering of families who are deprived even of the possibility of mourning. (...)

CC 4

DEADLY DEMOCRACY: LETHAL POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN BRAZIL - GLOBAL INITIATIVE AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

Brazil can be regarded as a key case study for deeper analysis of this phenomenon. The country has a long history of political violence. Between the 1889 coup d'état that ended the empire and established the republic, and the 1964 coup that precipitated a military dictatorship, at least 20 political conflicts were resolved through the killing of opponents. The two decades of dictatorship that followed (1964–1985) maintained this method of resolving political disputes.

Since the fall of the authoritarian regime in 1985, Brazil has consolidated formal democratic institutions, held regular elections and peacefully transferred power between rival parties. Yet institutional stability has coexisted with political violence: since 2017, three former presidents have been imprisoned, one has been impeached and there has been an attempted coup. These developments are part of a social configuration that drives a preference for violent solutions to political conflicts. Nevertheless, Brazil lacks

rigorous and consolidated statistics on political assassinations.

Men constituted 74% of victims of lethal political violence, reflecting the fact that Brazil's politicians are mostly male.

Over half (54%) of assassinations occurred in visible public spaces, such as streets and roads.

CC 5

WORLD REPORT 2023: BRAZIL - HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

Political violence marred the electoral contest. Four people were killed during the electoral campaign season in circumstances suggesting they were targeted for their political views.

The Observatory of Political and Electoral Violence at Rio de Janeiro's Federal University compiled 426 cases of threats and violence against individuals engaged in politics—or their relatives—from January through September 2022. (...)

The Superior Electoral Court prohibited carrying guns in a 100-meter area around polling places on and immediately before and after election day. The Supreme Court also temporarily suspended portions of presidential decrees that had made it easier to buy and carry guns.

CC 6

BRAZIL: AUTHORITIES MUST GUARANTEE RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN ELECTORAL PROCESS - AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL

Responding to media reports of escalating episodes of politically motivated violence and threats in the context of the elections in Brazil, Erika Guevara-Rosas, Americas director at Amnesty International, said:

“The news of escalating violence and threats against people exercising their civil and political rights is alarming. Among them, the exponential increase in reports of electoral harassment against working people who are under pressure to define or declare their vote, including threats of losing their jobs if they fail to do so, is very worrying.”

“Electoral intimidation has been particularly prominent in religious centers and it has flooded social media, where more and more people, including public figures, assault and persecute those who express an opinion different from their own.”

CC 7

BRAZIL: FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2024 - FREEDOM HOUSE

B3 - 0-4 pts

Are the people’s political choices free from domination by forces that are external to the political sphere, or by political forces that employ extrapolitical means?

Brazilian voters face high levels of political violence, which increased by 400 percent between 2018 and 2022 according to a survey conducted by two nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In November 2022, Agência Pública recorded 15 murders and 23 attempted murders over that year’s election period. A study conducted by NGOs Justiça Global and Terra de Direitos recorded 247 cases of political violence in the same period. In an August 2022 survey, ahead of the legislative elections and the presidential runoff, almost 70 percent of Brazilian respondents feared threats and harassment for their political views. Militias and other criminal organizations—which may exercise significant control over campaigning and other political activity within their territories—have been blamed for a rise in violence in recent years.

BRAZIL'S PROFILE - INSIGHT CRIME

As well as being Latin America's largest country by population, economy, and area, Brazil is also home to some of the region's most powerful criminal organizations.

The country shares porous borders with every nation in South America except Ecuador and Chile, and its many major ports make it a key hub for global cocaine trafficking. It is also a major drug consumer.

Brazil's two largest gangs, the First Capital Command (Primeiro Comando da Capital – PCC) and the Red Command (Comando Vermelho – CV), have used prisons as bases of operations, becoming increasingly involved in international drug trafficking as well as arms and contraband trafficking.

Militias, largely comprised of current and former police officers, are another source of violent crime, extorting whole neighborhoods and committing extrajudicial killings.

Security Forces

Brazil's military is the largest in Latin America. Its primary role is enforcing border control, but the country's large size, combined with the remoteness of its border regions and a lack of capacity on the part of neighboring nations, makes this difficult.

Brazilian police forces have a reputation for abusiveness, lack of accountability, and low levels of public trust. They frequently face accusations of extrajudicial killings, and innocent bystanders are often caught in the crossfire of shootouts between security forces and criminals.

Corruption also poses a challenge for many Brazilian security institutions. Police and soldiers often work with organized crime groups, or form their own criminal organizations, as in the case of the militias.

Judicial System

Brazil’s judicial system has federal and state courts, as well as courts specialized in military, labor-related, and electoral matters. The country’s highest court is the Supreme Federal Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal).

Most courts are slow, corrupt, and generally ineffective. Pretrial detention is common for criminal suspects, contributing to problems in the prison system.

CC 9

INSIGHT CRIME'S 2025 HOMICIDE ROUND-UP: BRAZIL - INSIGHT CRIME

(...) The country is known for having one of the most violent police forces in the region, with only 17% of residents in Rio’s favelas saying they trusted the military police, according to the latest survey by Brazilian research institute Data Favela, which specializes in collecting data on Brazil’s most vulnerable neighborhoods.

Brazil has also registered a record number of disappearances since 2015, suggesting the drop in its homicide rate may be due at least in part to undetected murders.

CC 10

LESS THAN 40% OF HOMICIDES IN BRAZIL ARE SOLVED, ACCORDING TO RESEARCH - CNN BRAZIL NEWS PORTAL

A survey indicated that only 36% of homicides that occurred in the country in 2023 were solved by the end of 2024. The study, named "Where Impunity Lives", was released by the Sou da Paz Institute this Monday (6).

Based on data requested from the Public Prosecutor's Offices and Courts of Justice of all Brazilian states, the institute indicates that, since 2015, the percentage of solved cases has remained around 35%, peaking in 2018 at 44%.

“The historical series of the indicator expresses the low priority that state institutions give to solving homicides. It is urgent that the Ministry of Justice and Public Security create an official indicator and use this metric to identify good practices, locations with greater difficulties, and to induce public policies at the federal and state levels, focused on improving police investigations,” says Carolina Ricardo, executive director of the Sou da Paz Institute.

The research also addresses how the low efficiency in providing answers reflects on the Brazilian prison system. According to the National Penal Information System, only 13% of the 670,792 inmates are imprisoned for homicide.

CC 11

POLITICAL VIOLENCE IS WIDESPREAD THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, AND THE VICTIMS INCLUDE PROFESSIONAL POLITICIANS AND ACTIVISTS - USP JOURNAL

Like any other form of violence, political violence also leaves a trail of blood, tears, and suffering. In two decades, Brazil recorded 760 deaths from this form of violence, according to a study by USP and the Brazilian Center for Analysis and Planning (Cebrap), in a survey that took into account violence committed against professional politicians – including incumbents, candidates, and those who left office or their candidacy up to five years before the crime – and activists (union members, participants in social movements, various organizations, and civil associations). We are talking about an annual average of 61.4 cases, which represents a total of 5.1 per month, data that, in itself, faces difficulties in being collected, since some of them do not even have judicial processes. "When the bodies disappear, there are no processes," says Professor Angela Alonso, from the Department of Sociology at the Faculty of Philosophy, Letters and Human Sciences (FFLCH), a researcher at Cebrap and responsible for the project.

(...) According to Angela, this is an unprecedented survey, because those already conducted in the country are restricted to certain regions and focused on professional

politicians, while data relating to activists were practically nonexistent. "This is the first study in Brazil to simultaneously survey attempted assassinations, threats, and assassinations of activists and professional politicians," says the professor and researcher, who points out differences in the threats faced by "those who engage in politics within and those who engage in politics outside the institution." Activists, who belong to the latter group, are at high risk in certain regions of the country, while local politicians are very vulnerable and therefore frequent victims of political violence. (...)

Regional differences

The research also identified regional differences in relation to political violence, with the states of Roraima and Mato Grosso leading the statistics for political crimes compared to the other states in the Federation. On the other hand, there are cities that stand out significantly from the average, such as Lajeado do Bugre, in Rio Grande do Sul, or Santo Expedito, in the state of São Paulo. Angela also reveals that political violence is more concentrated in urban areas than in rural areas, contrary to what one might think, "but it is distributed throughout the entire country," she emphasizes. "It is present in all states, throughout all these 20 years that the study covered."

Another important point to highlight is that political violence is generally planned, and the vast majority – almost 90% of the crimes committed – involved firearms. “It’s not a crime that can be immediately characterized as revenge, as is the case with crimes of direct violence. What we found most often was this situation of shooting, and especially execution-style shooting, shooting in the head, in the heart, from a distance, by people who have no direct relationship with the victim” – which leaves room to assume that these crimes are committed by professionals, the so-called hired gunmen. “What is striking, besides the fact that they are executions in most cases, is that many of them happen in broad daylight, in the middle of the city, inside public buildings; this is not unusual.” It is also less common for these types of crimes to occur in large metropolises – the tendency is for them to concentrate in

small towns, confined, therefore, to the circuit of local politics.

CC 12

POLITICAL VIOLENCE IS SURGING AHEAD OF BRAZIL'S ELECTION ON SUNDAY - TIME NEWS PORTAL

As Brazil enters the final stretch of its campaign season, a spate of politically motivated death threats, physical attacks, and killings across the country are raising fears of more widespread violence after the Oct. 2 election.

Former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, known as "Lula," has widened his lead over right-wing incumbent Jair Bolsonaro in recent polls in the most polarized election since the end of Brazil's military dictatorship in 1985. While violence against political candidates is not unprecedented in Brazilian elections—Bolsonaro himself was nearly killed after being stabbed by a mentally ill man during the 2018 campaign—officials and analysts say this election season has seen an unusual uptick in attacks between supporters and violent threats against public officials, ministers, and poll workers.

Cases of politically motivated violence against candidates, officials and government workers have spiked 23% since 2020, according to the Observatory of Political and Electoral Violence in Brazil. There have been at least 214 such cases this year, a number that includes 45 alleged homicides, according to their analysis.

Da Silva, a left-wing former union leader who served two terms as president from 2003 to 2010, has been appearing under tight security and wears a bulletproof vest to public events. His scheduled campaign kickoff event at an engine factory in August had to be cancelled due to security concerns raised by federal police. Bolsonaro, a right-wing former army captain, has also been wearing a bulletproof vest. Unlike in his 2018 campaign, he has been limiting his interactions with supporters in the crowd at his rallies, who are patted down before they can approach the stage.

CC 13

A MEMBER OF THE WORKERS' PARTY (PT) STABBED A FRIEND TO DEATH DURING A POLITICAL ARGUMENT - BBC BRAZIL NEWS PORTAL

A supporter of former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT) confessed to killing a supporter of President Jair Bolsonaro (PL) in Itanhaém, on the coast of São Paulo, after a political argument. The case was confirmed by the São Paulo Civil Police to BBC News Brasil.

"A 42-year-old man was arrested in the act after killing another man, aged 59, on Tuesday afternoon (September 4th), on Av. Santo André, in Itapel, Itanhaém, on the coast of São Paulo," the police said in a statement.

"Military police were called to a report of an assault and, at the scene, determined that the victim had been stabbed after a political argument. The ambulance service (SAMU) was called and confirmed the death. A forensic examination of the scene was requested, and the knife was seized, in addition to a forensic medical examination of the victim. The case was registered as homicide at the DIG (Specialized Investigations Division) in Itanhaém."

According to the newspaper Folha de S.Paulo, electrician Luiz Antonio Ferreira da Silva stated in his testimony that the fight began after fashion designer José Roberto Gomes Mendes asserted that "all members of the Workers' Party are thieves." At the time of the incident, the two were having lunch at the house where they lived together.

Silva reportedly responded, "You're eating the food that the PT member bought," according to Folha. He stated that he was attacked with a knife and that he used the same weapon to fight back during a physical altercation.

According to the G1 news portal, the police report indicates that "the motives and number of stab wounds rule out, for now, the possibility of Silva claiming self-defense."

This is the fifth assassination, possibly politically motivated, to occur in these elections.

CC 14

BOLSONARO SUPPORTER STABBED IN POLITICAL FIGHT AND DIES IN SC - O GLOBO NEWS PORTAL

Hildor Henker, 34, died after being stabbed in a bar fight in the Fundo Canoas neighborhood of Rio do Sul, in the Itajaí Valley. According to the Military Police, the crime occurred around 4:30 pm this Saturday due to political motivations and old family disputes. Hildor declared himself a supporter of Jair Bolsonaro (PL) on social media. He was attended to by the Fire Department and taken to the Rio do Sul Regional Hospital, where he underwent surgery, but did not survive and died this Sunday.

The perpetrator's identity has not been revealed. According to the Military Police, he is 58 years old, has a criminal record for assault and defamation, and is currently a fugitive. After the crime, he informed his wife of what he had done and fled. According to witness accounts, the victim and the assailant were drinking together when, at some point, they began to argue. The perpetrator slapped Hildor in the face and took him outside the establishment. The stab wound severed the femoral artery. The case is being investigated by the Civil Police of the State of Santa Catarina.

Relatives and friends mourned the death and the political motivation behind the case. The wake and funeral took place on Monday.

CC 15

SIX OUT OF TEN FEAR AGGRESSION DUE TO THEIR POLITICAL AFFILIATION - TRIBUNA DE MINAS NEWS PORTAL

Six out of ten people fear being physically assaulted because of their political or partisan choices. This is according to the research "Fear of Crime and the 2026

Elections: The Triggers of Insecurity ," conducted by the Datafolha Institute and commissioned by the Brazilian Forum on Public Security. The percentage, 59.6% of Brazilians aged 16 or older, indicates a decrease compared to 2022, when it reached 68% of the population. Even so, political violence could make the 2026 elections even more tense than the last ones, according to Ludmila Ribeiro, professor and researcher at UFMG.

The numbers vary when the research differentiates by sex, race, and class. Women (65.5%) feel more fear of political aggression than men (53.1%); the black population (61.4%) also fears violence more than the white population (56.7%); finally, the fear is more pronounced in economic classes D and E (64.2%), followed by C (58.9%) and then A and B (54.9%).

Beyond fear, the research provided absolute numbers regarding physical assaults motivated by political reasons: 2.2% of the population, representing a projection of 3.6 million people, stated that they had been physically assaulted because of their political or partisan choice in the last year. In turn, men (2.9%) are more victimized than women (1.5%); Black people (2.6%) report more political assaults than white people (1.4%); and the highest victimization occurs in social classes D/E (3.5%), followed by classes A/B (2.2%) and C (1.4%).

The report also highlights how the fear of experiencing violence is mediated by exposure and presence on social media. "From the moment our lives become much more digitized, they relate to an environment that is part of our daily interactions. The more exposed we are to social media, the greater the feeling of insecurity."

CC 16

THIRD EDITION OF THE POLITICAL AND ELECTORAL VIOLENCE SURVEY POINTS TO RECORD NUMBER OF CASES IN 2024 - JUSTIÇA GLOBAL

The final data from the third edition of the Political and

Electoral Violence in Brazil survey, developed by the organizations Justiça Global and Terra de Direitos, launched this Monday (16), presents a record number of cases of political violence in the country between November 1, 2022 and October 27, 2024: there were 714 cases of violence directed at candidates or politicians in office , the highest number since the beginning of the historical series.

The research consolidates 2024 as the year with the highest number of occurrences since 2016, the year in which the research had its first edition. In the 2018 presidential elections, one person was a victim of political violence every 8 days. In 2022, political violence victimized 3 people every 2 days. By 2024, there are almost 2 victims of political violence per day.

In total, this year there were 558 cases of political violence, including 27 murders, 129 attacks, 224 threats, 71 physical assaults, 81 offenses, 16 criminal charges, and 10 invasions. Threats are the most frequent type of violence, representing almost 40% of the total cases for the year.

Exhibit 3

Brazil 2024 Human Rights Report

Executive Summary

The human rights situation in Brazil declined during the year. The courts took broad and disproportionate action to undermine freedom of speech and internet freedom by blocking millions of users' access to information on a major social media platform in response to a case of harassment. The government undermined democratic debate by restricting access to online content deemed to "undermine democracy," disproportionately suppressing the speech of supporters of former president Jair Bolsonaro as well as journalists and elected politicians, often in secret proceedings that lacked due process guarantees. The government also suppressed politically disfavored speech on the basis that it constituted "hate speech," a vague term untethered to international human rights law.

Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: arbitrary or unlawful killings; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest or detention; and serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against journalists.

The government did not always take credible steps to identify and punish officials who committed human rights abuses.

Section 1. Life

a. Extrajudicial Killings

There were several reports police committed arbitrary or unlawful killings during the year. Some killings were attributed to a police operation against transnational criminal organizations in Sao Paulo State in the first half of the year and a police operation that took place from July 2023 to April in Baixada Santista, a coastal area including the port city of Santos.

In July, a São Paulo court charged two officers from a police shock battalion (ROTA) with aggravated homicide and obstructing evidence in the death of Fábio Oliveira Ferreira, who was killed in the operation in July 2023. One defendant was Captain Marcos Correa de Moraes Verardino, one of the coordinators of the operation, who allegedly fired three shots at Ferreira after he had surrendered. The other defendant, Corporal Ivan Pereira da Silva, also of ROTA, allegedly shot the victim twice in the chest while the victim was lying on the ground. In December, the two defendants were acquitted by courts in São Paulo State. The São Paulo Public Prosecutor's Office of appealed the decision, and higher courts were considering that appeal at year's end.

In April, Roraima State Civil Police reported it launched an operation to dismiss a group of officers from the military police of Roraima suspected of being part of a militia and an extermination group, according to a *Globo*

news report. More than 100 officers were investigated, and several arrests were made. The investigation examined cases in which police officers allegedly provided armed security for illegal miners, robbed and tortured competing invaders, and robbed the miner bosses themselves.

There were developments in the politically motivated 2018 killing of city councilwoman MarielIe Franco and her driver Anderson Gomes, in Rio de Janeiro. In March, police arrested Chiquinho Brazão, a Federal Chamber deputy (representative), and his brother, Domingos Brazão, a member of the Rio de Janeiro State Audit Court, for their alleged role in ordering the 2018 killing of Franco. The brothers remained in custody and were charged with qualified homicide and attempted homicide. Rivaldo Barbosa, who was the chief of police of Rio de Janeiro when Franco was killed, was also arrested in March for allegedly helping plan the killing and for obstruction of justice. In November, two former police officers were sentenced for the killings. Ronnie Lessa was sentenced to 78 years and nine months for firing the shots that killed Franco and Gomes and injured one of Franco's aides. Élcio de Queiroz was sentenced to 59 years and eight months for driving the getaway car.

b. Coercion in Population Control

There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.

Section 2. Liberty

a. Freedom of the Press

The constitution and law provided for freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media. Supreme Court (STF) rulings, however, restricted the freedom of expression for individuals it deemed to be in violation of the law prohibiting antidemocratic speech.

Censorship by Governments, Military, Intelligence, or Police Forces, Criminal Groups, or Armed Extremist or Rebel Groups

The law prohibited politically motivated judicial censorship, but there were reports of censorship. The government censored online content deemed in violation of STF orders, which instructed platforms to remove content that allegedly spread misinformation related to the electoral system or judicial institutions or to disparage judicial officials with online threats or harassment. Court records reveal that Justice Alexandre de Moraes personally ordered the suspension of more than 100 user profiles on the social media platform X (formerly Twitter), disproportionately suppressing the speech of advocates of former president Jair Bolsonaro instead of taking narrower measures to penalize content that incited imminent lawless action or harassment. The government telecommunications regulator Anatel ordered internet service providers to block X by order of the STF on August

31, after the company failed to appoint a legal representative and pay outstanding fines for failure to remove content in compliance with orders issued by the STF and the Superior Electoral Court. The STF authorized fines of 50,000 reais ($9,000) per day to individuals or companies who accessed the platform via a virtual private network (VPN), although no fines were reportedly assessed. The STF authorized X to resume its operations in the country on October 8 after the company complied with court orders and paid outstanding fines. Other media companies were subject to similar content removal orders. This broad repression blocked Brazilians' access to information and viewpoints on a range of national and global issues. Additionally, the court's temporary prohibition on the use of a VPN, under penalty of fine, further eroded freedom of the press by removing privacy protections from individuals whose ability to blow the whistle on government corruption hinged on their capacity to do so anonymously.

Nongovernmental criminal elements at times subjected journalists to threats or violence due to the journalists' reporting on their criminal activities.

b. Worker Rights

Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining

The law provided for freedom of association for all workers (except members of the military, military police, and firefighters), the right to

bargain collectively with some restrictions, and the right to strike. The law prohibited antiunion discrimination, including the dismissal of employees who were candidates for, or holders of, union leadership positions, and it required employers to reinstate workers fired for union activity.

New unions were required to register with the Ministry of Labor, which would accept the registration unless objections were filed by other unions. The law stipulated certain restrictions, such as *unicidade* (in essence, one union per occupational category per city), which limited freedom of association by prohibiting multiple, competing unions of the same professional category in a single geographical area. Unions that represented workers in the same geographical area and professional category could contest another union's registration.

The law stipulated a strike could be ruled "disruptive" by the labor court and the union could be subjected to legal penalties if the strike violated certain conditions, such as if the union failed to notify employers at least 48 hours before the beginning of a walkout or end a strike after a labor court decision. Employers were not allowed to hire substitute workers during a legal strike or fire workers for strike-related activity, provided the strike was not ruled abusive as defined in the law.

The law obliged a union to negotiate on behalf of all registered workers in the professional category and geographical area it represented, regardless of whether an employee paid voluntary membership dues. The law included

collective bargaining rights, such as the ability to negotiate a flexible hourly schedule and work remotely. The law permitted the government to reject clauses of collective bargaining agreements that conflicted with government policy.

Freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining were generally respected, according to observers. Collective bargaining was widespread in establishments in the private sector.

In the view of nongovernmental organization (NGO) experts, the government usually effectively enforced applicable laws, and penalties were commensurate with those for other laws involving denials of civil rights, such as discrimination. Penalties were regularly applied against violators.

Forced or Compulsory Labor

See the Department of State's annual *Trafficking in Persons Report* at https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.

Acceptable Work Conditions

Wage and Hour Laws

The law provided for a minimum wage, which was higher than the official poverty income level. The law limited the workweek to 44 hours and specified a weekly rest period of 24 consecutive hours, preferably on Sundays. The law also provided for paid annual vacation, prohibited

excessive compulsory overtime, limited overtime to two hours per workday, and stipulated any hour worked above the monthly limit had to be compensated with at least time-and-a-half pay; these provisions generally were enforced for all groups of workers in the formal sector. The constitution also provided for the right of domestic employees to work a maximum of eight hours per day and 44 hours per week, and to receive a minimum wage, a lunch break, social security, and severance pay.

Occupational Safety and Health

The Ministry of Labor set occupational safety and health (OSH) standards that were consistent with internationally recognized norms, although unsafe working conditions were prevalent throughout the country, especially in construction, according to media reports. The law required employers to establish internal committees for accident prevention in workplaces. Inspectors identified unsafe conditions and responded to worker complaints, but the number of inspections conducted was lower than necessary. The law also prohibited firing employees for their committee activities. Workers could remove themselves from situations that endangered their health or safety without jeopardy to their employment, although those in forced labor situations without access to transportation were particularly vulnerable to situations that endangered their health and safety.

Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement

The Ministry of Labor addressed problems related to minimum wage, overtime, and OSH laws. In the view of NGO experts, officials effectively enforced OSH laws. Penalties for violations included fines that varied widely depending on the nature of the violation. Penalties were in general commensurate with similar crimes such as fraud or negligence. Penalties were regularly applied against violators. The number of labor inspectors was insufficient to enforce compliance, according to the Labor Inspectors Union. Inspectors had the authority to make unannounced inspections and initiate sanctions.

According to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, the informal sector represented almost 40 percent of the workforce.

Gig workers were not considered employees, and food delivery and ride-share companies did not consider the workers who provided services through their platforms to be employees. These workers were not protected by labor laws.

c. Disappearance and Abduction

Disappearance

There were no reports of enforced disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.

Exhibit 4

OSAC Country Security Report
Brazil

Published: February 5, 2025

This report is intended to supplement the U.S. Department of State COUNTRY Travel Advisory and Brazil Country Information Page.

Embassy & Consulate Contact Information

U.S. Embassy Brasília
Av.Das Nações Sul, Quadra 801, Lote 3, Brasília-DF.
Tel: +55 (61) 3312-7000
Hours: 0800 – 1700, Monday to Friday.
After-hours Emergencies: +55 (61) 3312-7400.

U.S. Consulate Porto Alegre
Av. Assis Brasil, 1889 Passo d'Areia, Porto Alegre-RS.
Tel: +55 (51) 3345-6000

U.S. Consulate Recife
Rua Gonçalves Maia, 163, Boa Vista CEP, 50070-060 Recife-PE.
Tel: +55 (81) 3416-3050

U.S. Consulate Rio de Janeiro
Avenida Presidente Wilson, 147 – Centro, Rio de Janeiro-RJ.
Tel: +55 (21) 3823-2000

U.S. Consulate São Paulo
Rua Henri Dunant, 500, Chácara Santo Antônio, São Paulo-SP, 04709-110.
Tel: +55 (11) 3250-5000

U.S. Consulate Branch Office in Belo Horizonte
Note: Does not offer consular services.

OSAC Country Chapters

São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Recife, and Porto Alegre have active OSAC chapters.

Contact OSAC's Americas team with any questions.

Brazil Travel Advisory

The current U.S. Department of State Travel Advisory at the date of this report's publication assesses that travelers should exercise increased caution due to crime.

Crime

The U.S. Department of State has assessed Brasília and Belo Horizonte as being **HIGH**-threat locations for crime, and Porto Alegre, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo as being **CRITICAL**-threat locations for crime directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests.

The U.S. Department of State has included a Crime "C" Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Brazil, indicating that there may be widespread violent crime and/or organized crime present in the country, and/or that local law enforcement may have limited ability to respond to serious crimes.

Crimes of opportunity such as armed robbery, pickpocketing, purse snatching, and smash-and-grab thefts occur with the greatest frequency. Criminals engaged in this activity are often armed and will target their victims indiscriminately, with a preference for persons projecting affluence and a lack of awareness of their surroundings. Targeted items include wallets/purses, jewelry, and electronics. Cell phones are of particular interest. It is not uncommon for quick snatch-and-grab robberies of phones. Store electronics in the trunk of a vehicle when traveling to and from an airport, and limit the number of possessions carried on your person when out and about in the city.

Street crime is an ever-present problem, especially in the evenings and late at night. Pay particular attention when traveling at night through rural areas and satellite cities, due to the significant potential for roadside robberies. Armed robberies are prevalent throughout major cities. In many of these instances, multiple armed criminals on foot or in vehicles (typically motorcycles) identify an isolated victim or take advantage of traffic jams to rob a series of gridlocked vehicles. The criminals stop in front of or alongside their victim's vehicle, present a firearm, and subsequently demand all of the victim's valuables, then depart the area. In the majority of these incidents, compliant victims are unharmed.

Foreign visitors of all nationalities, including U.S. citizens, have been victims of crime. Criminals most often target their victims due to perceived wealth and lack of awareness. There is no indication that criminals target U.S. citizens or U.S. government employees due to their nationality. Most criminals commit crimes while armed and will not hesitate to use violence if they encounter resistance. In most incidents, compliant victims were unharmed.

Foreign visitors may be more susceptible to targeting for certain crimes because they may be less likely to file a police report and/or return to testify at criminal proceedings, should police apprehend the perpetrators. Foreigners are normally seen by criminals as easier targets due to their facilitated identification and expected lack of familiarization with the local reality. Be

careful of cash transactions on the street – a hurried transaction often leaves the customer with shoddy/counterfeit goods or with counterfeit money.

Although the risk is greater at night, street crime frequently occurs during the day. Incidents of theft are frequent on city buses and metro trains. Brazil's criminals often use motorcycles in street crimes to evade police. Comply with criminals' demands; resisting increases the likelihood of serious bodily harm. Brazil's criminal justice system suffers from low conviction rates. An acute shortage of jail space in Brazil and resulting prisoner furloughs contribute to the cycle of violence. Despite laws that regulate firearms, weapons such as handguns, rifles, military grade weapons, blades, and improvised weapons are frequently involved in criminal activities. These crimes can include gratuitous violence.

Mass robberies, locally known as *arrastões*, occur when a gang of criminals sweep through public places and rob pedestrians, beachgoers, patrons, customers, and individuals stuck in traffic. An *arrastão* can occur randomly during daylight or night hours, regardless of location. Police struggle to react and capture the criminals. Comply with demands for valuables and do not resist. These have most commonly occurred in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.

Do not accept drinks from strangers and always watch your drink. Criminals may add scopolamine or a similar drug to your drink. This has been particularly prominent in relation to casual meetings at bars and restaurants in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, as well as those utilizing dating applications in Brazil. People have woken up robbed of their valuables or sexually assaulted after accepting such advances. Criminals have also utilized dating apps to lure individuals to a location before robbing or assaulting them, which has led to loss of life. Individuals deciding to use such apps should do so with substantial caution.

Exercise extreme caution in nightclubs, especially in São Paulo, where nightclub staff have swindled patrons into purchasing bottles of alcohol without disclosing the actual price of the drinks, at times running up to US$1,000/bottle. Security personnel have physically harassed patrons who refuse to pay and have taken their credit cards.

Criminals use a variety of scams to rob victims, including virtual kidnapping, whereby an unknown caller claims to have kidnapped a person you know, possibly a family member. Unless you immediately pay the ransom, they will harm the person in question. It only becomes clear that the kidnapping never until occurred after you pay a ransom. In another scam, an unknown caller states an employee or family member has been in an accident and needs immediate medical attention. You must provide payment for the injured individual to receive treatment—a common requirement in Brazil. This scam often targets household staff, who react without verifying with their employer.

Scams involving credit cards are common as well. Travelers using personal ATM or credit cards sometimes receive billing statements with unauthorized charges after using cards in Brazil, or discover their cards cloned or duplicated without their knowledge.

Due to the heightened risk of credit card fraud in Brazil, cybersecurity companies often note that, while still vulnerable, chip-and-PIN cards are more secure and harder to clone than magnetic swipe cards. Monitor credit card usage during and after your trip for transaction inconsistencies. Commonsense practices to guard against card fraud include inspecting the outside of an ATM for unusual or suspicious devices or equipment, and if using a credit card at a restaurant or store, making sure the employee brings the credit card reader to you. Never let anyone walk off with your credit card. There are reports of beach vendors adding additional zeroes to legitimate charges of those unfamiliar with the exchange rate. Always use an ATM in well-lighted, public areas, and never let someone "assist" you with your transaction.

Local cybercriminals target ATMs to obtain credit card and banking information, as well as portable point-of-sale (PoS) systems to obtain the information stored in the magnetic strip of credit cards. Because this scheme requires access to payment hardware, insider access is usually involved. Cyber criminals can install corrupt PoS card readers (commonly called *chupa-cabra*) at stores, restaurants, or ATMs. These devices steal card information wirelessly or with the help of an employee accomplice.

Avoid street vendors selling knock-off designer products; by buying them you may face a large fine.

In addition to using only trusted ATMs at major banks, hotels, or shopping malls, exchange dollars only at banks or other reputable money exchanging services. Be aware of the increased risk to credit and debit card information, and carefully monitor accounts for suspicious activity. Criminal groups have reportedly used explosives (primarily dynamite) to destroy ATMs in public areas late at night to gain access to money stored within.

Residential burglaries also pose a constant threat and concern. According to police, mobile street gangs often target residential areas in the city with more affluence. Criminals from the surrounding satellite cities travel by metro, bus, or car into these neighborhoods looking for targets of opportunity. Family members and household employees should not allow anyone to enter the residential grounds without proper identification and prearranged appointments. Local security companies that monitor security alarm systems tend to be the primary responders; local police response can be delayed for hours. Some neighborhoods employ static guard posts to monitor activity on the streets adjacent to homes. Larger properties and commercial sites generally employ 24/7 security guard services.

Typically, criminals gain entry to a property via the vehicle gate while the residents are leaving or arriving, or they threaten local staff into compliance. General countermeasures and situational awareness are strong criminal deterrents. Proper use of alarm systems to give first responders early warning, and properly checking surroundings when entering/exiting homes, have proven most effective. Residences should feature solid-core entry doors with quality deadbolts, peepholes, security grilles on all windows, adequate front and rear security lighting, and a monitored alarm system. Business and home surveillance camera systems are worthwhile investments and are effective deterrents against property crime.

Exercise increased caution in December and January. During the holiday season, Brazil experiences an increase in crime due to several factors: these include Brazil's system of prison furloughs, which allows for prisoner leave during the holidays; a higher percentage of police officers on annual leave during the coinciding summer vacations and Christmas season; and the reality that citizens receive a "13th month" salary bonus in December and are in possession of more disposable income during these months. Burglars target vacant homes and apartments during these two months with a greater frequency than the rest of the year. These crimes affect foreign visitors, who are targets on occasion due to perceived wealth.

Violent crime remains a key concern for large parts of the country, with several large cities having high homicide rates. Almost every year since 2017 overall homicides have gone down, reaching the lowest levels in over a decade. However, some areas like the northern and northeastern regions of Brazil have seen higher rates than the rest of the country. The national homicide rate in 2023 was around 18.5 homicides per 100,000 residents. In 2023, there were 37,639 homicides, a 3.3% decrease from 2022. Around 90% of homicide victims are male. Conflicts between armed criminal factions competing for territorial control between each other and state security forces play a major role in driving homicide numbers.

Organized crime exists on a large scale. The largest Brazilian criminal organization, *Primeiro Comando da Capital* (First Capital Command, or PCC), is based in São Paulo, but has affiliations in many parts of the country. PCC is a violent prison gang that controls the majority of illegal contraband and drugs coming into/out of the prisons in São Paulo, and remains an organization of great interest to the government of Brazil and the police. *Comando Vermelho* (Red Command, or CV) is Brazil's second largest criminal group with a presence in 23 of Brazil's states. It similarly has roots in the prison system, with a base in Rio de Janeiro. PCC, CV, and other similar groups participate in a variety of illicit markets in Brazil.

Assault with a deadly weapon that led to death fell 5.8% from 2022 to 2023. Additionally, attempted robbery that led to death, locally called *latrocínio*, saw a significant 22.7% reduction from 2022 to 2023.

Brazil's criminals often use motorcycles to evade police. A common street crime involves motorcycle-riding thieves driving alongside stopped cars and robbing the car's driver or pedestrians on the sidewalk. In most cases, the thieves depart after taking the victim's belongings, but sometimes victims receive injuries. Consulate employees have also been victims to these types of crimes. Comply with criminal demands for valuables, resisting increases the likelihood of serious bodily harm.

Carjacking and vehicle theft is common. Perpetrators usually carry firearms and may quickly escalate to violence. Incidents of vehicular robbery and theft declined from 2022 to 2023, by 9.5% and 3.7% respectively.

Bank robberies and assaults on ATMs and armored money trucks by criminal gangs remain a concern, yet incidents declined around 40% from 2022 to 2023, with 131 total incidents. These incidents increasingly involve the use of heavy weaponry and explosives. The criminals' superior

firepower can overwhelm police, particularly in rural interior towns. Gangs have attacked bank branches during day and night. In small cities, where the security is not as omnipresent, thieves have used explosives to assault banks, and have used innocent bystanders as "human shields," creating a barrier to allow them to escape safely.

Cargo theft remains a major security issue on the roads throughout Brazil, despite a 10% decrease in reported incidents in 2023. Incidents increased in the north and northeast of Brazil in 2023, but São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro states saw about 82% of all incidents. Incidents of cargo theft, both from overland shipments originating at ports of entry and from storage facilities, occur frequently. Brazil's rate of cargo theft is among the highest in the region, and of particular concern in Rio de Janeiro. Criminals target all commercial goods, although shipments of petroleum, pharmaceuticals, and mobile electronics are especially lucrative. As a result, many companies employ countermeasures, including armed security escorts for high value loads and the use of satellites to track truck movements.

Parks, beaches, and other recreational areas have experienced violent crimes, mostly at night, to include assault, theft, and sexual assault. Although assault and theft are also common during the day, higher rates of crime have been reported at night. Depart from these public areas before sundown.

Public transportation hubs, hotel sectors, and tourist areas are the locations with the highest crime rates, ranging from petty theft to armed robbery, especially at night. U.S. government personnel are discouraged from using municipal buses throughout Brazil due to the risk of robbery and assault at all times of day. Crime statistics indicate that passengers face an elevated risk of robbery or assault using public, municipal bus transportation throughout Brazil. Those utilizing metro systems in Brazil should be cautious of pick-pockets and mind their belongings closely – especially during rush hour. Sexual harassment is commonly reported on public transportation.

Crime on the roads remains a problem, especially during evening travel, traffic jams, and road closures due to protests. Carjacking and robbery occur in cities, particularly at night. Criminals take advantage of victims stopped at red lights, particularly in the evening hours, and in less dense or remote areas of the city. Call **0800-081-1078** for the Traffic Police (CTTU). Some U.S. companies use armored passenger vehicles to transport visiting senior executives they deem to be targets due to their high profile or high-value status.

Throughout Brazil, low-income informal housing developments in urban areas known as favelas (sometimes called *communidades*, *vilas*, or *conglomerados*) are common and easily recognizable. Many of these marginalized areas lack a robust state presence and are controlled by criminal groups. They tend to more frequently see shoot-outs between criminals and police, as well as other illegal activity with a higher frequency. It is not uncommon for these areas to be in close proximity to middle or upper-income areas. These areas are off limits to U.S. government personnel and considered Level 4: Do Not Travel locations. It is recommended to avoid them, especially those without around-the-clock police presence. The U.S. Embassy

website has maps of informal housing developments in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Brasília, and Salvador. However, the maps are not exhaustive.

Below includes additional areas of concern within each of the consular districts in Brazil and is separated by the five U.S. consular districts. To locate which consular district a particular location falls within, visit the Contact Information and Working Hours page on the Embassy website or reference the image below.

Travelers should exercise caution along Brazil's border areas. Do not travel to any areas within 150 km/100 miles of Brazil's land borders with Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Guyana, Suriname, French Guiana, and Paraguay due to crime (note: this does not apply to the Foz do Iguaçu National Park or Pantanal National Park).



Figure 1: U.S. Consular Districts in Brazil.

Brasília Consular District

The Federal District (*Distrito Federal*) of Brasília was a planned city and has been the seat of the federal government since its founding in 1960. It has since grown to the fourth most-populated metropolitan area in Brazil. Several outer lying areas of Brasília, known as its Administrative Regions or "Satellite Cities" are considered Level 4: Do Not Travel locations between the hours

of 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. (non-daylight hours) for U.S. government personnel, due to crime. These areas include Ceilândia, Santa Maria, São Sebastião, and Paranoá. For 2023, the homicide rate for the Federal District was about 8.0 homicides per 100,000 residents, down from 11.3 in 2022.

Bus stations in and around downtown Brasília remain a concern, including the principal station, Estacão Rodovíara. Pickpocketing and armed robberies occur in these locations more frequently than in other areas of the city. Remain alert to surroundings, especially at large markets. Many foreign visitors to Brasília opt to stay in Asa Sul, Asa Norte, Lago Sul, Lago Norte, Sudoeste, and Aguas Claras.

Several states in the northern region of Brazil, which includes much of the Amazon basin, have seen higher violent crime rates in recent years when compared to other parts of the country. Manaus, capital of Amazonas state, was the municipality with the third highest homicide total in 2023 with 866, including 24 robberies leading to death. Amazonas had an overall homicide rate of 31.79. The state of Amapá saw a 59% increase in homicides from 2022 to 2023 and registered the highest homicide rate of any other Brazilian state at 41.29. The state of Pará had a rate of 30.11, with its capital city of Belém registering 284 homicides in 2023. The state of Roraima has had an ongoing challenge related to illegal mining, which has led to conflict between wildcat miners and indigenous groups. However, the state did see a 25% decrease in homicides from 2022 to 2023 with a rate of 20.42. Similarly, Tocantins saw a 14% decline to 22.76, and there was a 12% decline Goáis's homicide rate to 14.07.

The state of Mato Grosso in the center-west region registered a nearly 50% increase in attempted homicides in 2023, with a homicide rate of 23.86.

In Brazil's southeast, Minas Gerais registered a homicide rate of 12.94 in 2023.

Porto Alegre Consular District

Porto Alegre is the capital of Brazil's southernmost state, Rio Grande do Sul. In 2023, the state registered its biggest drop in homicides since 2010, with a homicide rate of 18 per 100,000 residents in 2023. Criminal violence in Porto Alegre and Rio Grande do Sul peaked between 2016 and 2017, mainly due to disputes between local criminal organizations over territory. However, since the implementation of the multiagency program, RS Seguro, by the state government in 2019 crime reporting has shown a substantial drop not only in Porto Alegre, but throughout the whole state. Rio Grande do Sul security authorities continue to repeatedly deny the presence of PCC and/or CV in the state and affirm their indirect presence locally is noted in specific partnerships with local minor criminal groups such as Os Manos and Bala na Cara.

In the Porto Alegre metropolitan area, there are currently over 1,000 surveillance cameras monitoring and deterring crime, controlled and monitored by a state-funded central command center and the current State Government keeps on investing heavily in security technology and other solutions. In neighborhoods such as Bela Vista, Higienópolis, Auxiliadora, Moinhos de Vento and Petrópolis (the site of Consulate direct-hire housing), static guards oversee main

access points. Larger apartments and commercial sites often employ 24/7 on-site private unarmed security guard services. Although there have been no reports of residential break-ins and burglaries against U.S. employees, residential burglaries pose a constant concern.

In Porto Alegre, the incidence of crime against tourists is greater in areas surrounding the airport, hotels, bars, nightclubs, the Porto Alegre Centro Histórico, public transportation, and other establishments that cater to visitors. It's not recommended to wander in suburban areas of Porto Alegre due to its lack of infrastructure, including unclear road signage, poor cellphone service in some areas, deserted buildings, and higher violent crime rates.

The state of Santa Catarina and its capital, Florianópolis are considered to have some of the lowest crime rates in Brazil, with only 8.9 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2023. The state does face issues such as money laundering and criminal activities at the seaports related to drug trafficking and transporting other illicit goods. The PCC has a small presence in Florianopolis and other main cities such as Joinville and Balneario Camboriu. Disputes between them and the main criminal organization in Santa Catarina, Primeiro Grupo Catarinense (PGC), for territory do occur, including a violent confrontation in late October 2023 between the two groups and police. However, these incidents are rare.

Although violence is rated very low in Santa Catarina State, visitors should still guard against petty theft- specially at beaches and other touristic spots, exercise caution at night, and preferably not display indications of wealth.

Santa Catarina has also one of the highest rates of neo-Nazism in the country, after São Paulo state, and is partially tied to its large German descendant population. Local security authorities have worked to identify and map neo-Nazi cells and supporters.

Recife Consular District

The northeast region of Brazil had the highest average homicide rate when compared to other regions of the country at 30.15 homicides per 100,000 residents. However, some states saw reductions from 2022 to 2023. Piauí saw a 11.3% decline in homicides, Sergipe had a 22% decline, and Rio Grande do Norte state saw a 17% decline as the state has worked to improve security, including in its capital, Natal.

Like many other metropolitan cities in Brazil, crime is a major concern in Recife. All neighborhoods in Recife are susceptible to criminal activity. Tourists and foreigners are frequently targeted by criminals in Recife Antigo (Old Town Recife). The state of Pernambuco, of which Recife is the capital, had the second-highest homicide rate in Brazil in 2023 at 36.78, a 6% increase from 2022. Public security officials reckon that over 70% of homicides in the state are linked to drug trafficking and violent conflicts among rival gangs. Recife registered the fifth-most homicides for any municipality in Brazil in 2023 with 556.

Alagoas state had the third highest homicide rate among Brazilian states with 35 homicides per 100,000 residents in 2023. Maceió, the state capital, registered 394 homicides. The state of

Ceara had a homicide rate of 33 homicides per 100,000 residents for 2023. Its capital, Fortaleza, registered the fourth most homicides among municipalities in Brazil with 715. Maranhão saw a 5% increase in homicides in 2023 with a rate of 25.35.

Rio de Janeiro Consular District

In Rio de Janeiro, violent crimes such as murder, armed robbery, carjacking, assault, drugging, and kidnapping are a frequent occurrence. In Zona Sul, opportunistic street crime such as pickpocketing, purse snatching, and smash-and-grab theft from vehicles and storefronts is a constant concern. These acts take place in all areas of the city at any time throughout the year. Major drug gangs and militias control organized crime in Rio de Janeiro, operating mainly in the favelas and in the country's prison system. All of Rio's neighborhoods are subject to criminal activity.

The south and southwest of the city are more common locations for foreign visitors to stay, and host many of the touristic points and tourist infrastructure in the city. Ipanema, Leblon, Urca, Lagoa, Jardim Botânico, Copacabana, Botafogo, Flamengo, and Barra da Tijuca are among neighborhoods where visitors commonly find lodging. However, crime occurs throughout the city, and you should always exercise an increased situational awareness when in public and transiting between destinations.

The city center, or *Centro*, is lower risk to visit during the day. However, it is not recommended to go to the center after dark as it is known to become more unsafe, with a higher risk of mugging and violent crime. The north of the city includes some higher-crime areas that may put visitors at greater risk if they are unfamiliar with the area. The U.S. government includes informal housing developments, commonly referred to as *favelas*, as Level 4: Do Not Travel locations in Brazil.

There has been an increase in roadway violence that is directly attributed to favela police operations. This is most impactful on the road from the Galeão–Antonio Carlos Jobim International Airport (GIG) to Zona Sul, along Linha Vermelha. A new tactic has appeared in recent months whereby criminals deliberately shoot at cars and drivers to divert police attention away from arrest operations they may be conducting. Linha Vermelha was shut down at least twice, for an hour or more, in late 2024 due to this kind of activity. This can impact travelers transiting to/from the international airport.

In 2023, the state of Rio de Janeiro had a homicide rate of 22.21. Fifty of the 131 bank robberies carried out nationally occurred in the state, and it saw the highest number of state security personnel killed with 51. The city of Rio de Janeiro registered the largest total number of homicides than any other municipality in Brazil in 2023 with 1,118 murders, a 6.6% increase from 2022, and saw the second most deaths resulting from armed robbery with 26.

Violence escalated in the state of Bahia in 2022-2023 as rival criminal factions, including PCC, CV affiliates, and others engaged in territorial battles, with violence concentrated in Salvador. In 2023, the state of Bahia registered a homicide rate of 32.67 homicides per 100,000 residents.

The state capital, Salvador, had the second highest number of homicides of any municipality in Brazil with 986.

São Paulo Consular District

All neighborhoods in São Paulo are susceptible to crime, including affluent residential sections where government and business leaders reside. Public transportation hubs, hotel sectors, and tourist areas have the highest rates of robbery and theft. The Secretary of Public Security publishes comprehensive crime statistics. In 2023, São Paulo state registered the lowest homicide rate of any state in Brazil at 5.64 homicides per 100,000 – its lowest rate in almost 20 years. However, the state registered the highest number of robberies that ended in homicide than any other state, with 43 in the city of São Paulo alone. Car theft remains a prominent problem in the state of São Paulo. Homicides in Sao Paulo state in 2024 are on track to be lower than 2023, with an estimated rate of 4.68 homicides per 100,000.

Many visitors to São Paulo stay in the west and southwest of the city. This includes areas near to Avenida Paulista, Jardins, Vila Madelena, Pinheiros, Paraíso, and Bela Vista. International business travelers commonly stay in the Itaim Bibi, Faria Lima, and Berrini areas. Crime, especially non-violent crimes, still occurs in these areas.

The Tri-Border Area (TBA) of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay is a regional hub for the transit of illicit goods, including narcotics and firearms. To date, no incidents directed against U.S. citizens have occurred in this area. Visitors to the area, to include Foz de Iguaçu, should remain especially vigilant and maintain a low profile. Mato Grosso do Sul, Paraná, and São Paulo states contain trafficking routes for marijuana and cocaine.

Kidnapping Threat

The U.S. Department of State has not included a Kidnapping “K” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Brazil.

While Brazilians are most often the targets of kidnapping, foreigners are also vulnerable. Vary routes and times of travel. Household help should not allow anyone to enter the residence without identification and prearranged appointments. Report suspicious persons or activities in the neighborhood to the police immediately. Kidnapping for ransom involving U.S. citizens is rare. Regardless, U.S. businesses often take security precautions for senior executives who are resident in São Paulo and other major cities, arranging significant security measures for high-level visits.

While kidnappings for ransom have become less common in recent years, incidents continue to occur. One tactic of organized gangs is to target individuals observed withdrawing money from ATMs or exiting banks. Using ATMs located in secure locations such as shopping malls or major hotels reduce the chances of criminal targeting.

Another version of this is express kidnapping, an ongoing criminal activity in which kidnappers take ATM users at gunpoint and take them to several ATMs to withdraw cash. Criminals have also utilized banking applications when carrying express kidnappings, forcing victims to open their banks apps and transfer funds. This has primarily been used with the local banking application Pix. While Brazilians are the most frequent targets, foreigners are also vulnerable to this crime.

It is also advised to park vehicles in garages and other well lighted/guarded areas, since criminals will often confront victims upon entry into their vehicles. Limit the amount of bank/credit cards in your wallet to limit the potential loss and duration of the incident.

"Virtual kidnapping" scams also occur with some frequency, particularly targeting business leaders. These incidents often involve allegations that the business leader's family member has been kidnapped, and demand a ransom. Usually these incidents involve smaller amounts, with demands for expediency (before it is discovered that the alleged kidnapping victim is not actually kidnapped.)

Terrorism

The U.S. Department of State has assessed Brasília, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo as **LOW**-threat locations for terrorism directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests.

The U.S. Department of State has not included a Terrorism "T" Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Brazil.

Brazil is a non-aligned country with no significant enemies and is not the target of any known radical groups. Though there are no known indigenous terrorist groups operating in Brazil, several al-Qa'ida members or sympathizers operate in the country. Concerns exist regarding the facilitation of transfers of money and people for terrorist organizations.

While organized terrorism may not be as pronounced of a threat in Brazil, lone wolf terrorist attacks have gained momentum. School shootings have become more prevalent in Brazil over the past few years. Since 2019, Brazil has experienced 17 school attacks that have led to the deaths of 26 people.

Political Violence and Civil Unrest

The U.S. Department of State has assessed Belo Horizonte, Brasília, Porto Alegre, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo as being **MEDIUM**-threat locations for political violence directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests. The U.S. Department of State has assessed Recife as being a **LOW**-threat location for political violence.

The U.S. Department of State has not included a Civil Unrest "U" Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Brazil. Civil unrest can develop quickly without prior notice, often interrupting

logistics and services. Avoid demonstration activity, as even those planned to remain peaceful have the potential to turn violent.

Political violence is possible in any of the major cities of Brazil, but generally uncommon. Economic conditions in Brazil have the potential to contribute to civil unrest, protests, and strikes.

Extremist groups occasionally conduct acts of civil disobedience and may conduct violent confrontations with police. There have been political protests in the past year throughout the country.

Elections/Political Stability

Nationwide municipal elections were held in October 2024 and were considered free and fair. However, the 2024 election campaign did register a record number of cases of political violence in Brazil. There were at least 338 episodes from July to September 2024, according to a survey by the Electoral Investigation Group of the Federal University of the State of Rio de Janeiro.

General elections were last held on October 2, 2022, to elect the president, vice-president, and many other political offices. The presidential election was extremely close with current President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, or simply Lula, defeating the then incumbent Jair Bolsonaro.

Bolsonaro made several allegations of election fraud and requested that the Superior Electoral Court invalidate the votes recorded by electronic voting machines that lacked identification numbers. The court rejected the request. On January 8, 2023, pro-Bolsonaro protestors unsuccessfully stormed the offices of the National Congress, the Presidential Palace, and the Supreme Federal Court seeking to violently overthrow the democratically elected Lula. Bolsonaro was subsequently barred from running for office until 2030.

There has been increased polarization between right and left-wing supporters in recent years, with increased concerns of partisan violence. Polarization has resulted in more protests split along ideological lines. Protestors and counter-protestors often demonstrate on issues such as human rights, the right to bear arms, labor laws, and social security system reform. These demonstrations are sometimes violent.

The next general election in Brazil is scheduled to occur in October 2026.

Protests & Demonstrations

São Paulo hosts public demonstrations periodically. Frequent calls for strikes remain a constant concern. São Paulo continues to experience strikes originating from the public transportation, petroleum, postal, and education sectors. Most protests in São Paulo occur on Avenida Paulista (near the *Museu de Arte de São Paulo*, or MASP) or in or around Praça da Sé (See Square).

The vast majority of these are peaceful, but some develop into violence, resulting in disturbances, property damage, and confrontation between protestors and opposing groups and/or police. Some protestors in Brazil use black bloc tactics. Their mission is to infiltrate otherwise peaceful demonstrations to cause chaos and violence between police forces and protestors. Their tactics involve total face coverage.

In Rio de Janeiro protests often occur in the city center, which includes many other government and cultural buildings. These may occur near Praca Floriano and along the broad Avenida Presidente Vargas. Occasionally, demonstrations are organized along Copacabana's Avenida Atlantica.

In Brasília and other cities, protests over inflation, living conditions, and labor relations are common. While most demonstrations remain peaceful and well controlled by local authorities, acts of violence and confrontation with police occurs. Protests can form with little notice, and often result in clashes with police, deployment of tear gas, and destruction of property, to include burning city buses and attacking private business establishments. Within the Federal District, most protests and demonstrations take place in the city's large, open public Esplanda area.

In the past several years, Brazilians, political parties, and social organizations have used major international and national events as a platform to voice discontent with the Brazilian government.

In 2018, a massive nationwide strike by truck driver unions protesting diesel fuel prices, tolls, and the need for tax reform paralyzed roads, causing nationwide shortages of food, medicine, and oil.

Anti-U.S./Anti-Western Sentiment

Most Brazilians regard U.S. nationals in a positive manner and are friendly to foreigners.

Law Enforcement

Law Enforcement and Emergency Contact Information:

- Civil Police Emergency Line: **197**
- Federal Police: **194**
- Military Police: **190**
- Federal Highway Patrol: **191**
- State Highway Patrol: **198**

The three national police forces–the Federal Police, Federal Highway Police, and Federal Railway Police–have domestic security responsibilities and report to the Justice Ministry.

Federal Police (*Policia Federal*, DPF): Responsible for crimes against federal institutions, to include international drug trafficking, terrorism, cyber-crime, organized crime, public

corruption, white-collar crime, money laundering, immigration, border control, airport security, and maritime policing.

Federal Highway Police (*Policia Rodoviária Federal*, PRF): Brazil's federal highway patrol is principally tasked with combatting crime on Brazil's federal roads and highways, as well as monitoring and enforcing traffic laws. They may also perform emergency response. Federal roadways are designated with a "BR."

There are two distinct units within each state's police forces:

- **Civil Police (*Polícia Civil*):** They carry out criminal investigations, gather evidence, execute warrants, operate police stations (*delegacies*) where crimes are reported and processed. They focus on complex crimes like fraud, homicide, drug trafficking, and organized crime.

- **Military Police (*Polícia Militar*):** They are tasked with maintaining law and order. They conduct patrols, deter criminal activity, provide immediate response to emergencies and disturbances, conduct traffic enforcement, and crowd control. Despite the name, military police forces do not report to the Defense Ministry. They are the Brazilian equivalent of U.S. uniformed state police officers, deploying solely to respond to or act as a deterrent against the commission of crime.

The armed forces also have some domestic security responsibilities and report to the Defense Ministry.

Police Response

Local police are generally well equipped and responsive to requests for assistance from U.S. and other foreign visitors. However, disparities do exist across Brazil's 27 states in terms of response capability and law enforcement resources for public security.

Civilian authorities have at times not maintained effective control over security forces. Members of the security forces have committed numerous abuses. From 2018-2023 police-involved shootings resulted in over 6,000 civilian deaths nationwide in 2023, with Bahia and Rio de Janeiro seeing the largest number of victims.

Travelers with Special Considerations

For specific traveler concerns in Brazil, review the local laws and circumstances on the Department of State's Country Information Page.

- Women Travelers
- LGB Travelers
- Travelers with Disabilities
- Student Travelers
- Faith-Based Travelers

Rule of Law, Arbitrary Detention, Official Harassment, Corruption, & Transparency

The U.S. Department of State has not included a Risk of Wrongful Detention "D" Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Brazil.

The constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and limits arrests to those caught in the act of committing a crime or called for by order of a judicial authority; however, police at times did not respect this prohibition. The law provides for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court. The government generally observes this provision.

The law provides criminal penalties for conviction of corruption by officials and stipulates civil penalties for corruption committed by Brazilian citizens or entities overseas. There have been numerous reports of corruption at various levels of government, and delays in judicial proceedings against persons accused of corruption were common, often due to constitutional protections from prosecution for elected officials. This often resulted in de facto impunity for those responsible.

Brazil embraces a robust and energetic press system that is often critical of the government. The Brazilian press has been successful in the past in uncovering and reporting corruption. Several past high ranking Government officials have gone to prison as the result of investigative reporting.

Cybersecurity

Brazil is one of Latin America's leading digital nations. Approximately 84% of Brazilians are active internet users, with 8 out of 10 active on social media. Brazilian financial institutions were early pioneers of online services, and continue to invest heavily in evolving IT security solutions. Next-generation biometric identity technologies are common features in Brazil's consumer banking sectors. Nevertheless, cybersecurity and online fraud are persistent concerns, with annual losses reaching billions of dollars. Hacktivists have defaced government websites and taken them offline in recent years.

Brazil continues to rank as one of the most pervasive cybercrime environments in the world. Brazilian cybercriminals have grown more brazen despite new legislation and official efforts to stop malicious activity online. The banking sector has been the primary target of these operations; however, cybercrime in Brazil also affects daily Internet users, private-sector organizations, and short-term travelers. Maintain awareness of popular schemes to avoid becoming a cybercrime victim.

Import/Export Restrictions

Brazilian customs authorities may enforce strict regulations concerning temporarily importing or exporting items such as firearms, ammunition, antiquities, mineral samples, tropical plants, wildlife, medications, and business and communication equipment. There are no known issues with bringing in satellite phones.

A country-specific listing of items/goods prohibited from being exported to the country or that are otherwise restricted is available from the U.S. International Trade Agency website.

Additional resources and reports can be found in the OSAC Traveler Toolkit.

Exhibit 5

Brazilian Yearbook of Public Security 2025

FÓRUM BRASILEIRO DE SEGURANÇA PÚBLICA

A636

Brazilian Yearbook of Public Security / Brazilian Public Security Forum. – 1. 2006 - . – São Paulo: FBSP (Brazilian Forum on Public Security), 2025.
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ISSN: 1983-7364

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Increase in Missing Persons May Obscure Executions and Forced Disappearances

Samira Bueno
Executive Director of the Brazilian Forum on Public Security (FBSP) and has a PhD in Public Administration and Government, FGV-SP


Beatriz Schroeder
Researcher at the Brazilian Forum on Public Security (FBSP) and has a Bachelor's Degree in Public Administration, FGV-SP

Isabela Sobral
Supervisor of the Data Unit at the Brazilian Forum on Public Security and has a Master's Degree in Public Administration and Government, FGV EAESP

The rate of reported missing persons increased by 4.9% in Brazil in 2024, totaling 81,873 cases reported to Civil Police authorities nationwide. After a sharp decline in 2020 and 2021, during the Covid-19 pandemic period, the number of reports began to rise again, reaching, in the most recent year, the highest figure since 2018. **Based on recent statistics, an average of four missing persons reports per hour were filed with law enforcement authorities.**

An analysis of regional variation between 2018 and 2024 indicates that the Northeast and North regions recorded the largest increases during the period, at 41.4% and 31.0%, respectively. The Southern region also experienced an increase of 6.2%, while the Southeast region registered a decrease of 4.1%, and the Central-West region, a decrease of 13.5%.

CHART 26
Missing Persons Reports
Brazil and Regions, 2018–2024



	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Brazil	78.290	79.608	62.913	65.263	77.823	77.725	81.873
North	3.823	4.017	2.940	3.711	4.654	4.976	5.010
Northeast	9.894	9.312	7.746	9.118	12.151	13.044	13.995
Central-West	9.899	9.832	7.136	6.583	9.375	8.882	8.567
Southeast	36.636	36.828	30.144	30.146	34.792	33.285	35.145
South	18.038	19.619	14.947	15.705	16.851	17.538	19.156

Source: State Secretariats of Public Security and/or Social Defense; Rio de Janeiro Public Security Institute (ISP); Civil Police of the Federal District; Civil Police of the State of Roraima; Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) – Population Projections for Brazil and its Federative Units; Brazilian Forum on Public Security.

The increase in missing persons in Brazil coincides with a period in which a significant decline in intentional violent deaths has been observed, alongside the expansion of criminal organizations such as the PCC - First Capital Command (*Primeiro Comando da Capital)* and the Red Command (Comando Vermelho). Following conflicts stemming from internal splits in previous years, these groups began consolidating new territories in partnership with local criminal organizations. It is therefore noteworthy that the states currently located in the most violent regions of the country also present the largest increases in the number of missing persons during the period analyzed.

The states located in the most violent regions of the country currently also present the largest increases in the number of missing persons during the period analyzed.

In 2024, the states that recorded the highest increases in missing persons rates were Amapá (+27%), Sergipe (+19.9%), and Bahia (+14.8%). These same states also stood out during the same period for reductions in intentional violent deaths. However, these territories are marked by intense disputes among criminal organizations for control of drug trafficking and by high levels of police lethality, which raises the hypothesis that part of the violence in these contexts may be concealed in the form of disappearances.

In light of this context, the analysis of the reduction in intentional violent deaths must be qualified by the growth in disappearances, acknowledging that official lethal violence rates may be underestimated due to the practice of disposing of the bodies of execution victims.

This phenomenon, moreover, is not new in Brazil. Since at least the period of the military dictatorship, the existence of clandestine cemeteries used for the disposal of bodies has been documented. In 1990, the country became aware of a clandestine cemetery in São Paulo, created by state agents during the military regime for the disposal of the remains of victims of political repression and of death squads formed by police officers. In the Perus mass grave, as it became known, 1,049 bags containing skeletal remains were found.[1]

Even during the democratic period, the practice of disposing of the bodies of executed individuals in clandestine graves has persisted, although research on the subject remains scarce. This practice has been primarily adopted by criminal factions and militias as a means of eliminating rivals without drawing the attention of the State. If there is no body, there is no crime, nor an investigation.

Most of these individuals end up appearing in the statistics as “missing persons,” which is considered by the police to be an atypical occurrence, that is, not a crime. And since it does not constitute, a priori, a criminal offense, this type of

1 Perus Mass Grave: The clandestine cemetery where the military dictatorship hid the remains of victims of repression. Available at: https://blogs.oglobo.globo.com/blog-do-acervo/post/vala-de-perus-descoberta-do-cemiterio-clandestino-onde-foram-enterradas-vitimas-da-ditadura.html

The legal classification of disappearance is relatively recent in Brazil. It was only with the enactment of Law No. 13,812, of March 16, 2019, that a legal concept for the disappearance of a person was formally established.

report frequently does not result in the opening of a police investigation, lacks material evidence, and is not subject to statutes of limitation (Ferreira, 2013).[2]

The legal classification of disappearance is relatively recent in Brazil. It was only with the enactment of Law No. 13,812, of March 16, 2019, that the legal concept of a missing person was defined as: "any human being whose whereabouts are unknown, regardless of the cause of the disappearance, until their recovery and identification have been confirmed through physical or scientific means."

Experts on the subject argue, however, that although the law represents an advance, it is excessively vague, as it does not differentiate among types of disappearance. The public prosecutor of the State of São Paulo, Eliana Vendramini,[3] argues in her doctoral dissertation that disappearances should be classified into three types: voluntary disappearance, in which an adult individual voluntarily distances themselves from family and friends; involuntary disappearance, in which a person leaves or is removed by third parties without the ability to signal the event, due to incapacity, accidents, or natural disasters; and forced disappearance, in which a person, whether capable or not, is forcibly removed through violence or threat (Carneiro, 2022[4]; Brazilian Forum on Public Security (FBSP), 2023[5]).

In December 2006, the United Nations General Assembly approved the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, which is defined under international law as a crime against humanity, and whose text entered into force in 2010. Although Brazil is a signatory to the UN Convention[6], as well as to the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons[7], the country still lacks domestic legislation formally classifying the offense as a crime.

Data from the Missing Persons Map in Brazil, produced by the Brazilian Forum on Public Security, show that the profile of missing persons is predominantly composed of men (62.8%), adolescents and young people (53.5%), and Black individuals (54.3%), who disappear primarily between Friday and Sunday—the same profile observed among homicide victims.

2 FERREIRA, Letícia Carvalho de Mesquita. From a family problem to a social problem: ethnographic notes on missing persons in contemporary Brazil. Anuário Antropológico [online], vol. 38, no. 1, 2013.

3 CARNEIRO, Eliana Faleiros Vendramini. Missing persons: a critical analysis of the State's criminal policy. 2022. 155 p. Doctoral Dissertation (PhD in Law) – Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo (PUC-SP), São Paulo, 2022. Available at: https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/30904. Accessed on April 23, 2024.

4 CARNEIRO, Eliana Vendramini. Missing persons: a critical analysis of the State's criminal policy. Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo. Doctoral Dissertation. São Paulo, 2022.

5 Brazilian Forum on Public Security. Map of Missing Persons in Brazil. Available at: https://publicacoes.forumseguranca.org.br/server/api/core/bitstreams/91de3f95-67de-410a-9fb7-ce0227d248cb/content

6 Regulated by Decree No. 8,767, of May 11, 2016. Available at: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2015-2018/2016/decreto/d8767.htm

7 Regulated by Decree No. 8,766, of May 11, 2016. Available at: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2015-2018/2016/decreto/d8766.htm

A brief Google search indicates the existence of clandestine cemeteries used for the disposal of bodies by criminal organizations in cities across several Brazilian states, including Mato Grosso[8], Bahia[9], Rio Grande do Sul[10], Pará[11], São Paulo[12], Rio de Janeiro[13], and Ceará[14], among others. Not by coincidence, a recent study conducted by the Brazilian Forum on Public Security in partnership with Datafolha, entitled Victimization and Perception of Violence and Public Security Survey[15], found that between July 2023 and June 2024, an average of 8% of the Brazilian population aged 16 years or older reported having knowledge of the existence of "clandestine cemeteries" in the cities where they lived. In 2024, this figure corresponded to approximately 14.2 million people. According to the same survey, this percentage is even more significant among residents of state capitals and municipalities with more than 500,000 inhabitants, where 17% of residents reported knowing of illegal cemeteries. In light of the significant increase in missing persons reports in Brazil, particularly in regions marked by high homicide rates and disputes among criminal organizations, it is urgent to recognize that this dynamic may be concealing an even more perverse dimension of criminality: execution followed by concealment of the body. The absence of specific legislation defining forced disappearance as a crime hampers the institutional response to the problem, contributing to the invisibilization of victims and to the suffering of families who are deprived even of the possibility of mourning. The approval of Bill No. 6,240/2013, which has been pending in the National Congress for more than a decade and classifies forced disappearance as a criminal offense, including it among heinous crimes, is an indispensable measure to break with the normalization of disappearances and to ensure the right to memory, truth, and justice.

In light of the significant growth in missing persons records in Brazil, especially in regions marked by high homicide rates and disputes among criminal organizations, it becomes urgent to acknowledge that this dynamic may be concealing an even more perverse form of criminality: execution followed by the concealment of the corpse.

8 https://record.r7.com/cidade-alerta/policia-encontra-cemiterio-clandestino-de-faccao-criminosa-no-mato-grosso-23112023/

9 https://noticias.r7.com/bahia/balanco-geral-ba/balanco-geral-especial/videos/exclusivo-descobertas-ossadas-em-cemiterio-clandestino-em-simoes-filho-ba-31032018/

10 https://g1.globo.com/rs/rio-grande-do-sul/noticia/2019/08/22/cemiterio-clandestino-em-porto-alegre-teria-cerca-de-100-corpos-enterrados-segundo-mp.ghtml

11 https://www.oliberal.com/policia/cemiterio-clandestino-e-encontrado-em-ananindeua-tres-corpos-1.397692

12 https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/nacional/sudeste/sp/cemiterio-clandestino-em-sao-paulo-pelo-menos-14-ossadas-sao-encontradas/

13 https://g1.globo.com/rj/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2025/07/14/policia-encontra-cemiterio-clandestino.ghtml

14 https://g1.globo.com/ce/ceara/noticia/2020/10/30/policia-investiga-cemiterio-clandestino-utilizado-por-faccao-criminosa-para-torturar-e-enterrar-rivais-em-fortaleza.ghtml

15 https://publicacoes.forumseguranca.org.br/items/a8cdbf9d-848d-46ca-ba35-28e840b9914d

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Marina Viana **Date: January 28, 2026**

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Crescimento dos desaparecimentos pode invisibilizar execuções e desaparecimentos forçados

Samira Bueno
Diretora-executiva do Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública (FBSP) e Doutora em Administração Pública e Governo pela FGV-SP


Beatriz Schroeder
Pesquisadora do Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública (FBSP) e Graduada em Administração Pública pela FGV-SP

Isabela Sobral
Supervisora do Núcleo de Dados do Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública e Mestre em Administração Pública e Governo pela FGV EAESP

A taxa de registros de desaparecimentos cresceu 4,9% no Brasil em 2024, totalizando 81.873 casos notificados às Polícias Civis de todo o país. Após uma queda acentuada nos anos de 2020 e 2021, período da pandemia de Covid-19, os registros voltaram a subir, atingindo, no último ano, o maior número desde 2018. Considerando as estatísticas recentes, **foram realizadas, em média, quatro notificações de desaparecimento por hora às autoridades policiais.**

A análise da variação por região entre 2018 e 2024 indica que as regiões Nordeste e Norte apresentaram os maiores crescimentos no período, de 41,4% e 31,0%, respectivamente. A região Sul também registrou aumento, de 6,2%, enquanto a Sudeste teve queda de 4,1% e a Centro-Oeste, de 13,5%.

GRÁFICO 26
Registros de Desaparecidos
Brasil e regiões, 2018-2024



	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Brasil	78.290	79.608	62.913	65.263	77.823	77.725	81.873
Norte	3.823	4.017	2.940	3.711	4.654	4.976	5.010
Nordeste	9.894	9.312	7.746	9.118	12.151	13.044	13.995
Centro-Oeste	9.899	9.832	7.136	6.583	9.375	8.882	8.567
Sudeste	36.636	36.828	30.144	30.146	34.792	33.285	35.145
Sul	18.038	19.619	14.947	15.705	16.851	17.538	19.156

Fonte: Secretarias Estaduais de Segurança Pública e/ou Defesa Social; Instituto de Segurança Pública/RJ (ISP); Polícia Civil do Distrito Federal; Polícia Civil do Estado de Roraima; Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE) – Projeções da População do Brasil e das Unidades da Federação; Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública.

O crescimento dos desaparecimentos no Brasil coincide com o período em que vimos um declínio significativo das mortes violentas intencionais, mas também um movimento de expansão de organizações criminosas como o PCC e o Comando Vermelho, que após os conflitos gerados pelo racha em anos anteriores, passaram a consolidar novos territórios em parceria com organizações criminosas locais. Chama atenção, portanto, que justamente os estados das regiões mais violentas do país hoje, apresentam também os maiores crescimentos no número de desaparecimentos no período analisado.

Os estados das regiões mais violentas do país hoje, apresentam também os maiores crescimentos no número de desaparecimentos no período analisado.

Em 2024, os estados que registraram os maiores aumentos nas taxas de desaparecimentos foram o Amapá (+27%), Sergipe (+19,9%) e Bahia (+14,8%). Esses mesmos estados também se destacaram, no mesmo período, pela redução nas mortes violentas intencionais. Trata-se, no entanto, de territórios marcados por intensas disputas entre organizações criminosas pelo controle do tráfico de drogas e por elevadas taxas de letalidade policial, o que levanta a hipótese de que parte da violência nesses contextos esteja sendo ocultada sob a forma de desaparecimentos.

Diante deste contexto, a análise da redução das mortes violentas intencionais precisa ser matizada pelo crescimento dos desaparecimentos, reconhecendo que as taxas de violência letal oficiais podem estar subestimadas pela prática de descarte de corpos de vítimas de execução.

Esse fenômeno, aliás, não é novidade no Brasil. Ao menos desde a ditadura militar, sabe-se da existência de cemitérios clandestinos para a desova de corpos. Em 1990, o país tomou conhecimento de um cemitério clandestino em São Paulo, criado por agentes do Estado durante o regime militar para o descarte dos restos mortais de vítimas da repressão e de esquadrões da morte formados por policiais. Na vala de Perus, como ficou conhecido, foram encontrados 1.049 sacos com ossadas[1].

Mesmo durante o período democrático, a prática de descartar corpos de pessoas executadas em valas clandestinas se manteve, embora as pesquisas sobre o tema sejam escassas. Esta prática foi incorporada principalmente por facções criminosas e milícias como forma de eliminar rivais sem chamar a atenção do Estado. Se não há corpo, não há crime e tampouco uma investigação.

A maioria dessas pessoas acaba figurando nas estatísticas de "desaparecidos", o que é considerado pelas polícias como um fato atípico, ou seja, não se trata de um crime. E como não constitui, a priori, um delito, esse tipo de ocorrência frequentemente não resul-

1 Vala de Perus: O cemitério clandestino onde a ditadura militar escondeu as ossadas de vítimas da repressão. Disponível em https://blogs.oglobo.globo.com/blog-do-acervo/post/vala-de-perus-descoberta-do-cemiterio-clandestino-onde-foram-enterradas-vitimas-da-ditadura.html

A tipificação jurídica de desaparecimento é bastante recente no Brasil. Foi apenas com a aprovação da lei 13.812, de 16 de março de 2019, que se estabeleceu o conceito jurídico para o desaparecimento de uma pessoa.

ta em abertura de inquérito policial, não possui materialidade e tampouco está sujeito à prescrição (Ferreira, 2013[2]).

A tipificação jurídica de desaparecimento é bastante recente no Brasil. Foi apenas com a aprovação da lei 13.812, de 16 de março de 2019, que se estabeleceu o conceito jurídico para o desaparecimento de uma pessoa: "todo ser humano cujo paradeiro é desconhecido, não importando a causa de seu desaparecimento, até que sua recuperação e identificação tenham sido confirmadas por vias físicas ou científicas".

Especialistas no tema, no entanto, argumentam que embora a lei represente um avanço, foi excessivamente vaga ao não diferenciar os tipos de desaparecimento. A promotora de justiça do Estado de São Paulo, Eliana Vendramini[3], defende em sua tese de doutorado que os desaparecimentos sejam diferenciados em três tipos: o desaparecimento voluntário, em que um indivíduo maior de idade se afasta voluntariamente de familiares e amigos; o desaparecimento involuntário, em que a pessoa se afasta ou é afastada por terceiros sem dispor de condições para sinalizar a ação, por ser incapaz ou ainda por acidentes e desastres naturais; e o desaparecimento forçado, em que a pessoa, seja ela capaz ou não, é afastada forçadamente por violência ou ameaça (Carneiro, 2022[4]; FBSP, 2023[5]).

Em dezembro de 2006 a Assembleia das Nações Unidas aprovou a Convenção Internacional para a Proteção de todas as pessoas contra o desaparecimento forçado, definido pelo direito internacional como crime contra a humanidade e cujo texto entrou em vigor em 2010. Embora o Brasil seja um dos países signatários da Convenção da ONU[6], assim como da Convenção Interamericana sobre o Desaparecimento Forçado de Pessoas[7], até o momento não conta com legislação para a tipificação do crime.

Dados do Mapa dos Desaparecidos no Brasil, produzido pelo Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, mostram que o perfil da pessoa desaparecida é marcado basicamente por homens (62,8%), adolescentes e jovens (53,5%), negros (54,3%), que desaparecem entre sexta e domingo – o mesmo perfil das vítimas de homicídio.

2 FERREIRA, Letícia Carvalho de Mesquita. De problema de família a problema social: notas etnográficas sobre o desaparecimento de pessoas no Brasil contemporâneo. Anuário Antropológico [online], v. 38, n. 1, 2013.

3 CARNEIRO, Eliana Faleiros Vendramini. Pessoas desaparecidas: uma análise crítica sobre a política criminal do Estado. 2022. 155 f. Tese (Doutorado em Direito) – Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, São Paulo, 2022. Disponível em: https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/30904. Acesso em: 23 abr. 2024.

4 CARNEIRO, Eliana Vendramini. Pessoas desaparecidas: uma análise crítica sobre a política criminal do Estado. Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo. Tese de Doutorado. São Paulo, 2022.

5 Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública. Mapa dos desaparecidos no Brasil. Disponível em: https://publicacoes.forumseguranca.org.br/server/api/core/bitstreams/91de3f95-67de-410a-9fb7-ce0227d248cb/content

6 Regulamentado através do Decreto 8.767, de 11 de maio de 2016. Disponível em: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2015-2018/2016/decreto/d8767.htm

7 Regulamentada através do Decreto 8.766, de 11 de maio de 2016. Disponível em https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2015-2018/2016/decreto/d8766.htm

Uma rápida busca no Google indica a existência de cemitérios clandestinos para a desova de corpos por organizações criminosas em cidades dos estados do Mato Grosso[8], Bahia[9], Rio Grande do Sul[10], Pará[11], São Paulo[12], Rio de Janeiro[13], Ceará[14], dentre outros. Não à toa, pesquisa recente do Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública e do Datafolha, intitulada Pesquisa de Vitimização e Percepção sobre Violência e Segurança Pública[15], apontou que, entre julho de 2023 e junho de 2024, 8% da população brasileira com 16 anos de idade ou mais, em média, declarou que tinha conhecimento da existência de "cemitérios clandestinos" nas cidades em que moravam. Isso equivalia, em 2024, a cerca de 14,2 milhões de pessoas. Ainda segundo a pesquisa, esse percentual é ainda mais significativo entre os moradores de capitais e entre moradores de municípios com mais de 500 mil habitantes, quando 17% dos residentes nessas localidades declararam conhecer cemitérios ilegais. Diante do crescimento expressivo dos registros de desaparecimentos no Brasil, especialmente em regiões marcadas por elevadas taxas de homicídio e por disputas de organizações criminosas, torna-se urgente reconhecer que essa dinâmica pode estar ocultando uma face ainda mais perversa da criminalidade: a execução seguida da ocultação de cadáver. A ausência de uma legislação específica que tipifique o desaparecimento forçado como crime dificulta o enfrentamento institucional ao problema, contribuindo para a invisibilização das vítimas e para o sofrimento das famílias que, sequer, tem a possibilidade de enfrentar o luto. Aprovar o PL 6.240/2013, que tramita há mais de uma década no Congresso Nacional e tipifica o crime de desaparecimento forçado, incluindo-o como crime hediondo, é medida indispensável para romper com a naturalização do desaparecimento e assegurar o direito à memória, à verdade e à justiça.

Diante do crescimento expressivo dos registros de desaparecimentos no Brasil, especialmente em regiões marcadas por elevadas taxas de homicídio e por disputas de organizações criminosas, torna-se urgente reconhecer que essa dinâmica pode estar ocultando uma face ainda mais perversa da criminalidade: a execução seguida da ocultação de cadáver.

8 https://record.r7.com/cidade-alerta/policia-encontra-cemiterio-clandestino-de-faccao-criminosa-no-mato-grosso-23112023/

9 https://noticias.r7.com/bahia/balanco-geral-ba/balanco-geral-especial/videos/exclusivo-descobertas-ossadas-em-cemiterio-clandestino-em-simoes-filho-ba-31032018/

10 https://g1.globo.com/rs/rio-grande-do-sul/noticia/2019/08/22/cemiterio-clandestino-em-porto-alegre-teria-cerca-de-100-corpos-enterrados-segundo-mp.ghtml

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13 https://g1.globo.com/rj/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2025/07/14/policia-encontra-cemiterio-clandestino.ghtml

14 https://g1.globo.com/ce/ceara/noticia/2020/10/30/policia-investiga-cemiterio-clandestino-utilizado-por-faccao-criminosa-para-torturar-e-enterrar-rivais-em-fortaleza.ghtml

15 https://publicacoes.forumseguranca.org.br/items/a8cdbf9d-848d-46ca-ba35-28e840b9914d

Exhibit 6



CEBRAP
centro brasileiro de análise e planejamento

GLOBAL INITIATIVE
AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

DEADLY DEMOCRACY

LETHAL POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN BRAZIL

Angela Alonso | Viviane Brito de Souza | Patricia Jimenez Rezende

José Alexandre Oliveira | Paulo Castro

JANUARY 2026



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On the evening of 14 March 2018, Marielle Franco, a city councillor in Rio de Janeiro, was leaving a political event when she was shot four times in the head.[1] Anderson Gomes, her driver, was fatally shot three times in the back, while Fernanda Chaves, her assistant, escaped.[2] This political assassination exemplifies a broader pattern. Although the case received international media coverage, it was not an exceptional event, but rather part of a worldwide phenomenon: the resolution of political conflicts through the elimination of opponents.

Democracies are facing mounting challenges, including the rise of far-right governments, increasing political polarization and the encroachment of organized crime into institutional politics. Lethal political violence is one such threat, yet despite its significance, it has been understudied, with most research focusing on high-profile cases rather than on systematic patterns. However, political assassinations represent one of the most extreme threats to democratic governance worldwide and thus understanding patterns of lethal political violence is essential.

Brazil can be regarded as a key case study for deeper analysis of this phenomenon. The country has a long history of political violence. Between the 1889 coup d'état that ended the empire and established the republic, and the 1964 coup that precipitated a military dictatorship, at least 20 political conflicts were resolved through the killing of opponents.[3] The two decades of dictatorship that followed (1964–1985) maintained this method of resolving political disputes.

Since the fall of the authoritarian regime in 1985, Brazil has consolidated formal democratic institutions, held regular elections and peacefully transferred power between rival parties. Yet institutional stability has coexisted with political violence: since 2017, three former presidents have been imprisoned, one has been impeached and there has been an attempted coup. These developments are part of a social configuration that drives a preference for violent solutions to political conflicts. Nevertheless, Brazil lacks rigorous and consolidated statistics on political assassinations.

This study provides the first comprehensive longitudinal survey of lethal political violence in Brazil, encompassing institutional political actors (politicians) and non-institutional political actors (activists) during two decades of intense political conflict. It documents 1 228 cases of lethal political violence: 760 assassinations, 358 attempted assassinations and 110 death threats,[4] spanning six governments – both left-wing and right-wing – from the inauguration of the first left-oriented president after the

end of dictatorship, in 2003, to the far-right coup attempt on 8 January 2023. This represents an annual average of 61.4 cases, or about 5.1 per month, an extraordinarily high rate for an established democracy.[5]

This research makes two contributions to understanding lethal political violence in Brazil. Analytically, it reveals patterns in regional distribution, perpetration styles, victim profiles and the most common locations for executions. It also highlights key subjects and political contexts in lethal political violence, primarily the political orientation of the government. Politically, it demonstrates that lethal political violence has become disturbingly routine in Brazil, a situation that demands an urgent policy response. The conclusion addresses implications for Brazilian democracy and offers policy recommendations.

Methodology

This study is based on three methodological assumptions. First, it includes institutional actors (politicians) and non-institutional ones (activists) as political actors, going beyond existing literature.[6] The research provides a comprehensive analysis on political assassinations in Brazil, encompassing politicians and activists at a national scale.

Second, in order to avoid the broad category of 'political violence', this study adopts the more specific term 'lethal political violence', referring to any successful or attempted assassination, or credible death threat, against politicians (including candidates, incumbents and recent office-holders) or activists involved in disputes over political positions, resources or state-managed opportunities. This definition encompasses three nested analytical categories, which become increasingly exclusive. These categories are not interchangeable and will be used throughout the report to specify the data considered at each stage of the analysis.

- 'Lethal political violence' is the broadest category and refers to all assassinations, attempted assassinations and death threats that were motivated by political reasons.
- 'Political lethality' is a middle-range category, referring to assassinations and attempted assassinations only. This is a more narrow category, excluding threats because these are inconsistently reported across regions and victim types, and not all credible threats result in actual attempts.
- 'Political assassination' is the narrowest category, corresponding to completed murders only (excluding threats and unsuccessful attempts).

Third, this report employs an adapted protest event analysis methodology to systematically identify and code lethal political violence events from newspaper sources. Primary data sources are two major Brazilian news outlets from the Globo media group, selected for their comprehensive national coverage: the digital platform G1 (2010–2023) and the digitized print newspaper *O Globo* (2003–2013).[7] Despite limitations inherent in newspaper-based event analysis, several factors support the reliability of the findings. The consistency of geographic and temporal patterns across several independent variables (victim type, conflict theme, method, location) suggests measurement error does not substantially bias core findings. The high concentration of cases being in frontier regions known for land conflicts (the North and the Central-West regions) aligns with what NGOs and social movements frequently report.

Key findings

- In the two decades between 2003 and 2023, politicians faced greater risk of lethal political violence (63.1% of cases) than activists did (35.7%), contradicting assumptions that institutional positions provide protection. Among office-holders, candidates and recent former officials, 470 were killed and 305 faced threats or assassination attempts.
- Political leaders were disproportionately targeted (61.9% of assassinations) but other political actors also faced considerable risk (36.3%). Local politicians (94.4%) were more at risk than state or federal officials.
- Men constituted 74% of victims of lethal political violence, reflecting the fact that Brazil's politicians are mostly male.
- The rate of lethal political violence per million voters was five times higher in the North region than in the South. Roraima, Mato Grosso do Sul and Pará were the deadliest states for activists. Alagoas was the deadliest state for politicians.
- Urban areas accounted for most cases overall (63.1%), but activists were predominantly killed in rural or forest areas (72%) and politicians more in cities (83.4%).
- Over half (54%) of assassinations occurred in visible public spaces, such as streets and roads.
- Firearms were used in 87.5% of cases, indicating professional execution rather than crimes of passion. This suggests an established market for political assassination services.
- Two conflict types dominated: institutional political disputes (399 cases) and land ownership conflicts (393 cases). Land conflicts primarily affect activists; institutional conflicts primarily affect politicians.
- Municipal election years were associated with elevated assassination rates for politicians, whereas federal election years appear to have had greater consequences for activists.
- Political crises (2013–2016) coincided with increased lethality, suggesting that institutional breakdown enables violent political conflict resolution.
- Right-wing federal governments (2016–2022) saw 56.1 assassinations per year, compared with 25.9 per year under left-wing federal governments (2003–2016, 2023).

Exhibit 7

Brazil

Events of 2022

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva won the presidential elections in October at a critical time for Brazil's democracy.

Throughout his term, former President Jair Bolsonaro harassed and insulted Supreme Court justices and journalists. He tried to undermine trust in the electoral system, making unproven claims of electoral fraud. Political violence rose during the campaign season.

Eighty-four percent of the 6,145 people police killed in 2021 were Black, the latest available data show.

Deforestation and human-caused fires ravaged the Amazon rainforest. Indigenous people, community leaders, and others who defended it suffered threats and attacks.

Democratic Rule

Lula won the October election by a narrow margin. Bolsonaro did not explicitly recognize defeat but allowed the transition, as of November.

Ahead of the October elections, then-President Bolsonaro insulted and tried to intimidate Supreme Court justices and repeated unproven claims of electoral fraud. He said it "appears" that election winners would be those "who have friends" in the Superior Electoral Court. He told dozens of ambassadors in July that Brazil's electoral system was unreliable. In September, he said that if he did not get 60 percent of the vote, "something wrong would have happened" at the electoral court.

In August, more than one million Brazilians, including prominent businesspeople, former Supreme Court justices, politicians, and artists, co-signed a manifesto defending democracy and the rule of law.

Political violence marred the electoral contest. Four people were killed during the electoral campaign season in circumstances suggesting they were targeted for their political views.

The Observatory of Political and Electoral Violence at Rio de Janeiro's Federal University compiled 426 cases of threats and violence against individuals engaged in politics—or their relatives—from January through September 2022. Women candidates, especially Black and trans women, were particularly targeted for threats and online harassment, civil society organizations reported.

The Superior Electoral Court prohibited carrying guns in a 100-meter area around polling places on and immediately before and after election day. The Supreme Court also temporarily suspended portions of presidential decrees that had made it easier to buy and carry guns.

Exhibit 8



© Photo by MIGUEL SCHINCARIOL/AFP via Getty Images

28 October 2022

Also available in Español,Français

Brazil: Authorities must guarantee respect for human rights in electoral process

Responding to media reports of escalating episodes of politically motivated violence and threats in the context of the elections in Brazil, Erika Guevara-Rosas, Americas director at Amnesty International, said:

“The news of escalating violence and threats against people exercising their civil and political rights is alarming. Among them, the exponential increase in reports of electoral harassment against working people who are under pressure to define or declare their vote, including threats of losing their jobs if they fail to do so, is very worrying.”

“Electoral intimidation has been particularly prominent in religious centers and it has flooded social media, where more and more people, including public figures, assault and persecute those who express an opinion different from their own.”

> “
> **The news of escalating violence and threats against people exercising their civil and political rights is alarming**
>
> **Erika Guevara-Rosas, Americas director at Amnesty International**

Exhibit 9

Invest in Freedom's Future. Support Freedom House.

Freedom House

FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2024

Brazil

FREE

72 /100

Political Rights	**30** /40
Civil Liberties	**42** /60

LAST YEAR'S SCORE & STATUS

72 /100 **Free**

A country or territory's Freedom in the World status depends on its aggregate Political Rights score, on a scale of 0–40, and its aggregate Civil Liberties score, on a scale of 0–60. See the methodology.



Overview

Brazil is a democracy that holds competitive elections, and the political arena, though polarized, is characterized by vibrant public debate. However, independent journalists and civil society activists risk harassment and violent attack, political violence is high, and the government has struggled to address crime and disproportionate violence against and economic exclusion of minorities. Corruption is endemic at top levels, and governmental transparency has decreased in recent years, contributing to widespread disillusionment among the public. Societal discrimination and violence against LGBT+ people remain serious problems.

Key Developments in 2023

- Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who narrowly defeated President Jair Bolsonaro in the October 2022 presidential runoff, was inaugurated on January 1.
- On January 8, thousands of Bolsonaro's supporters stormed the National Congress, Supreme Court, and presidential palace in Brasília, occupying government buildings and calling on the military to keep Bolsonaro in power. Police forces responded, using tear gas to disperse rioters and arresting as many as 2,000 people. Some 1,300 people were charged by October and 25 people were convicted as of November, according to Human Rights Watch (HRW).
- In May, police charged Ruben Dario da Silva Villar, who allegedly operated an illegal fishing enterprise, of ordering the murders of British journalist Dominic "Dom" Phillips and activist Bruno Araújo Pereira in 2022. Police also accused a fisherman of involvement in the murders.
- Also in June, the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) barred Bolsonaro from holding office until 2030, saying that his 2022 comments on the country's electronic voting mechanism constituted an abuse of power.

Political Rights

A. Electoral Process

A1 0-4 pts

B3 0-4 pts

Are the people's political choices free from domination by forces that are external to the political sphere, or by political forces that employ extrapolitical means?	**2** / 4

Powerful business interests undermine democratic accountability by facilitating or encouraging corruption among elected officials. Criminal groups have carried out attacks against political candidates and representatives, especially women and LGBT+ politicians. In September 2023, cabinet minister Anielle Franco requested police protection after receiving death threats; Anielle is the sister of Marielle Franco, a city councilor who was murdered in 2018.

Brazilian voters face high levels of political violence, which increased by 400 percent between 2018 and 2022 according to a survey conducted by two nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In November 2022, Agência Pública recorded 15 murders and 23 attempted murders over that year's election period. A study conducted by NGOs Justiça Global and Terra de Direitos recorded 247 cases of political violence in the same period. In an August 2022 survey, ahead of the legislative elections and the presidential runoff, almost 70 percent of Brazilian respondents feared threats and harassment for their political views. Militias and other criminal organizations—which may exercise significant control over campaigning and other political activity within their territories—have been blamed for a rise in violence in recent years.

The January 2023 riots in Brasília were mainly conducted by ordinary citizens, but some security officers and officials were accused of either supporting the riots, displaying inaction as they occurred, or otherwise backing former president Bolsonaro openly. President Lula accused elements of the country's intelligence agency, police, and military of either mounting a lax response or of complicity in the riots. Federal District security chief Anderson Torres, who had been dismissed by Governor Ibaneis Rocha soon after the riots, was arrested over allegations of colluding with rioters in mid-January. In August 2023, *Folha de São Paulo* reported that PRF chief Vasques allegedly "requested votes for Bolsonaro online" during the October 2022 runoff, as his agency inspected buses carrying voters.

B4 0-4 pts

Exhibit 10

InSight Crime

Brazil Brazil

Brazil Profile

by *InSight Crime*
24 Nov 2023



Brazil, Latin America's largest economy, faces a new era of violence and crime.

As well as being Latin America's largest country by population, economy, and area, Brazil is also home to some of the region's most powerful criminal organizations.

The country shares porous borders with every nation in South America except Ecuador and Chile, and its many major ports make it a key hub for global cocaine trafficking. It is also a major drug consumer.

Brazil's two largest gangs, the **First Capital Command** (Primeiro Comando da Capital – PCC) and the **Red Command** (Comando Vermelho – CV), have used prisons as bases of operations, becoming increasingly involved in international drug trafficking as well as arms and contraband trafficking.

Militias, largely comprised of current and former police officers, are another source of violent crime, extorting whole neighborhoods and committing extrajudicial killings.

Manage consent

The Red Command has used its strong presence in its home turf of Rio de Janeiro to gain major influence in prisons across the country. It also has a foothold inside Bolivia, from where it sources much of its cocaine. However, it faces competition in Rio from two gangs that formed as splinter groups: the **Pure Third Command** (Terceiro Comando Puro) and **Amigos dos Amigos**.

The **Family of the North** (Familia do Norte – FDN) has long been Brazil's third-largest criminal group, with a strong presence in northern Brazil but not matching the nationwide presence of the PCC and Red Command. In early 2020, the FDN came under **sustained attack** by the Red Command in Manaus, the biggest city in the Amazon. While the fallout of this war has not been fully measured, it is likely the FDN has been left greatly weakened.

Bullet in the Face (Bala na Cara – BNC)is a prominent criminal group headquartered in Brazil's southernmost state of Rio Grande do Sul, with a presence in southern Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Argentina.

Escritório do Crime and the Justice League (Liga da Justiça) are among the largest and most powerful militia groups in Rio de Janeiro, controlling many aspects of life in western parts of the city. Their criminal portfolio extends to drug trafficking, extortion and other organized crime activities. In the last couple of years, these militia groups have begun setting aside their traditional rivalries with the Red Command and morphing into hybrid criminal structures.

Brazil also is home to sophisticated **corruption networks**, many of which have organized around politics and the construction industry.

Additionally, foreign crime groups – primarily Nigerian networks and the Italian 'Ndrangheta — have a presence in Brazil.

Security Forces

Brazil's military is the largest in Latin America. Its primary role is enforcing border control, but the country's large size, combined with the remoteness of its border regions and a lack of capacity on the part of neighboring nations, makes this difficult.

Brazilian police are divided into federal and state forces, which include military and civilian forces. The Federal Police are responsible for investigating international and state crimes. The Military Police are responsible for enforcing public order within the states. The Civilian Police manages criminal investigations on the state level. The Federal Highway Police have also begun to take on crime-fighting functions.

Brazilian police forces have a reputation for abusiveness, lack of accountability, and **low levels** of public trust. They frequently face accusations of extrajudicial killings, and innocent bystanders are often caught in the crossfire of shootouts between security forces and criminals.

Corruption also **poses a challenge** for many Brazilian security institutions. Police and soldiers often work with organized crime groups, or form their own criminal organizations, as in the case of the militias.

Judicial System

Brazil's judicial system has federal and state courts, as well as courts specialized in military, labor-related, and electoral matters. The country's highest court is the Supreme Federal Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal).

Most courts are **slow, corrupt, and generally ineffective**. Pretrial detention is common for criminal suspects, contributing to problems in the prison system.

Prisons

Brazil has one of the world's largest prison populations, divided into federal and state systems. The facilities are often overcrowded, under-resourced, and controlled by one or more gangs. They are frequently the scene of **prisoner abuse** and bloody battles between criminal groups, which use them as bases of operations.

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Exhibit 11

InSight Crime's 2025 Homicide Round-Up

insightcrime.org/news/insight-crime-2025-homicide-round-up

Christopher Newton March 11, 2026

Despite the widespread use of states of emergency, the increasingly militarized response to organized crime, and the growth of criminal economies, the murder rate in 2025 across Latin America and the Caribbean declined.

While murders in the region dropped last year as a whole, a number of countries, including Ecuador and Haiti, saw homicide rates hit new highs, spurred by criminal dynamics.

In total, at least 108,838 people were murdered in Latin America and the Caribbean during 2025, putting the median homicide rate at around 17.6 per 100,000 people, over 5% lower than in 2024.

InSight Crime analyzes the organized crime dynamics behind the violence in every country in the region. All homicide rates are victims per 100,000 people, unless otherwise stated.

** Data for these countries is either preliminary, unreliable, incomplete, or measures homicides in a way that it is not possible to compare homicide rates with other countries. See the country's section in the text and the "Notes and Methodology" section for more information.*

Brazil (-8.5%)

Brazil's homicide rate dropped from 21 per 100,000 in 2024 to 19.2 in 2025, continuing a downward trend that started in 2019. The decrease means 3,615 fewer people were murdered in Brazil last year compared to 2024, and the data includes homicides, femicides, police killings, robbery followed by murder, and manslaughter.

Despite the high levels of crime, the drop can be partially explained by the consistent movement of criminality towards technology and cybercrime, which involves less physical violence while still causing significant harm to its victims.

Some states did see increases in violence: Acre, Rondônia, Roraima, and Rio Grande do Norte in the north of Brazil; Rio de Janeiro in the southeast; and the Federal District in the center-west. Northern states reported high levels of violence due to fighting between Brazil's two biggest gangs, the First Capital Command (Primeiro Comando da Capital – PCC) and the Red Command (Comando Vermelho – CV), and local gangs. Meanwhile, the Red Command frequently engaged in shootouts with other gangs and the police in its home base state, Rio de Janeiro.

Police killings increased by 4.5% in Brazil in 2025. In October, police killed over 100 people in Brazil's most lethal operation to date in Rio de Janeiro. The country is known for having one of the most violent police forces in the region, with only 17% of residents in Rio's *favelas* saying they trusted the military police, according to the latest survey by Brazilian research institute *Data Favela*, which specializes in collecting data on Brazil's most vulnerable neighborhoods.

Brazil has also registered a record number of disappearances since 2015, suggesting the drop in its homicide rate may be due at least in part to undetected murders.



Exhibit 12

Less than 40% of homicides in Brazil are solved, according to research.

cnnbrasil.com.br/nacional/brasil/menos-de-40-dos-homicidios-no-brasil-sao-resolvidos-diz-pesquisa

Helena Barra, Thiago Félix October 7, 2025



A survey by the Sou da Paz Institute indicates that only 36% of murders are solved; Bahia registers the worst rate (13%).

A survey indicated that only 36% of homicides that occurred in the country in 2023 were solved by the end of 2024. The study, named "Where Impunity Lives", was released by the Sou da Paz Institute this Monday (6).

Based on data requested from the Public Prosecutor's Offices and Courts of Justice of all Brazilian states, the institute indicates that, since 2015, **the percentage of solved cases has remained around 35%, peaking in 2018 at 44%.**

“The historical series of the indicator expresses the low priority that state institutions give to solving homicides. It is urgent that the Ministry of Justice and Public Security create an official indicator and use this metric to identify good practices, locations with greater difficulties, and to induce public policies at the federal and state levels, focused on improving police investigations,” says Carolina Ricardo, executive director of the Sou da Paz Institute.

The research also addresses how the low efficiency in providing answers reflects on the Brazilian prison system. According to the National Penal Information System, only 13% of the 670,792 inmates are imprisoned for homicide.

According to the data collected, the vast majority of arrests are for property crimes and drug-related offenses, which are usually more likely to result in arrests made in the act.

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Exhibit 13

Political violence is widespread throughout the country, and the victims include professional politicians and activists.

jornal.usp.br/atualidades/a-violencia-politica-esta-distribuida-no-pais-inteiro-e-as-vitimas-sao-politicos-profissionais-e-ativistas

Redação

11 de março de 2026



Political violence is usually planned, and the vast majority of crimes committed involve firearms – Photo: senivpetro/Freepik

Like any other form of violence, political violence also leaves a trail of blood, tears, and suffering. In two decades, Brazil recorded 760 deaths from this form of violence, according to a study by USP and the Brazilian Center for Analysis and Planning (Cebrap), in a survey that took into account violence committed against professional politicians – including incumbents, candidates, and those who left office or their candidacy up to five years before the crime – and activists (union members, participants in social movements, various organizations, and civil associations). We are talking about an annual average of 61.4 cases, which represents a total of 5.1 per month, data that, in itself, faces difficulties in being collected, since some of them do not even have judicial processes. "When the bodies disappear, there are no processes," says Professor Angela Alonso, from the Department of Sociology at the Faculty of Philosophy, Letters and Human Sciences (FFLCH), a researcher at Cebrap and responsible for the project.

Faced with this difficulty in collecting data, the decision was made to conduct a survey of cases published or reported in the mainstream press, covering a period of 20 years (from the arrival of the first left-wing government to power after the end of the dictatorship until the attempted coup d'état of January 8th). According to Angela, this is an unprecedented survey, because those already conducted in the country are restricted to certain regions and focused on professional politicians, while data relating to activists were practically nonexistent. "This is the first study in Brazil to simultaneously survey attempted assassinations, threats, and assassinations of activists and professional politicians," says the professor and researcher, who points out differences in the threats faced by "those who engage in politics within and those who engage in politics outside the institution." Activists, who belong to the latter group, are at high risk in certain regions of the country, while local politicians are very vulnerable and therefore frequent victims of political violence. “Professional politicians are also targets of lethal political violence – 63.1% of cases involve politicians, the overwhelming majority, practically two-thirds of this universe; while episodes of violence against activists account for about 36%.”



Angela Alonso, professor of sociology at FFLCH USP – Photo: LinkedIn

Regional differences

The research also identified regional differences in relation to political violence, with the states of Roraima and Mato Grosso leading the statistics for political crimes compared to the other states in the Federation. On the other hand, there are cities that stand out significantly from the average, such as Lajeado do Bugre, in Rio Grande do Sul, or Santo Expedito, in the state of São Paulo. Angela also reveals that political violence is more concentrated in urban areas than in rural areas, contrary to what one might think, "but it is distributed throughout the entire country," she emphasizes. "It is present in all states, throughout all these 20 years that the study covered."

Another important point to highlight is that political violence is generally planned, and the vast majority – almost 90% of the crimes committed – involved firearms. “It’s not a crime that can be immediately characterized as revenge, as is the case with crimes of direct violence. What we found most often was this situation of shooting, and especially execution-style shooting, shooting in the head, in the heart, from a distance, by people who have no direct relationship with the victim” – which leaves room to assume that these crimes are committed by professionals, the so-called hired gunmen. “What is striking, besides the fact that they are executions in most cases, is that many of them happen in broad daylight, in the middle of the city, inside public buildings; this is not unusual.” It is also less common for these types of crimes to occur in large metropolises – the tendency is for them to concentrate in small towns, confined, therefore, to the circuit of local politics.

Exhibit 14

Political Violence Is Surging Ahead of Brazil's Election on Sunday

time.com/6218560/political-violence-brazil-election

Vera Bergengruen

30 de setembro de 2022



As Brazil enters the final stretch of its campaign season, a spate of politically motivated death threats, physical attacks, and killings across the country are raising fears of more widespread violence after the Oct. 2 election.

Former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, known as "Lula," has widened his lead over right-wing incumbent Jair Bolsonaro in recent polls in the most polarized election since the end of Brazil's military dictatorship in 1985. While violence against political candidates is not unprecedented in Brazilian elections—Bolsonaro himself was nearly killed after being stabbed by a mentally ill man during the 2018 campaign—officials and analysts say this election season has seen an unusual uptick in attacks between supporters and violent threats against public officials, ministers, and poll workers.

Cases of politically motivated violence against candidates, officials and government workers have spiked 23% since 2020, according to the Observatory of Political and Electoral Violence in Brazil. There have been at least 214 such cases this year, a number that includes 45 alleged homicides, according to their analysis.

Da Silva, a left-wing former union leader who served two terms as president from 2003 to 2010, has been appearing under tight security and wears a bulletproof vest to public events. His scheduled campaign kickoff event at an engine factory in August had to be cancelled due to security concerns raised by federal police. Bolsonaro, a right-wing former army captain, has also been wearing a bulletproof vest. Unlike in his 2018 campaign, he has been limiting his interactions with supporters in the crowd at his rallies, who are patted down before they can approach the stage.

Exhibit 15

A member of the Workers' Party (PT) stabbed a friend to death during a political argument; see other cases.

▪▪▪ **bbc.com**/portuguese/brasil-63152266

BBC News Brasil October 5, 2022



Credit,Getty Images

Photo caption,The presidential election has been marked by cases of political violence.

A supporter of former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT) confessed to killing a supporter of President Jair Bolsonaro (PL) in Itanhaém, on the coast of São Paulo, after a political argument. The case was confirmed by the São Paulo Civil Police to BBC News Brasil.

"A 42-year-old man was arrested in the act after killing another man, aged 59, on Tuesday afternoon (September 4th), on Av. Santo André, in Itapel, Itanhaém, on the coast of São Paulo," the police said in a statement.

"Military police were called to a report of an assault and, at the scene, determined that the victim had been stabbed after a political argument. The ambulance service (SAMU) was called and confirmed the death. A forensic examination of the scene was requested, and the knife was seized, in addition to a forensic medical examination of the victim. The case was registered as homicide at the DIG (Specialized Investigations Division) in Itanhaém."

According to the newspaper Folha de S.Paulo, electrician Luiz Antonio Ferreira da Silva stated in his testimony that the fight began after fashion designer José Roberto Gomes Mendes asserted that "all members of the Workers' Party are thieves." At the time of the incident, the two were having lunch at the house where they lived together.

Silva reportedly responded, "You're eating the food that the PT member bought," according to Folha. He stated that he was attacked with a knife and that he used the same weapon to fight back during a physical altercation.

According to the G1 news portal, the police report indicates that "the motives and number of stab wounds rule out, for now, the possibility of Silva claiming self-defense."

This is the fifth assassination, possibly politically motivated, to occur in these elections.

Exhibit 16

Bolsonaro supporter stabbed in political fight and dies in SC

oglobo.globo.com/politica/eleicoes-2022/noticia/2022/09/bolsonarista-e-esfaqueado-em-briga-politica-e-morre-em-sc.ghtml

26 de setembro de 2022

Hildor Henker, 34, died after being stabbed in a bar fight in the Fundo Canoas neighborhood of Rio do Sul, in the Itajaí Valley. According to the Military Police, the crime occurred around 4:30 pm this Saturday due to political motivations and old family disputes. Hildor declared himself a supporter of Jair Bolsonaro (PL) on social media. He was attended to by the Fire Department and taken to the Rio do Sul Regional Hospital, where he underwent surgery, but did not survive and died this Sunday.

The perpetrator's identity has not been revealed. According to the Military Police, he is 58 years old, has a criminal record for assault and defamation, and is currently a fugitive. After the crime, he informed his wife of what he had done and fled. According to witness accounts, the victim and the assailant were drinking together when, at some point, they began to argue. The perpetrator slapped Hildor in the face and took him outside the establishment. The stab wound severed the femoral artery. The case is being investigated by the Civil Police of the State of Santa Catarina.

In a statement, the agency reported that all investigations are underway. According to Detective Juliano Tumitan, no line of investigation has been ruled out regarding the motive for the crime at this time.

Relatives and friends mourned the death and the political motivation behind the case. The wake and funeral took place on Monday.

Hildor had been a supervisor for three years at the National Institute for the Eradication of Educational and Social Deprivation (INECES). The organization issued a statement of condolence: "INECES expresses its solidarity with Hildor's colleagues, friends, and family during this time of grief."

Exhibit 17

Six out of ten fear aggression due to their political affiliation.

tribunademinas.com.br/noticias/politica/26-07-2026/violencia-politica.html

Bernardo Marchiori 26 de julho de 2026

Six out of ten people fear being physically assaulted because of their political or partisan choices. This is according to the research **"Fear of Crime and the 2026 Elections: The Triggers of Insecurity** ," conducted by the Datafolha Institute and commissioned by the Brazilian Forum on Public Security. The percentage, 59.6% of Brazilians aged 16 or older, indicates a decrease compared to 2022, when it reached 68% of the population. Even so, political violence could make the 2026 elections even more tense than the last ones, according to Ludmila Ribeiro, professor and researcher at UFMG.

The numbers vary when the research differentiates by sex, race, and class. Women (65.5%) feel more fear of political aggression than men (53.1%); the black population (61.4%) also fears violence more than the white population (56.7%); finally, the fear is more pronounced in economic classes D and E (64.2%), followed by C (58.9%) and then A and B (54.9%).

Beyond fear, the research provided absolute numbers regarding physical assaults motivated by political reasons: 2.2% of the population, representing a projection of 3.6 million people, stated that they had been physically assaulted because of their political or partisan choice in the last year. In turn, men (2.9%) are more victimized than women (1.5%); Black people (2.6%) report more political assaults than white people (1.4%); and the highest victimization occurs in social classes D/E (3.5%), followed by classes A/B (2.2%) and C (1.4%).

The newspaper A Tribuna requested data from the Regional Electoral Court of Minas Gerais (TRE-MG) regarding cases of political violence registered in Minas Gerais and, more specifically, in Juiz de Fora, year by year since 2023. However, the body responded that it does not possess this data, since there is a limitation on extracting reports from the electronic Judicial Process system, "which is an impediment to investigating any processes on the subject."

Political violence: what is it?

Political violence is defined as the use or threat of force, but it can also involve coercion and intimidation, as explained by Ludmila Ribeiro, professor and researcher at UFMG. "It can be physical, psychological, symbolic, and institutional violence – with the aim of controlling certain political rights."

She points out that the last national election, in 2022, was marked by political violence, but the 2018 election already brought discussions, including people using force over issues related to candidate preferences. "I remember a very famous case, of a prison guard who was celebrating his birthday and the theme was the Workers' Party (PT). A municipal guard saw this, went home, got his gun and killed him. It's a very emblematic case of political violence, with the use of physical force."

The previous election period was also marked by institutional political violence, according to Ludmila. The concept refers, above all, to when public institutions use their power of intimidation to persecute political opponents or restrict fundamental rights.

> “One example was the operations of the Federal Highway Police to prevent voters from reaching the polls and exercising their right to vote. There was also institutional violence, not only exercised by public bureaucracies, but by private ones as well. Employers coercing employees to vote for a particular candidate. In fact, in the building where I lived, the building manager called all the condominium employees together and practically said that if they didn't vote for candidate X, they didn't even need to show up the next day. I saw this and intervened.”

Voting is essential.

The researcher emphasizes that voting is part of political rights and is essential. “Brazil is one of the great consolidated democracies in the world, even from the point of view of something very strong in political theory, which is that each person counts as one vote. In the United States, for example, you don't have that: there are quotas in some states, where one person is worth more than one vote and vice versa,” she points out. Furthermore, Ludmila adds that the expectation for the 2026 elections is for “something a little more dramatic than what has been seen in the last ones.”

For her, this reveals how institutionalized political division is in Brazilian society and the use of violence to prevent others from exercising their rights, which includes different types of strategies: threats, moral harassment, physical violence, and even institutional violence. “Political analysts will say: when the campaign starts, people become much more afraid. 'If I leave home dressed in green and yellow or red, will I be attacked?' So, there is a great deal of fear.”

More than 3% suffered physical assault in neighborhoods with gangs.

Another factor impacting the numbers of political violence in Brazil is organized crime. In neighborhoods with a presence of factions or militias, victimization increases: 3.3% of people say they have been physically assaulted because of their political or partisan choice, while the national average is 2.2%. The research estimates that 68.7 million Brazilians aged 16 or older recognize the presence of organized groups linked to drug trafficking or militias in their neighborhood.

Furthermore, regarding the restriction of freedom and self-censorship, the study by the Brazilian Forum on Public Security points out that the presence of organized criminal groups has a direct impact on the exercise of citizenship: 59.5% of people living in these territories avoid talking about politics out of fear.

“Organized crime is spreading much more rapidly. Several experts, including international ones, have pointed out that it only becomes institutionalized when there is state corruption. In other words, taking over territory, subjecting people to illegal rules, and coercing certain individuals into committing actions

only happens if there is state corruption," emphasizes Ludmila Ribeiro.

From the arrival of counterfeit goods to a more sensitive dimension, she emphasizes that there is a shift in perspective regarding the advancement of factions in different locations – including the greater institutionalization of territorial control by organized groups. "Thus, there is a direct interest in those who occupy the State continuing to occupy it, in order to continue their illegal business."

> "The more vulnerabilities a person has (whether racial, economic, or even living in neighborhoods where people themselves say there are gangs or militias), the greater the fear of suffering political violence. In the end, it's as if we're returning to the era of political bosses, to the logic of coerced voting."

Exposure to social media intensifies insecurity.

The report also highlights how the fear of experiencing violence is mediated by exposure and presence on social media. "From the moment our lives become much more digitized, they relate to an environment that is part of our daily interactions. The more exposed we are to social media, the greater the feeling of insecurity."

Although there is no data to confirm this, Ludmila proposes the logic of a "cognitive loop" as a hypothesis. "I see people suffering violence because of their political positions. Because of this, I am more afraid of suffering the same, which absurdly increases the feeling of insecurity. This is also common in other crimes, such as violence against women," she exemplifies.

What to do in case of political violence

"It's not just about being able to create measures that effectively protect individuals, but also about disseminating them so that people begin to feel a little safer," says Ludmila Ribeiro regarding the priority of reducing cases of political violence across the country.

The first thing to do as a victim is the same as in any crime situation: especially if there are threats, assaults, or other crimes involved, call the Military Police at 190 or report the violence to a police station. "It's very important to keep messages, emails, audio recordings, screenshots, call logs—all this evidence. This helps a lot from a procedural standpoint, especially when there is a greater restriction on the exercise of political rights."

Citizens can also file a complaint with the Ombudsman of the TRE-MG (Regional Electoral Court of Minas Gerais) . The report will be forwarded to the Public Prosecutor's Office for investigation. If the situation of political violence is specifically in the workplace, the complaint should be directed to the Labor Public Prosecutor's Office, by phone at 0800-702-3838 or through their website .

Gathering evidence is important.

As explained by the Regional Prosecutor's Office of the 6th Region of the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office, anyone who suffers political violence should gather as much evidence as possible and file a formal complaint, preferably with the Federal Police or the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office (MPF), either online or in person. Once the complaint is filed, the person receives a protocol number and can track its progress on the website .

Besides the victim themselves, any other person, political party, or institution can report the case to the Public Prosecutor's Office. They simply need to gather evidence to help prove the violence, such as newspaper articles, emails, videos, images, audio recordings, and witness statements, among other things.

“Finally, it’s crucial to bring political violence to the forefront, not just during elections. It’s also important not to normalize political violence and to constantly try to bring it to the public eye, because this allows us to record and start compiling statistics, enabling us to take a stand and change this reality somewhat – and even think about more effective prevention and intervention actions,” concludes Professor Ludmila.

Exhibit 18

Third edition of the Political and Electoral Violence survey points to record number of cases in 2024

global.org.br/blog/terceira-edicao-da-pesquisa-violencia-politica-e-eleitoral-aponta-recorde-de-casos-em-2024

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In the last two years, the country has accounted for almost half of the cases registered since 2016.

The final data from the third edition of the Political and Electoral Violence in Brazil survey, developed by the organizations Justiça Global and Terra de Direitos, launched this Monday (16), presents a record number of cases of political violence in the country between November 1, 2022 and October 27, 2024: there were 714 cases of violence directed at candidates or politicians in office , the highest number since the beginning of the historical series.

The research consolidates 2024 as the year with the highest number of occurrences since 2016, the year in which the research had its first edition. In the 2018 presidential elections, one person was a victim of political violence every 8 days. In 2022, political violence victimized 3 people every 2 days. By 2024, there are almost 2 victims of political violence per day.

In total, this year there were 558 cases of political violence, including 27 murders, 129 attacks, 224 threats, 71 physical assaults, 81 offenses, 16 criminal charges, and 10 invasions. Threats are the most frequent type of violence, representing almost 40% of the total cases for the year.

Data referring to the year 2024:

- Pre-election period (January 1st to August 15th) : 152 cases
- Election period up to the first round (August 16 to October 6) : 374 cases
- Between the 1st and 2nd rounds (October 7th to 27th) : 32 cases

> “ **The high level of political violence in 2024 is worrying, but not surprising, as it confirms a trend already identified in previous research, which is the increase in this type of violence, especially during municipal election periods. This increase can be attributed to the normalization of this violence, since the State's responses to this scenario are still insufficient** ,” says Gisele Barbieri, Political Advocacy Coordinator at Terra de Direitos.

She also points out that new issues need to be addressed when it comes to political and electoral violence today. "There are also new factors identified in this period, such as the unregulated proliferation of fake news, threats and insults in virtual environments, especially against women, and the actions of organized crime, whether in financing campaigns or intimidating political figures."

Glaucia Marinho, executive director of Justiça Global, highlights that the data from the third edition of the research points to a very worrying issue that needs to be observed carefully: the normalization of cases of political violence through the omission of effective actions that could address the problem and improve this scenario.

> **“What also draws our attention is the high number of threats and attacks. Political violence once again proves to be a scourge on our democracy, and it is extremely important that actions be implemented at the municipal, state, and federal levels to effectively address this problem that affects left-wing, center, and right-wing parties in all regions of the country** ,” he emphasized.

Political violence on the rise.

- Since the beginning of the historical series, 1,583 cases of political violence have been recorded in Brazil;
- In this third edition of the survey, which covers the period from November 1, 2022 to October 27, 2024, 714 cases of political violence were recorded, the highest number since the beginning of the historical series;
- Over the past two years analyzed by the 3rd edition of the survey, the most recurrent form of violence was threats. There were 36 recorded murders, 311 threats, 146 attempted murders, 95 offenses, 86 physical assaults, 28 criminal charges, and 12 home invasions.
- Municipal elections in the historical series: in 2016, 46 cases were registered. This number grew to 214 cases in 2020 and, in 2024, there was a jump to 558 cases. This represents an increase of 344 cases in the four years between 2020 and 2024, or an increase of approximately 2.6 times compared to 2020. Compared to 2016, the increase is even more impressive, with the number of cases in 2024 being more than 12 times higher;
- The increase in cases in 2024 represents the continuation of a trend observed in years of municipal elections, periods in which, since the beginning of the historical series, we have recorded an increase in cases of extreme violence, mainly due to local disputes;
- Despite the escalation of violence, the data reveals a variable pattern, with periods of sharp increase followed by decreases or stabilization. This variation is linked to election years: when there are disputes, the number of cases tends to increase, followed by a decrease in subsequent years;
- In 2024, within the analyzed period, the average frequency of reported cases is approximately one case every 15 hours.

Geographic distribution of the data

The research records data on political violence in all Brazilian states between November 1, 2022, and October 27, 2024. The highest numbers were observed in:

- São Paulo: 108 cases;

- Rio de Janeiro: 69 cases;
- Bahia: 57 cases;
- Minas Gerais: 49 cases.

Violence against women

Women, both cisgender and transgender, were the targets of 274 incidents, representing 38.4% of the total cases. The most common form of violence was threats (135 cases), followed by 19 reports of rape threats. Online attacks account for approximately 40% of incidents against women, and 73.5% of offenses during the pre-election period occurred in parliamentary or campaign settings, with 80% of the aggressors being cisgender men, also members of parliament.

Measures to combat political violence

The organizations suggest concrete actions to combat and prevent political violence:

- **Legislative branch** : programs to combat political violence in legislative bodies, improvement of laws, and enhanced security for teams and collective mandates;
- **TSE** : campaigns against hate speech, racism and gender violence, as well as monitoring and combating fake news;
- **Electoral and justice system** : support for victims, structured channels for reporting, and expedited case trials;
- **Political parties:** creation of internal complaint bodies and promotion of permanent campaigns against political and electoral violence.

The study highlights the urgent need for coordination between civil society, democratic institutions, and political parties to curb the rise in violence and strengthen democracy in Brazil.

Jose Carlos Pereira dos Santos	**File No. A 240-169-089**
Jaqueline das Neves Dantas Maia	**File No. A 240-169-090**
Jose Carlos Pereira dos Santos Junior	**File No. A 240-169-091**

Proof of Service

On this day, I, Otavio Haverroth Silva, served a copy of the following documents:

RESPONDENTS' COUNTRY CONDITIONS IN SUPPORT OF ASYLUM AND WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL

To the following:

Office Location:	**Mailing Address:**
Office of the Principal Legal Advisor Department of Homeland Security 100 Montgomery Street, Suite 800 San Francisco, CA 94104	US Immigration and Customs Enforcement US Department of Homeland Security Office of the Principal Legal Advisor P.O. Box 26449 San Francisco, CA 94126-644

by:

☑ Through the EOIR Courts and Appeals System (ECAS), which will automatically send service notification to both parties that a new document has been filed.



Otavio Silva (Bar N. 343486)
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 90487
San Diego, CA 92169
Counsel for Respondent